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INTRODUCTION 
The task of this thesis is laid out definitely and unequivo-
cally. Even though Gabriel Marcel began his philosophizing within 
the ra.nks of idealism, this thesis hopes to point out that the 
ultimate conclusions of M. Marcel's philosophy are free from their 
idealist beginnings. 
The best method by which to demonstrate this is an historical 
progression. In the first chapter of the thesis the idealism in-
herent in the themes of Marcel's earlier works is accented. The 
following chapters discuss realist themes as they appear more and 
more frequently in his writings. In this way the gradual develop-
~ent of realism in Marcel's doctrine will appear. External influ-
ences which helped to shape his thought, such as the circumstances 
and various crises in his life, w1ll be added as an aid to under-
stand better his later realism. 
This historical progression and development of fundamental 
themes has been ohosen not only for its aptness to illustrate the 
fundamental points of this thesis, but also beoause it 1s essen-
tially the same method employed by Maroel. From a given starting 
point he rises by dialectic and reflection to a higher vantage 
ground where the initial point of departure is further enriched. 
Taking this enriched starting point the ascent begins again. This 
starting point is concrete participation, the concreteness of 
v 
v1 
ind1vidual existence; the progress1on is through intentionality, 
that phenomenon of consciousness wh1ch led him to the reality of 
the nother," as revealed 1n a dialectic of experience. l 
The procedure followed in this thesis is essentially the same. 
From a concrete time in h1story, about 1910, Marcelts doctrine 
progresses historically until a certain definite doctrinal founda-
tion is achieved. Starting from this, another historical progres-
sion, or dialectical ascent, begins. Finally, when the primary 
doctrines eventually have been evolved, the progression stops and 
the doctrines are considered and judged 1n themselves. 
However, a work of this kind cannot but be replete with diffi-
culties, not the least of which is Marcel's lack of systematic 
reflect1on. This anti-systematization is not something which hap-
pened to Marcel either by chance or by the lack of system and or-
der in his own mind, but rather by design. As he tells us of him-
self: "But it is evident that in that I automatically renounce 
" 
" . 
setting up what until now has been called a system; for no system-
atization is possible without constant recourse to the notion of 
lA word of justification may be demanded here for this use of 
spatial meta.phors to describe Marcel '8 evolution of thought. ~~ar­
eel himselt employs such spatial terms. He conceives of his evolv-
ing doctrine as a rising out of the confines of idealism into the 
freedom of realism. His doctrine itself is concerned with the in-
d~ .. vidual personts rising from the piecemeal of existential experi-
ence into the unity of being. Thus two of the fundamental realist 
doctrines are termed "immersed participatlontl and ftemerged partici. 
pation. " 
}< .... or Marcel fS use of the term "dialectic" please see Chapter 
II, pp. 19-20. 
vii 
totali ty • "2 
This anti-systematization reveals itself in a dia~ narration 
~d a collection of reflections whioh 1s uniquely Gabriel Marcel's. 
ponsequently, it is difficult, first, to separate different ele-
ments in his doctrine, and second, to find how various elements 
combine and interrelate. This task, however, is not impossible. 
Kurt Reinhardt has pointed out the possibility of finding here an 
inherent continuity. "The strictly philosophic works of Gabriel 
Maroel are few in number. The presentation of his ideas is infor-
mal and unsystematic. Although outwardly these books seem little 
~ore than collections of diary fragments and philosophic essays, 
there is found in them a coherence and continuity of thought which 
add up to a consistently integrated philosophy of life.") 
Since Marcel wrote in his native French, translations into 
English must be employed in this thesis. Consequently, the follow-
• ing procedure will be used. Where the,' published standard English 
translation appears adequate it will be used and 80 noted in the 
footnote. However, when for one reason or another, this author 
finds the standard translation unsatisfactory, or when English 
translations of the particular wo.rk are, or were not avaliable at 
tho til'ne of this writing, the transla. tions will be supplied by 
20abriel Marcel, Metaphysical ,TournaI, trans. Bernard Wall 
(Chieago, 1952), p. xiI. 
3Kurt Reinhardt, The Existentialist Revolt (Milwaukee, 1952), 
p. 20. 
viii 
this a.u thor. 
The purpose of this thesis is to establish that the doctrine 
of Gabriel Marcel is realist in intention and content. If this 
much can be successfully achieved, the ta.sk w ill have been worth-
while, and perhaps a. propaedeutic will have been presented for a 
future study of Marcel's meta.physics. 
CHAPTER I 
F..ARLY SOURCES F'OR THE THOUGHT OF' GABRIEL MARCEL 
Gabriel Maroel has termed his dootrine a philosophy of the 
spirit. l What is a philosophy of the spirit in the sense in whioh 
!{:aroel uses the term? Firs t of all philosophy for ~~Tarcel is the 
re-creation of man. He is not conoerned with man in general, the 
on or the Man of Heidegger, but with the individual, personal, sub. 
- - . 
jective J.!. -1- l'homme authentigue. Marcel asks himself: tlQue 
auis ... je?" ItWhat am 11 Why am I here1,,2 A well known Jeauit 
I~ri ter says of him: nOf Marcel'a philosophical writing one can 
say that a great part of it is devoted to revealing to man what he 
is and what his spiritual activities, his truly human activities, 
imply. ft 3 'l'hls, then, is the meanlng::of Marcel fa philosophy of the 
.. 
" . 
spirit, the philosophy of the individual man--living, daring, free. 
IGabriel Marcel, The Mystery 2! Beins, trana. G. S. Fraser 
(London, 1951), II, 150:-
21t should be noted from the outset that 7"arce1 considers his 
philosophizing as a personal ordeal. To find truth, each individ-
ual man must undertake the ordeal, as Marcel himself did. Conse-
quently, he very often makes use of the first personal pronoun. 
In order to :keep as C10S6 to ~'arcel 's thought and expression as 
possible, except when ambiguity or confusion would arise, the same 
use of this personal pronoun will be retained in this thesis. 
3F. C. Copleston, S.J., "Exist.ent1allsm, t1 Ph:tlosophy, J](111 
(January 1948), 22. 
1 
2 
MEANING A1:ID WORTH OF MARCEL'S PHILOSOPHY 
Marcel's philosophy, with its emphasis on the real man, has 
special worth for our own modern world. It is the individual 
choice of each man to realize his own au.thenticity, his own desti-
ny. He must think his own thoughts and live his own ideas in oppo-
sition to the depersonalizing world as flFa.rcel describes it in a 
later article. "Now the function, incredibly baneful, of the press 
radio and cinema, is just that of a steam roller, crushing this o-
riginal reality- (the authentic man) flat and leaving in its place 
a collection of ideas and images, superL~po8ed one upon another 
and bereft of all roots in the actual being of the subject."4 
Over and above the full life that Lijarcel points out for every 
;man, his thought has a special worth for Catholics. Born in an 
age of agnosticism in no way inferior to our own, he rose through a 
long and painful askesis into the lif,"ht of Ciltholicisrn. It is in 
, 
" . 
this very rise to the faith that M. Bernard sees his greatest 
worth. "And in that journey, that slow but sure ascent toward the 
fa! th (the Catholic faith) !:.2. !.!.llii, wi thout !. doubt, in ~ entire 
contemporary existentialist movement, ~ uniqueness E.! Yaroelian 
metaphysics.u.s 
40abrlel Marcel, flThe ~'alady of Our Age: A Fanaticized Con-
sciousness," trans. A. Gordon Smith, The Dublin Review, 224 (Third 
Ruarter, 1950), 5-6. 
5~Uohel Bernard, La ahiloso~hie religieua8 de Gabriel Maroel (Radz, 1952), p. 9: "Et' nne co te marche, cotte montde lente, 
maia sUr vera la foi (i la foi catholique), ~ trouvona 
-3 
In the early years of his philosophical speculation Marcel's 
~hilosophy of the spiri twas d om1r~a ted by a fear of real! ty, of 
the world itself; and thus his first thought is determinedly ideal-
lstic. Hmvever, an activo instinct tor realis~! left him ill at 
je8.se in the ideal is ts t C8.;"1p. 'lis acquuintances from the re~ lis ts ' 
rbastions not only led him to the Catholic faith but also p;ave h~.m 
the answers to many of his philosophical queries. 
LIl"E AND EDUC;A.TiION 
The first question that must be answered is: \~hy ~f:arcel's 
early attz-action for idealism? The answer appears in his early 
life and education. Gabriel Marcel was born on December 7 .. 1889. 
His father was a baptized Catholic. Under the influence of such 
writers as Talne, Snencer, and Renan, he stood forth as a militant 
J 
agnostic in an aee of agnosticism. His life was one of strict 
:intellectual and a.esthetic discipline. , .. 
Gabriel's m)ther died when he was very young, but he credits 
her wlth a strong influence on himself.. tfBut it must be remembered 
"hnt my whole childhood and probably my whole life have boen over-
shadowed hy the death of my mother, 9. death which wa.s co~pletely 
sudden and which shook the existence of all of us. I have few 
visual memorles of her; but she has l~emalned present and mysteri-
~nconteBtablement l'or18inalite de la metaphyslque marcelier...ne 
l!.ans !,'ensemble s!.1!-mouvement exiS"tentiallste contemporaln." 
4 
Dusly with me throughout my life. ,,6 May not Marcel '8 sense of 
presenoe, of the silent communication betv/een beings, maybe even 
his interest in the metapsychical be attributed to this presenoe of 
his mother? 
In place of the mother he lost so young, Gabriel was reared 
by an aunt. This admirable lady, though of Jewish stock, was edu-
cated as a Protestant. In oontradistinotion to the aesthetic ag-
Inosticism.of his father, hera was an ethical agnosticism. She was 
a pessimist at heart and nhad an aoute and implacable sense of the 
jabsurdity of existence. n7 
Since Gabriel was an only child, without a mother, his child-
[hood was anything but oarefree. He was solioitously shtelded and 
Ibound in by the striotest rigidity. It was, perhaps, as he tells 
~s, in this atmosphere of confinement that his attraotion for the 
~bstractions of idealism first took root. 
When I reoall my ohildhood, 80 carefully watched'over 
and 1n some way so oonfined, with its atmosphere of moral 
soruples and of hygienio preoautions, loan see the reason 
why abstraotion was the keynote of my early philosophioal 
thoughts and why I was almost oontemptuously hostile towards 
empiricism. This attitude seems to me the direot reflection 
of that horror of dirt and germs which had been bred in me 
trom. my earliest years upwards. Experience, as it is mostly 
conceived by philosophers, was to me impure and profoundly 
8.uspect. True, there was something in this also of the need 
to hit back at the praotical world which at overy step proved 
to me my ineptitude and my awkwardness: on the plane of Ideas 
60abrlel Marcel, The Philosophy 2! Existence, trans. Manya 
Harari (New York, 19~9r;-p. 83. 
7~., p. 81. 
5 
alone was I able to create a shelter from these wounding con-
taots of everyday life. Thus to philosophize meant for me at 
first to transoend. 5 
Not too many years later, however, a contrary repugnance for 
abstraction arose in Marcel. He attributes his growing dislike 
for the spirit of abstraction to the aloofness of his early profes-
sors at the lycee. He speaks of this remoteness in harsh terms. 
I think my aversion to it must have been at the root of my 
growing horror of the spirit of abstraction, of which the 
school was a kind of absurd palladium. ~Yhat, indeed, could 
have been more abstract than our relationship with our masters 
or even with one another, not to speak of the notions which 
were inculcated in our minds? There was hardly anything in 
all this that could touch our sensibility or fulfill our most 
pressing inward needs. For my own part, if my taste for 
letters was not destroyed in spite of the encquragement of my 
rather's prodigious culture, it was no thanks to the sohool, 
which disgusted me for years with
9
almost every one of the 
writers whom we studied in class. 
Further influence on Marcel was exerted by his love for Music 
~hich he knew and understood. Musical analogies abound 1n h1s 
~r1t1ng8. He feels that the insolubil!~ which he experienced 1n 
• 
" his own family life might conceivably be solved on some higher 
IPlanewhere harmony between dIVergencies, as exeMp11fied in music, 
is poss1 ble • 
It was, however, in the dialogue of the drama that Marcel 
found his most apt means of expression. Unlike other philosopher-
dramatIsts who for the most part oonsider their plays as vehicles 
for their philosophy, Marcel wrote his plays before he wrote any-
8 ~., p. 77. 
9~., p. 84. 
6 
thing strictly phllosoptucal. In his plays he also found an out-
let for his emotions and suppressed agitations of soul. 
Perhaps all this will be clearer if I say that from my 
earliest years I was haunted by the theatre, which attracted 
me less as a spectacle than as a privileged form of expression. 
l~aturally, my predilection for dialogue was not clear to me at 
the time, but I was less fond of stories or descriptions than 
of that form of art which conceals itself, as it were, behind 
the subjects whom it confronts. As I have said elsewhere, I 
experienced very early a kind of intoxication, not only in 
conceiving oharacters distinct from myself but in identifying 
myself with them sufficiently to beoome their mouthpiece. It 
is difficult to say how I came to have this bent; one reason 
was doubtless my father's innate sense of the theatre and his 
incomparable way of reading plays. But I have always thought 
that the ir.1aginary characters with whom I held silent conver-
sations replaced for me the ~5others and sisters whom I so 
cruelly missed in real life. 
But most important, from his drama Marcel further enlarged his 
sense of the concrete, of the real. Collins sees Marcel's preoccu-
pation with detail and human situation as a direct outgrowth of his 
drama. "And as for Gabriel Marcel, his long apprenticeship as a 
practising playwright has taught him 'the value of building up one's 
• 
" . 
total conception of a situation from the closely observed details 
of human 11fe and action."ll 
'1'his preocoupation with the concrete was magnified by the pro .. 
found joy he felt in travel. lit one time Marcel's father was!<,~ln-
Ister Plenipotentiary at Stockholm; later :"arcel travelled to 
Italy, Bavarla, and BolgilW. Even as a child, then, he felt a 
LXI 
lO~., pp. 78-79. 
llJames Collins "The Appeal of Existentialism," Commonweal 
(October 8, 1954), 7. 
• 
7 
~trong desire to discover qnd explore new tratls~ 
Marcel's first experience with higher education oceured at 
the Sorbonne where his first teacher was Leon B~lnschvicg, the 
idealist. Also, at that time, Bergson was teaching at the College 
de France. The doctrinal influence of these two men will be dis-
cussed below. Sufficient to note now, that due to the influence of 
these two philosophers, Maroel first realized the possibIlIty of a 
synthesis between idealism and the concrete. 
In August, 1914. he became head of the Information Service of 
the Red Cross during the Great War. His 111 health prevented h1m 
from engaging in aotive duty. It was while 1n this position that 
be recognized the dissimilarity between the ooncrete misery of the 
individuals with whom his often sad duty brought him in contaot, 
and the abstract manner in which, on record file oards, this indi-
I 
viduality lost all significance. Perhaps this experience started 
him on the road to existential thinking. 
But probably one of the most profound experl~n~es of his life 
occured on his conversion to Catholicism, March 23, 1929. A few 
days after attending a lecture at which he met FranQois Mauriac, 
the noted author called him and asked the penetrating question: 
"Why are you not one of us?" This was the invitation to act which 
Marcel had been seeking. Through the insights of his own thinking 
he had long been tending toward Catholicism. He now began his 
arduous road to the faith. Doubts and difficulties beset him. 
His entire early life revolted against such a step. Finally, on 
• 
I"""'" 
8 
~arch 23, the struggle was brought to a close.12 Marcel records 
the event simply in his diary without adornment calculated to ob-
scure the signif1canoe of the event for himself. "March 23 - I 
was baptized this morning with an innermost affection for which I 
hardly dared hope: not a feeling of elation, but rather of peace, 
contentment, of hope, of faith."l) 
It is clear, then, that Marcel's sheltered and rigorous child-
~ood instilled in him an attraction for abstraction which would 
eventuate in his acceptance, partial at least, of the tenets of 
idealism. But his gradual contact with reality and his revolt 
against the abstractions of his early childhood, his school life, 
his predisposition for the drama. his deli~~t in discovery, would 
instill 1n him both an attract10n for the concrete situation of 
the individual, as well as a desire to develop and attempt to solve 
what appeared to h1m at f1rst as insolub1lia. 
,-
INFLUENCE OF IDEALISTS 
With the experiences of Marcel's life as a background. atten-
t10n mus t now be turned to those particular ph1los ophers. whose 
works oame to his notice and d1d so much to shape the direction of 
his thought. The list of only the idealists reads like a cats.-
12rnformation from a personal interview of the author with 
Rev. Roger Troisfontaines, S.J. 
130abriel Marcel, Etre et avoir (Paris, 1935), p. 30: "23 
mars - J'ai ate baptise;-c8 mitrn, dans una disposition Intarieure 
que j'oaais a peine esperer: aucune exaltation, mais un sentiment 
~ • " -., ....... 11 II 
-9 
ogue. Consequently, these will be mentioned only briefly and will 
~e alluded to again as particular parallels present themselves 1n 
~he body of the thea Is. 
Rene Descartes (1596-1650) is most .fpequently mentioned in 
r.efutation in the writings of Mapcel. 'Perhaps, thour',:h p1."'obably 
without Marcel betne aware of the fact, it was Descartes who set 
the "problem" for him, the first necossary step 1n philosophizing. 
This problem was the relationship between body and mind. The body-
rt1nd Dl"oblem wa.s Marcel's persistent dilemma. 
1n Immanuel Kant (1724-1801t.) he found the problem stated as 
the dU'=lllty of the abstract and the ooncrete. Throur:h a suocessor 
of Kant's, Priedrich Schelling (1775-1854), Marcel first saw an 
opportunity to make use of his own maturing doctrine. In the 
toachings of his professor at the Sorbonne, Leon Brunschvicg (1869-
1944), Marcel discovered the possibility ~f obJectiviz1ng thought 
and thus distinguishing it from the th~nker. The possIbIlIty of 
synthes1zing the apparently irreducible elements of the abstract 
and the concrete, the subjeot and the object in thought, ca.me to 
him on readIng Georg Hegel (1770-1831). Thus through Hegel he saw 
the diohotomy of mind and matter somehow resolved. One of Hegel's 
followers, Francis Herbert Bradley (1846-1924), to whom Marcel 
often acknowledges a great debt, divided experience into appear-
ance and reality, and therefore the subject-object problem took on 
another aspect. The possibility of communication between beings ir. 
the world of reality was possibly suggested to him by Nil1iam 
10 
Ernest Hocking (1873- ), with whose works Marcel was well ac-
~uainted. This communication would become the world of intersub-
jectivity in a later stage of Marcel's dootrine. 
But perhaps the greatest influenoe on Marcel came from the 
writings of the American idea.list, Josiah Royce (1855-1916). In 
1917 and 1918 Marcel wrote a series of artioles for the Revue ~ 
M~taphysique ~ ~ Morale which Vlere published in 1945 in book fom: 
as La m~ta.ehysigu!!! ~ Royce. Ma.ny parallels can be found tn the 
~octr~.nes of the two men, and it was in great part due to his dis-
satisfaction with Royce that Harcel would finally arrive at r0alism. 
A1thourh frequent reference w1l1 be made later to the doctrines of 
Royce, a general understanding of his system is necessary here if 
these references are to have meaning. 
Royce was primarily a religious thinker, and his first proble~ 
was, "How is error possible? How can evil be?" as stated in his 
"-
firs t book, The Religious Aspee ts 2!. PhilosoP}:ll, published" in 1885. 
'l'he response to this question would lead him into absolute idealism. 
Royce next came to the problem of the rele. tionship between the 
Absolute and the individual in his Absolute 'World of Ideas. His 
fInal solution appeared in a book published 1n 1913 entitled, !.h! 
Problem 2! ChristianltI. Here he looks upon all reality as an ab-
solute community of interpretation. The individual makes himself 
and his own world by choioe, but "n and through the Absolute. The 
question na.turally arises: What is the rule by which this choice 
must be ma.de? Royce first answers, love; but pushing this notion 
11 
rurther, he finally holds it to be what is best tor the community. 
iConsequently, the individual has an obliga.tion to interpret himself 
and his world since without this interpretation there would be no 
community. Therefore, the oommunity becomes one of interpretation. 
Since the community requires an Absolute Interp~eter, it is a com-
munity of Absolute Interpretation. Ultimately reality is explaineo 
by the Absolute eternally interpreting Himself to Himself through 
individuals. This individual creating himself in the actuality of 
the Absolute is the individual moral self. Social consoiousness is 
the individual's moral concern. This "will-to-interpret," in the 
sense of being loyal to the community, saves Royce from solipsism, 
and his whole system takes on a social significance. 
Bome of Royce's ideas tind a fulfilment in Marcel's mature 
doctrine which Royce himselt had not conoeived. Many of these 
notio.nB will be mentioned as they 1'i t into Marcel's development. 
INFLUENCE OF REALISTS 
Many influences, then, were leading Marcel from idealism to 
realism. the problem of the abstract and the conorete, of body and 
mind, his own inna.te real1st sense, and his realist acquaintances 
and their writings. One of these realists was Henri Bergson (1859 
1941), who was teaching in Paris in Marcel's time. Bernard even 
maintains that Marcel remained somewhat faithful to the spirit of 
Bergson. Suoh an interpretation of Marcel's works could posslbil 
be verified. Bergson no doubt did give 1,4aroel much help in satis-
-12 
tying the need of the concrete he telt in himselt. 14 This is es-
pecially olear from Bergson's mistrust of abstraction, his notiona 
of body and materialization, and the nature of presence. 
MARCEL AND EXISTENTIALISM 
The primacy of experience in Marcelts doctrine, and his ab-
~orption with the concrete, oocasioned the placing of his doctrine 
~mong that of contemporary existentialists. The speoific reasons 
for this position among the existentialists will appear if the 
~eneral formulation of existentialism, as outlined by Father Roger 
Troisrontaines, S. J ., is considered. 'l'roistontaines points out 
that, in general, there are three fundamental doctrines in all of 
the existentialists. First, they a re philosophers ot the subjec-
tive; that is, they are concerned, not with man in general, the sa 
in French, but with the ~, the personal,8ubjeotive man. A dis-
tinction must be made between subjeotiv.e and subjectivist.' One 
concerned with the personal experience of an individual man is sub-
Jective. He is not, however, necessarily a subjectivist, that is, 
one entirely involved in his own thought and, at leaRt by reduction 
a solipsist. The seoond note common to the existentialists is 
freedom. Man !!lust be free to create l1is own being. to create in 
some way his OMl existence. Reality demands from the individual a 
~ersonal commitment dependent upon this freedom. The third charac-
14 Barnard. p. 42. 
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teristic is that of desoriptivo phenomenology aftAr the method of 
Husserl. Consequently, truth for the existentialists is not a \ml-
versal scientific truth. Suoh truth would neoessarily be found in 
a universal judgment whioh would apply only to man-in-general--ga. 
Consequently, existentialists do not concern themselves with a uni-
versal rn.etaphysios. Rather they attempt to desoribe, phenomenolog-
leally, the individual situation of an individual person--1!--ln 
the world. Fram this situation in the Vlorld they induce not only 
the freedom of the individual, but also his own individual duties. 
~arcel fits into this general pioture. His own do~trine be-
gins with a desoription of individual expHrience. This experienoe 
Is twotold: ot existence and of being. This existence and being, 
1n whioh the subjeot is engaged, de:"'lands a personal commitment and 
se1f-creativity.15 Throughout the writings of Marcel the notions 
ot existence and being are oonfused and tend to overlap. Father 
Troistontaines, in his book ~ l'exist9noe i Ifetre. the mbst ex-
tensive work done on Maroel's doctrine, has attempted to express 
Marcel's mind regarding the relationship of existence and being 
rather than what the aotual use ot the terms, in a specific pa8sag~, 
miGht seem to imply. Yilien Marcel saw the book, he was very ploased 
and felt thnt Father Trolstontaines had been justified in interpret-
ing mants lite as a rising freelY' and creatively out of existence 
into being. Thus we can be sure that Marcel conceived the distinc-
15Informatlon from a lecture given by Rev. Roger Troisfon-
taines, S.J., at Loyola University, Chicago, July 12, 1957. 
tlon as Ii1ather Trolst'ontaines has expressod it.16 This distinctior. 
will be oonsidered at length in Chapters III and V. 
Marcel's existentialism has further been called "Christian 
existentialism," since it emphasizes essentially Christian themes: 
man's freedom, consecration, hope, fidelity, faith, love. This is 
to distinguish Marcel's from the atheistic existentialism of Jean 
Paul Sartre (1905- ). Sartre bases his doctrine on the frustra-
t10n of the ind1vIdual's attempting to project his atre Eour soi 
into the etre ~ soi. Since this can never be accomplished, and 
yet man continues to so strive, life 1s a meaningless desperation. 
S~nce, at the time Marcel began writing, Sartre could not even read, 
it is clear that Sartre could have had little positive influence 
on Marcel. 
Furthermore, Maroe1 was the first of the existentialists to 
publish with the exoeption of Soren Kierkeguard (1813-185.5). In 
., 
1923 Marcel's Existence .!! objectlvit~ .. appea.red and has be~n con-
sidered the charter of existentIalism. It should be noted that 
this book was published before the cornprehensi ve study of Martin 
Heidegger (1889- ), §.!.!!!. ~~. HOY/ever, Marcel fa book ~ 
Against E!.!!. Society (!!'homrne contre !'humain, 1952), did develop 
1'[hat is essentially lieidegger's theme of !2!£!. Man. At the time of 
Exis tonce II obJ ecti vi te [Parcel ha.d rea.d nei ther rCarl .Jaspers 
(1883- ) nor Klerkcgaa.rd, but in later books ~·;arcel frequently 
l6FroM a personal interview of the author with Fr. Tro18fon-
talnes. 
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refers to these two men. In Maroel's own opinion, of the existen-
tialists it was Jaspers who has most influenoed his own thought. 
He makes explioit reference to this in the prefaoe to the Philoso-
~ 2! Existenoe, and again at length in Q£ refus ! l'invoeation. 
It i8 only in later works that Marcel comments on the youngest of 
the existentialist troupe, the Algerian, Albert Camus (1913- ). 
Marcel feels that Camus' theory of the absurd is not sufficiently 
developed, and reproaches him for an extremely simple attitude.11 
Today Marcel does not wish to be known as an existentialist. 
In 1945 he aocepted the name of Christian existentialist. Three 
years later, however, due to the opprobrium attaohed to the name 
beoause of Bartre, Marcel repudiated it. He felt his dootrine 
could be better termed neo-Soeratism. "One of my pupils once asked 
me whether my philosophy could not be oonsidered to be a kind of 
neo-Socratism. The expression struck me very much, and on reflec-
tion I wonder whether the description would not be the lea~t in-
exact that oould be applied to me. The term existentialism brought 
with it the worst of misunderstandings, and now I consider I have 
repudiated it onoe and for all. n18 
Consequently, though many of Marcel's themes are those of 
existentialism and partioularly Christian existentialism, he him-
11Gabriel Maroel! ~ A9ainst ~ Societl, trans. G. S. 
~raser (Chicago, 1952), p. 8 • 
18Maroel, Vetaphysioal Journal, p. xiii. 
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self prefers not to be numberad among this [',roup. Mnreover, he is 
more than jus tifled in this demand if Jacques Bar! tain t s defini tior: 
of oxistentia.lism as tml-'lylng t1destruction of the intellect," IIliq .. 
~idation of the basIc realities and radical claims of the parson 
and subjactivity n19 be generally accepted 0.3 true. 
MARCIt."L AND THOMISM 
One last consideration must be presented before ber,innIn~ the 
dIrect study of ~'arcel fS doctrine if this thlS'sls Is to h(~ Intolli-
f;lble. In spite of t..1-]e fact that "'~B.rcel uses ·t;er~s slrd~.ar to or 
the same as those e!'1ployed by Thomists, )\t1urcel does tlOt attach the 
same meanings to those terms as the Thomists. As a rosult of his 
conversion )\~arcel attempted to think wi thin the confines of Thomis-
tic thought .• but wi thout success,20 possibly because of the brand 
of ThOP!lstlc authors he read, such as the Rev. Rer~inald Garrigou-
~ . . j.l.Jagranpe, O.P., and Jacques Ma.ritain. ,.Marcel's terminology, then, 
~~ould not be interpreted Thomistically. He admIts, however, a 
~eslre to express true doctrines--Thomistic partlcularly--in newer 
am' fresher terms. "But I believe that there Is 8.180 a danger in 
thinking that phl1osophlcal-theolorical ideas such as we find in 
St. Thomas Aquinas, for instance (not doctrine, for that is another 
19Jaeques Maritain, Existence and the Existent, trans. Lewis 
Galantiere {New York, 1949}, p. 127:-----
20prom a personal interview of the author wi th Ii'r. Ror,er 
trrolsfontalnes, s .. r. 
~--------------~ 
I 
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storY)1 are suitable for evcr:rbody in our day, just as the~r stand. 
-T.rJrlinod to S:l'T thu t they are sui too. to 9 0'1(." TI11nds but not to ! an . '" _ 
all; &ne! tho Pl'oroundly true in tui tions expressed in the Thomis t 
formulae would gain greatly in force and intelligibility if they 
could be presented in frosh terrrJs; in words that were newer, sim-
pIer, more movinG, a.nd more closely in tune with our own experiencE 
ar.d (i f you will forei ve the word) our own ,)rdeal." 21 r.1~m.y ex-pI ie .. 
it parallols with Thom!slil wlll appea.r in the thf}sis. It is posfd-
ble to conclude that Ma.r-col o""ten enour;h doen exnross f:i Tho;,istic 
doctrin.e in noVi terms. 
Some of thone terms, however, :nay be ambiguous. Such terms 
~U"e ex:is tonce, beine, esool1ce, b:')dy, soul, and freedom. l<:Xis tenne 
for Harnel means a personal experience of hiMself and the reality 
around him through body, 110 indicated by f(~e1ing and sensation. 
Beine. is tho experience of fullness, an upsurge of joy, a compel-
1 in .. ~ desire to 1'1 se above one's nero 0;18 tence, and to srl8.t-e in 
the pleni tude of !!.h!! ll. f. person!.! when he is mos t him.self. 
Essence takes on a double meaning. 0ne 1s the notion of abstracted 
essence .. dlsjoinec. from reality, merely a. product of tT].ought. The 
other pertains to nature or freedom. In this sense Marcel rerers 
to an individual's power by whioh he cbooses !2. be, as he under-
stands the term, or to deny his being. Thus the essence of man is 
21Gabriel Maroe1, Being !!lSl Having, trans. Katherine F'arrer 
(Boston" 1951), pp. 200-201. 
,...... 
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22 ~18 freedom. Another term is body. For Marcel body is not so 
~uch that part of man distinct from his soul, but rather the body 
as informed by the principle of life, the soul, and therefore part 
of the selt. Later he will see this body as objeotifiable for 
thought and consequently ~ !h!.!ill. The las t notion is th''I.t of 
soul. By this Marcel means the elementary and unrealized sharing 
-
of a oerson ~;n being. Thus one 'a soul 1s his being, and oonsequent .. 
11 by free oreativity he can increase his being, that is, his 
soul. 
However, if one expects deductive reasonin~, absolute univer-
sal conclusions, syllogisms in Marcel, he will be disaPPOinted. 
We must take what he has--the description of facts of experience. 
If these are to be verified, they must be verified in the con-
science and mind of each individual man. In spite of this essen-
tially non-Thomistic approaoh, Maroel is worth our attention; for 
as Etienne Gilson has said: "In his writing man speaks directly to 
man; it will always have readers beoause he will never cease to 
make new friends. n23 
22Marcel, Etre at avoir, p. 150. The term freedom also de-
mands claritieat1On.-However, sinoe its meaning can only be grasp .. 
ed in the light ot his mature doctrine, the meaning of freedom will 
be disoussed in Chapter V, pp. 136-37 of this thesis. 
23Etienne Gilson~ Existentialisme Chretien: Gabriel Marcell 
(Paris, 1947), p. 2: En son oeuvre, i'homme parle direetement a 
l'homme: el1e aura toujours des leoteurs parce qu'il na oessara jamais de se faire de nouveaux s.mis." 
CHAPTER II 
IDEALISTS AND EARLY IDEALISM 
DIALECTICAL METHOD 
If the works of Gabriel Marcel are to be understood, the 
reader must first consider his method of procedure. This might be 
palled the dialectical method, which Marcel developed slmultane-
pusly with his doctrines. The fundamental meanin~ of dialectic is 
~he resolution of opposites. Marcel conceives his doctrine as the 
~esolution of the opposites presented to an individual in his dis-
~onnected and disunified existential experiences. These experi-
~nces are analyzed as they II. re x-evealed to consciousness. Marcel 
nsists he is concel"ned not wi th the 8 tates of consciousness but 
Ioathel" with the implioit content of tho\l.ght, as found in a 'certain 
~umber of type-situations, similar to the "being-in-the-world" of 
~eidegger and the "being-in-a-situation" of Jaspers. l As a person 
~radually resolves these experienoes in his life, he comes into the 
nif'ied experience of being. In like manner, as Marcel resolves 
~he apparent opposites he fInds in his early acquaintance with 
IGabriel flarcel, «Appartenance et disponibili te," Revue g, t!ill-
oire !! ~ Philosophie Religieuses, XIX (1939 No. 1)_ 5S. 
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idealism, he comes into a unifYing ~ealist conception of existence 
and being. 
His earliest notion of dialeotic is redolent of Kant. Kant 
begins by asking himself under what conditions knowledge is possi-
ble. ~~rcel starts with the hypothesis that a certain phenomenon 
is real. He then analyzes the conditions presupposed for that sit 
uation to be real. By a phenomenological dialectic he ascends to 
the meaning of the content in that experience. 2 Once having grasp 
ed the meaning of this content he descends again to the o~iginal 
experience which, having been enrjched by thought, is now more 
meaningful. It is the oontention of this thesis that by systemati 
cally analyzing this pattern of dialectic as it historically devel 
oped, oonclusions will gradually emerge. T.he pattern Is one of be 
ginning, analysis or breakup, and return to the original data, now 
further enriohed and unified or resolved as a result of the dialec 
tical progression. 
" . 
BEING AS TIDUGHT.THniKIIiG 
Marcel's first dialectical ascent p~ogressed from 1912 to 19l1 • 
In this period Marcel will deny the realist intuition of being, anc 
affirm that thought is the only valid starting point for thought 
itself. Finally, he w111 identify being and thought and define 
2Gabriel Marcel, Journal metaphysique, 3rd. ed. (Paris, 1945) 
p. 266. For further e.xplana~ions or~ifareel fS use of the term dia-
lectic, please see Journal metaphysique, PP. 12, 32-33, 139, 261. 
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being as thought in its deepest intimacy; not thought-as-thought, 
but thought-as-thinking. 
The firs t article to be considered is one enti tle\i: "Les con-
ditions dialectiques de la philosophie de l'intuition," which he 
wrote in 1912 in the Revue f!!. MetaPhlsigue !!! 9.!. ?~orale. At this 
early period the first problem he faces is the relationship betwee 
being and the idea. of being. He first rejects a negative dialecti 
which denies everything but the first intuition of being and which 
pretends to begin philosophy from what is left as the initial dat • 
This process of denial would be similar to ftOckham's r;.1zor." Mar .... 
cel maintains that such a nftgative dialectic presupposes, first. 
that there is a distinction between being and the idea of being. 
'!'his distinction, he maintains, has not been demonstrated as va.lid 
Second, such a negative dialectic also presup:)oses a limited intol 
lect which cannot attain being itself, but only some prinary intui-
tion of it. • Marcel then shows tha.t even this intuition itsolf rous 
be rejected since such an 1ntuition presupposes sone pure thought 
by whieh the intu1tion can be established or nt least judged. But 
pure thought cannot begin until first the intuition has been estab 
11sbed. As long, tLerefore, as an intuition presupposes some 
thought, it 1s not an intu1tion, and a realist system founded on i 
begins in a contradiction. He then concludes that, since all real 
lsm depends on some such type of intuition, realism is 1mpossible. 
'rJierefore, if philosophy is to be established, some other 
means must be used by which being becomes an object or an end and 
22 
II 'l'i n tl not a f:- va • This means is a positive dialeotio whose "given" 
must not be an intuition of being but thought itself, the only!. 
Driori faot possible for thought. He oonoludes, then, that if be-
~ 
~ng is to be attained by thought, it must somehow be inoluded in 
~ought since thought can only know itself. 
~leretore, thought is the only possible ~ priori fact for 
~hOUght 1 teelf. This conclusion becomes the starting point for 
Marcel's seoond dialectio. He now asks himself whether there is a 
dis tinction between being and the idea of being. The argument is 
bal!led on a disjunotion: either there is a distinction between the 
idea of being and being, or there 1s not a diD tinction. 
Presuppose that there is no distinction. Discursive thought, 
~s well as an intuition of thought, are uncontrovertable realities 
"hloh seek to discover an object. This object is being. If there 
IS no distinction between being and the idea ()f being, discursive 
~h')Ue)lt and intuition have no objeot. "The real! ty of thest§ modes 
)f knowing would have to be denied. There must, then, be some dls-
~1nction between being and the idea of being. 
However, sinoe thought is the only reality, this distinotion 
3an only be for thought itself. Furthermore, any cri terion by 
rhlch an attempt could be made to dis tinguish between being and the 
dee. of being is impossible; Such a criterion could only apply to 
llie idea of being, not bein~ itself. Therefore, bein~ and the idea 
)f beillf are dis tinct but cannot be distinguished frOlI'1 thought it .. 
elf. Being must in some way be identical with the act of thought 
rhich posits it. 
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this act of faith is preoeded by a practical dialeotic which ulti-
mately denies itself as object--an idea--in order to affirm being. 
This summarizes Marcel's thought at the end of the first peri 
od. He began with the facts of experience as given in thought, 
rose by analysis until thought denied itself and accepted being in 
an act of faith. This act of faith is similar to the "leap" of 
Kierkegaard. Marcel recognized, even at this early date, some 
of participation in being, and his dialectical method began to 
shape around a nucleus of phenomenology. However, being and 
thought were identified. Thus in this early period Marcel was an 
Ideal is t. 
In 1914 Marcel may be said to have started on the second stag 
of his dialectical ascent. He comments as follows on his early ob 
servations in the first part of the Journal metaphysique, a number 
of years after the lournal itself was published: 
[W]henever I again plunge, as I have just done, into .those 
wri tings .l?repara. tory to the firs t·· part of the Me taphys ica1 
Journal, I feel sick at heart. This feeling is essentially 
cotUlected wi t11 the poverty and insufficiency of my vocabulary 
I was then, in effect, a prisoner of certain expressions wa-
vering betw~en neo-criticism and neo-hegelianism. It seems t 
me today that, fettered with such Inadequ~te tools, I was fee 
bly attempting to cut a. path for myself toward a certain emer 
genoe, a cert§ln light, of which I had only an unfo~ulated 
pres en tirnen-t .~ 
This, then, is Marcel's personal estimate of the work done in 
"Information in a letter to the author from Gabriel ~~a.I'cel, 
Decembor 4, 1954: ff (L]orsque je me replonge, com:116 je viens de Ie 
taira, dans cas scrits qui sont tous le. preparation de 1a Premiere 
Partie du ,TournaI Metaphysique, j 'eprouve eonnne une sensation d t 
ecoeurement. Ceei est l1e essentiellement a la pauvrete et a l' 
t ff 
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this period. The conolusions he then reached will now be analyzed. 
ot primary importance 1n this period will be Marcel's first real 
encounter with the problem that will lead him out of idealism into 
realism: the relationship between mind and body, subject and ob-
ject. Most of his later important notions will first be intro-
duced in this early period. 
PLANES OF INTELLIGIBILITY 
He begins with a discussion of the planes of intelligibility. 
!he first of these is the plane of 1mmediate existence, which is 
unintelligible and fortuitous in itself. On the second plane, by 
the mediation of thought, experience and existence, first encoun-
tered on the first plane, are made intelligible. The third plane 
Is that on whioh the subject is empirioally oonstituted by pure re-
flection. On this plane thought distinguishes between the thinker 
and the objeot thought. By a gradual prooess of denying exterior-
ity thought affi~s itselt--what is left--as the subject thinking. 
Dialectio, at this point, "is the progression ot reflection which 
transcends itsorig1nal starting point. n6 In other wards, dialeo-
nier d'un certain langage d'ail1eurs vaoil1ant [sioJ entre Ie neo-
criticisme et le neo-hegelianisme. Et il me parait auJhourdthui 
que, muni de ce mauvals equipement, je tentais peniblement de me 
trayer un ohemin vers une certain issue, une certaine lumiere dont 
Je n'avals que Ie pressentiment comma informulab1e." 
• 6Marcel, Journal metaphyslgue, p. 12: "clsst le progres d'une 
l'erlexion qUi transcends ses propras positions." 
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tic on the second plane transcends existence and immediate experi-
ence. On the third plane thoue~t transcends the objects thought 
and affirms itself as subject. Marcel disclaims any valid ontolog-
ical weight for this dialectic as it ascends to higher planes of 
intelligibility. The process depends entirely on the mind which 
proposes it and has in it nothing of the concrete. The relation 01 
the subject to the objeot appears differently as the subject oon-
ceives the object. The difference between appearance and reality 
is conceived differently as the mind itself determines that it 
.hould be. Consequently. the subject is construoted by thought, 
and the object is what the subjeot determines it should be.7 
THOUGHT A:m ITS OBJECT 
This subject-object dichotomy will preoccupy Marcel for many 
~earsJ as he tries to reconcile his felt need for the concrete witb 
the notion of objeot and ita construction as he knew it fr'om Royoe 
and Kant. His problem arises from the presupposition in the Kantish. 
l1ne, between subjeot and object as already rooted in immediate 
experience. Furthermore. due to a possible influenoe from Royoe, 
this object 1s bound up with the knowing subject and dependent on 
it. It is apropos to discuss here Royce's notion of object. 
For Royce an idea has a twofold structure: the external refer-
tnce to an object beyond itself and its internal purpose which 1s 
the expression ot an interest. a desire, or a volition. The object 
-
1 Ibid., pp. 11 and 12. 
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~s that to which the idea tends in its internal purpose to conform. 
The object is not distinct from the idea but is an internal pur-
pose already embodied in the idea. Every idea represents some ob-
ject external to itself but somehmy indetermina to in the idea i t-
IBelf, plus an internal purpose of' t he idea urging it to further 
~etermine its own object. rrhus an object is the more definite 
~orm of the purpose or intention of the idea itself. 8 In the f01-
~owinp: words of Marcel we can see the influence of the idealism of 
lRoyce as well as of Kant: "The solution consists evidently in 
~olding that the object is constructed as .al1 object, that is--by 
IVery definition ... -as independent of the thinking subject; that con ... 
Itructive act neither follows the initial nct of experience as a 
contradictory species of eMpiricism holds, nor precedes it, but is 
~dentlcal with and coextensive with the act of oxperience Itself.n9 
Marcel here expresses essentially Roycian and }Cantian notions 
when he Insis ts that in immediate consciousness both the act of 
posltine the object as independent of the Eubject and the object 
~tself are identical. Furthermore, and just as immediately, the 
~mowing subject ascribes existence to "I;hat object experienced. 
8Josiah Royce, The World and tho Individua.l (New York, 1916), 
~P. 332 -334. - - -
9Mareel, .Tournal meta~hls19ue, p. 15: "La solution consiste ~~:tdel1?ment ~ poser que 1'0 jet est construit comma objet, clest-a-
~1re~-et par definition meme--comme Independant du sujet verce-~ant; cotte construction n'est ni posterieure a llexperience comme 
~~ voudrait un empiricisme contradictoire, nl anterieure a elle, 
ruQis elle lui est identique, elle lui est coextensive." 
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THOUGHT'S RELA'rION TO BODY ::'..ND MIND 
Marcel then makes a few observations on the nature of con-
soiousness, for which he admits a debt to Bergson. Somehow Marcel 
sees that existence 1s bound up with body as an object in space. 
pons equently , consciousness 1s also bound somehow to body. I can 
pnly be conscious of myself as existIng, as well as of others as 
~xist1ng, as I am a "given" in space--a body. Thus existenoe is 
bound to body. Consoiousness, however, is not limited to body, 
,ince it can transcend itself by thinking of an intellig1ble con-
tent which is not body and does not participate in existence. This 
content will be merely ideal and not sensible or existential. 10 
At the end of thIs first period of hls second dialectical as ... 
~ent Marcel has discovered that immediate consciousness, existence 
~nd corporeity are somehow mutually dependent. Furthermore, he 
.ass "how thought [consciousness] may transcend this datum. However 
it this point, object, existence, and corporeity are still psychic 
phenomena. Corporeal 8xis tence and thought are incompatible. 
True to the enriched starting point noted as essential to his 
~lalectic, he begins the second stage in this period wi th the con-
~lueions of the first. He turns attention, first, to thought it-
elf. T:19U(f.,ht must begin as an immediate correlation to an immedi-
lta object. It 1s not a datum as such nor definable outside an 
)rder which discovers things. HoweVer, it can suppress this exteri 
lOIbid., pp. 17-19. 
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ority and rise above the im~nedlate experience. Thus it MS a medi .. 
ating function. It mediates between the given external and itself, 
thuS giving some content to itself. He flwther identifies this 
content of thought as mind. Thus he has separated the "given" fron: 
thought itself and the immediacy of experience fro>;! the intelligi-
ble content developed in the planes of thought. 
The first action of the mind 1s to recognize the physical in-
teraction of the body as necessary although insufficient for ~{!;lOW-
ledp:e. Body is necessarily glven as anterior to the act of lmowin@ 
by which mind constitutes itself. But the mind does not recognize 
body 1n the immediate experience until I'led1ated by thought. After 
acknowledging this debt to body, the mind further sees that body is 
necessary for the external world. In fact, this construction of 
body is bound up with the construction of the externnl world. 
'fHOUGHT AND INDIVIDUALITY 
Turning consequently from body and the external world, mind 
focuses attention upon itself and creates its own individuality. 
This individuality has two notes. First, it depends on the empir-
'. 
leal content g1ven 1t aa an ex1st1ng bod7; second, there must be 
present Sor.le interiorized consciousness of individuali ty. This 
lneans, then, that the self must think itself dependent, that is, as 
created, since an individual can conceive himself as one of many 
only if he is dependent upon some act of creation, a free act by 
one distinct from himself and others. In this light of creation 
)0 
the communication between I!1l1ny created .individuals is possible. ll 
Marcel then concludes that there must be some consciousness 01 
individuality. Further, thought, through mind, is somehow necessa-
ry for this consciousness. He also recognizes the part of' body in 
the cons truc tion of ind! vidua1i ty, as well flS a primary dB. tUlll ror 
communication with the external world. However, as Is clear f'rom 
his words, this body, not to mention the self, is still bound in 
and by thought. 
The fact is, that, to explain the communication between these 
individualities, Marcel has recourse, as did Royce, to a God. For 
such canmunication presupposes some interior individuality distinot 
from that of body. Royce maintains, that, since ideas contain an 
implicit finality for a more and more complete determination and 
fulfilment, there must be one object-idea, or final end-idea, which 
is complete--an Absolute Idea. This alone can explain the possibil~ 
1ty of' many inoomplete thoughts, or for.·that matter, many imperf'ect 
created individuals. Royoe then identifies the self' containing the 
iunfulfilled idea with tho selt which possesses the complete idea. 
It is clear, t}~n, that the world of Royce must be an ideal world 
~r thought in which the th: .. lker is the thought.l<'urthermore, this 
~ust be a world in whioh an Absolu te Thought, embracing in itself 
~ll reality, is a complete thought and is necessary to explain in-
pomplete thaur;hts as a reterential axis. And so the Ylorld of Royce 
llIb!d., pp. 22, 124, 62. 
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is also an ideal world of one Absolute Idea. 12 
Marcel takes up the notion of communication, the conclusion ot 
his previous dia1eotic. He will now proceed from the meaning of 
oommunication to the meaning of intelligibility. 
SOUL AS NECESSARY SUBSTRATUM FOR MIND 
Communication is impossible without intelligibility. MoreoveI, 
what thought qualifies as intelligible, cannot be regarded as real-
ly distinct from thought itself. IntelligibilIty oannot be definec 
from outside thoupftt, but must be a relationship between thought 
and the totality of ideas. He concludes that there must be a mind 
which recognizes itself in the whole of its ideas. Only this makes 
intelligibilIty possible. Therefore, the mind is somehow prop,ress-
lng by creating itself through thought. Mar'ce1 recognizes that 
something stable is needed to explain the subject for .mind and its 
movement of thought. He calls this stahle substratum soul~ 
The soul, then, is seen by the mind as a necessary oondition 
for ita own reality. Soul appears to mind as that, which in mind 
itself, is unactivated or unrealized. 13 This conclusion goes back 
to his earlier notion that being is the irreducible of thought, ancl 
logically, in later years he will identify being as soul, being 
which demands fulfilment. 
l2Josiah Royce, The Spirit of Modern Philosophy (New York, 
1892), p. 372. --- --
13Maroel, Journal metaphysigue, pp. 110, 122. 
I 
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Therefore, intelligibility is mind recognizing itself; and 
soul is the necessary condi tion for th::lt mind. He then turns his 
attention to soul as substratum. 
RELATIONSHIP OF SOUL AND BODY 
The first question he asks is how to relate soul to body. 
Body, it will be remembered, was the first necessary datum for 
thought. It the body 1s non-extended, it is identical with soul; 
it extended, it is the extended aspect of the soul. He sees that 
both possibilities present an unintelligible dichotomy on the plan 
of mere existence. Further, he feels that the resolution of the 
antimony mi~,:ht be possible on a higher plane, in an ontological 
value superior to the notion of body. But he has already seen tha 
an absolute ontological value is impossible. Marcel consequently 
feels that it is impossible for him to make a metaphysical judgmen 
" 
about the relations of soul and body at. this time. 
A t the end of the second dialectical II. scent Mal'cel recognizes 
the starting point for a dialectic to be immediate consciousness. 
In the early stages of the ascent there is always a problem of 
duality: thought and matter; reality and appearance; thought and 
ideas; subject and object; body and soul. But further. it is the 
mediating function of thought to resolve this dualism by suppress-
ing exter1ority. Exter10rity is bound to body. By suppressing 
body thought evolves as mind, and mind develops into an individual. 
The individual appears as a soul, a necessary substratum for the 
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activities of the individual mind. 
Thus as early as 1914 ~1arce11 s la tel" doc trine of body and 
existence and the relationship of the soul and body was e!ubryonic-
ally formulated. Further, his notion of individuality was clearly 
defined. He recognized the need for some interiorized conscious-
esS of the self as a necessary prerequisite for communication. 
This is achieved by negating extez>iority. Individuality cannot be 
formed by externals because it is the self which mediates those 
externals. But, as Marcel noted, at the same time one is dependent 
pon the externals to define his own content. But sinco all these 
otions were seen to depend on one's own thouppt, Maz>cel remained 
efinitely an idealist. In 1914, then, Marcel has established 
some connection between bodily existence, the external 'World, and 
houGht, but by a nexus still dependent on thought and making inde-
enslb1e any realism separatin~ them. l4 
"-
The third dialectical ascent takes, place between the years 
and 1925. As late a8 1925 Marcel's doctrine will still be 
nterpreted in a :Cantlan context. However, a cIl8.nge of tone In hia 
ournal wl11 be noted at this point. Realist themes of existence, 
ody .. and sensation will beoome more numel"Ous. He ex."!lains thIs 
hangs: "The shock administered by the war explains the chan Be of 
one and of key which Is noticeable in the 
ournal. nl5 
Ibid., pp. 117-118. 
15Marce1, PhI1oso h of Existence, p. 90. 
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TRIt~D!C DIALECTIC 
He begins wi th a further anal~' sis of the nature of dialectic, 
putting together many of the observations he had previously made. 
He now sees thought as mediating, resolving, the opposites present-
ed to the subjeot in his existential experience. This mediation 
of thought rlarcel conceives as a dialogue. Slncs I am attached to 
a certain moment of time and definite point in space, I cannot go, 
~I it were, outside myself. My experience requires mediation by 
~8ans of question and answer., There are three terms in this dia-
logue. The first is the subject who questions. He may be consid-
ered in two ways, either according to what he has and, therefore, a 
tabulation of answers for somebody else; or according to what he is, 
,~ permanent state, and, therefore, as one appealing for an answer. 
The seoond term is the one who answers. This must be either some-
body else, or myself as one apart, whQ 1s capable of answering 
'j 
Ruestions. He is the one who interpret's for the subject. The 
third and last term, the object, is that whioh is interpreted by 
the interpreter for the subject. It is indifferent to the thought 
that thinks it, the predicate of a jUdgment.16 
Royce came to this same triad after reading Peirce, and after 
~is own reflection on the nature of knowing and the possibility of 
'~ror. Royce maintains that in knowledge there is the objeot as it 
18 ill itself and my own ima.ge of it. Now it is irlp08sible to be in 
16Marcel, Journal metaphysique, p. 139. 
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error about my own image of the object. However, 1f a strict dual. 
tty between subject and object is kept, it is equally impossible 
for me to have knowledge of the object in itself since in no way 
can it enter into me. Therefore, in order for there to be any 
knowledge at all there must be some interpretation between the ob-
ject and my image of it. Since I am the knower, only I can be the 
second person, the interpreter. 
BODY AS MEDIATOR IN KNOWING 
Progressing further with the idea of cODmunication, Marcel 
sees, as did Royce, that a pure thought cannot communicate by it-
self. The difficulty arises for Royce when he tries to interpret 
his past. Since one must always interpret in the present, he can-
not interpret his past. Therefore, if any interpretation is possi-
ble, it must be by one to whom there is neither past nor present. 
This notion of a timeless interpreter evolves into Roycels'Absolute 
Community of Interpretation.17 
Marcel. however, does not take the alternative of the abso-
lute, hut goes back to his notion of body and sees it as a neces-
sary eondltlon for the interpretation of the object by the subject. 
Body now becomes, in a certain sense, as thought, a mediator in 
cog·nltion. With this conclusion Marcel has at last found the key 
~hich w1ll open the door to realism for him. Thouebt is conscious 
17Max H. Fisch, ad., Classic American Ph11oso1-')hers (New York, ~95l), pp. 233-234. 
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of itself and oonverts itself into ~aterial signs. The body then 
comes in as the agent of transmission. On bein~ grasped by the bod-
y of the other, with whom the subject is in co~munication, the ma-
terial signs are reconverted into thought and the thought is then 
revealed to the other's consciousness. Marcel then takes a long 
step in the direction of realism. He says that the ego must not be 
treated as a oontent, as that species of idealism does which con-
siders the body to be part of the mind. For the body is no more 
in the mind than the piano keyboard is in the music which it plays. 
Re understands the body as distinct from the mind and the mind as 
incarnate. lending itself to the disoipline of the body in order to 
learn. lS This conclusion, however, can still be interpreted in a 
Kantian oontext. But it is indicative of Ma~celts developing real-
ist inclinations and his increasing dissatisfaction with idealism. 
cOMMm~IcATION THROUGH SENSA'rION 
Marcel then further develops the notion of body as mediator. 
This is an important part of Marcel's realist doctrine and will be 
treated in greater detail in Chapter V. It 1s sufficient to dis-
cuss it here only in so tar as the notion points up his realist 
progression. 
The movement we reel in the body is sensation. It is not na-
tural, he says. for us spontaneously to posit the objeot we sense 
as distinct from the "signs" by which it affects us. Sensation is 
18Marce1. Journal metanh..vsiaue .. n. 171:). 
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spontaneously considered a8 an affection, not an information. Nor 
1s it a message, nor a translation of something else, but it is 
strictly immediate. In this conclusion his doctrine of concrete 
participation is born. 
Furthermore, the feelings arising from sensation depend some-
how on the body·s flUctuating action. This feeling cannot be ex-
plained by words, nor can an idea express it. As a matter of fact, 
reflection may destroy it. Feeling mU$t somehow ignore itself and 
refuse to be treated as an "it." Marcel sees now the real conjunc 
tion between body, feeling, and sensation which cannot be actual-
ized or, as he will express it later, "objectlvized." Neither is 
sensation a constant, absolutely speaking, but a manner of being 
which ean be enriched by further experience. 
InCARNATION 
Sensation, then, is presupposed for all communication "between 
individuals. It is somehow an immediate participation in a cartai 
a participation which is neither static, since it ca 
e enriched, nor definable as an object. Marcel now gives this 
orp()real participation a name. He calls it incarnation. rl'here-
primary immed1ate sense experience is that of 1ncarnation 
is ;~:ust be the starting point for any d1a1ectic. Th1s 1ncarna .. 
looks to body as the tulchrum for all other ex1stents; and he 
that "every existent appears to me 8.S a prolongat1on of r:rry 
1n a certaIn direction--!Z body in so far as 1t 1s ~, that 
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is, non-objective. ~~ body is in a sense the archetype of other 
existents and in a rlore profound sense the point of ref'erence for 
all existents. The world exists for me, in the strictest sense of 
the word exist, in so far as I mainta1n with it relat10ns or the 
same kind as those I have w1th my own body--that is, 1n so far as 
I am incarna te. tl19 This body 1s necessary for my knowledge of the 
real world. 
At this point 1n Marcel's development the immed1acy of bodily 
participation 1s clear. A oertain progression 1s also obvious. 
The essential starting point of whic!l he spoke ear11er was merely 
the diversified experiences of life. By the return inherent 1n his 
dialectic he now comea baok to an enriohed starting point. These 
experienoes are now no longer merely "experience" but the experi-
ence of an incarnate beine bound to other existents by the 1mmedi-
acy of his own body. It 1s the immediacy of this incarnation that 
will establish his realism. Harcel now-goes on to develop':turther 
the notion of partioipation. 
This participation of incarnation is not an object as the 
third term in Royce's triadic relation. It somehow depends on ~. 
The object answers only in so far as I ask questions of it. Conse-
19l2!£.., p. 261: "tout existent m'apparait comme prolongeant 
mon corps dans une direction quelconque--~ corps en tant qu'll 
est ~, c'est-a-d1re, non-objeotifi mon corps est en ce sens a la 
fois l'exlstent-type et plus profondement encore le rep~re des 
existents. La monde existe pour moi, au sens fort de Mot exister, 
dans la mesure OU j'entret1ens avec lui des relations du type de 
celle que J'entretiens avec mon propre corps--c'est-a-dire pour 
lautant que je suis Incarl1;e. tt 
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quently, in spite of his grip on the realist theme of incarnation, 
Marcel remains within idealism since he feels that the object knoWI 
still must be projected by the mind which confronts it. However, 
the tendency of' idealists to minimize the "given" a.spect of the ob-
ject and to stress the subjective appeal to it, even~~ally identi-
fYing the two, becomes increasingly difficult for Marcel to recon-
oile with his own observations on the obJeot ts relationship to 
man's c ond! tion of j.llcarna t!on. 20 
INTERSUBJECTIVITY 
Next Marcel tries to piece together the notions of incarnatio! 
and communioation. He says that we must conceive others as a 
~ental-physieal system like ourselves. If, on the one hand, I 
know pts mental system, I must then malte his body ideally my own. 
If, on the other hand. I do not mow his mental 8 ,"stem, but I do 
know his body as "other," his thought 18 closed to me. Consequent .. 
ly, SOMehow I would have to minimize the objeotivity of his body Be 
that I could penetrate his mental system. However, since his exis-
tence Is given to me tlU'ough body I oannot deny that I mus t firs t 
know him as body. Consequently, I must minimize the objootivity of 
~ls body if I am to penetrate his thought. The only way I oan do 
this is to refleot on myself and thus render myself similar to him. 
In this way I put myself' in sympathy with him, a sympathy of soul, 
20 6 12!£., PP. 31 -317. 
and am able to open his m~ntal system to myself. This is the pas-
sage froM the "it" relationship to the "thou ff relationship. For 
this notion of Intersubjeotivity, Marcel is indebted to Hocking. 
'rhe conclusions of this philosopher on intersubjectivity greatly 
helped to free Marcel from idealism, in so far as it proved monad-
ism insufficient. 
TWO MOVEMENTS IN THOUGHT 
In the following analysis two more later doctrines of Marcel 
come to light. First of all he recognizes the realm of intersubjec-
tivity as necessary ror true canmunioation. Secondly, besides ob-
jective knowledge which tends to divide and separate, he recognizee 
another mode of knowing. This second mode of knowing, which has ae 
its purpose to unite and make one, will later emerge as secondary 
reflection. Through secondary reflection ~~Arcel will be able to 
recognize real participation. He now .q,as the means to eleEle t.he 
ea.:) between idealifl~ and realism or, more precisely, bet'Neen the 
subject-object dichotomy in idealisl'!1 and the onenesfI :'..n realism. 
Ther'efore J tf the role of re~lection--whether it is brought to beaT" 
upon the act of sensation or of external operation--consists not iT, 
sundering, in dissecting, but, on the contrary, in re-establishing 
in its continuity the living tissue which an inJud1cious analysis 
had d1sjolned."21 Henceforth he will attempt to penetrate beyond 
21 Ibid ., p. 324: "Ie role de la reflexion--qutelle s'exerce 
sur Ie sent1r ou sur It~--consiste non point i morceler, a de-
the gap between subject and object, and to find the moment when the 
separation of subject and object is no longer strictly meaningful. 
This properly concludes the dialectical ascent between 1912 
and 1925. Most of the reali8 t themes which 'ii 111 be developed sub-
.equently have already been introduced. Marcel began this dialec~ 
tic in 1912 under the supposition that being and thought are dis-
tinct. His dialectical ascent began completely independent of real~ 
1ty and progressed, through his essential process of return, to a 
starting point in experience. This differentiated experience, 
which he later saw to depend on body and sensation, became the in-
dispensable condition for a dialectic. He further saw that this 
experience was not objectified but was, in some way, immediate. 
Nor was it a given statio datum, but W&S, rather, the whole of our 
experience which enriohes and increases us as we communioate with 
our universe. Consequently, he ended on the note of intersubJec-
tive appreoiation. 
.' . 
DOUBLE REALM 01" THOUGHT 
The most i.l"lportant step made in this period was the disoo.very 
of concrete participation. He saw body as a mediator for communi-
cation through sensation. He further saw seoondary reflection as 
turning inwardly on oneself and finding the unity of experience. 
As a result, he discovered that there were two realms in which 
membrer, mais, tout au contraire, a retablir dans sa continuite le 
tis8U vivant qufune analyse imprudent avait disjoint." 
~-. ---------------------------------42~ 
thought may work: that of object, and that of mystery. It would be 
inaccurate to say that the distinction between the realms of object 
and mystery wa.s entirely original with Marcel, since his teacher, 
Leon Brunschvicg, had much the same idea in his dilemma of faith 
and verification. Either this dilemma must be denied outright or 
a subjective domain which is not open to objective thought must be 
affirmed. Marcel took the second possibility. ~he realm of sub-
jectivity Is that of mystery, and the realm of objectivity he wl11 
later characterize as the nealm of the problematic. 
One last note arises in his first refleotions on being and 
having. "Baslcally, it all comes down to the distinction between 
that which one has and that which one is."22 More will be said of 
this distinction in Chapters III and V. 
In Maroel, then, can be seen, in sum, the dividing of two 
realms, and his preoccupation with beings a mystery, somehow re-
vealed by reflection tn inwardness, s~ething that can be enriched 
through experience. On the other hand, his repugnance for objec-
tivization becomes evident. Objectivlzation tends to distort real-
Ity, to separate the subject more and more from the object, and to 
surround the object in an impenetrable insularity. But he still 
has fa~ to ascend before these doctrines become clear and cogent. 
At this point it is well to emphasize Marcel's dissatisfactior. 
with idealism. He became aware of much of this dissatisfaction in 
22.!E..!A.,p. 307: "Au fond tout se ramene a le. distinction 
entre ce qu'on ~ at ce quton !!i." 
~----------------------------~ 
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retrospect, but SOMe oQ.1'IIDlonts ware entered in the diary of. those 
dayS. Looking back, he later considered this period as that time 
in whioh his early dissatisfa.ction with Ideal18~ began. He also 
saw, however, that he was still bo~tnd to some doctrines of ldeallsn 
which at the same time he mistrusted. 
At the beginning, however, my reaotion aRalnst Idealls~ devel-
oped 1Ils1de a framework of thoup-)lt which wa.s itself Ideal1st, 
or which, at any rate, otill owed a ~ood deal to Idealist 
categories. Th1s accounts for much of' what 1s difficult, 
lrttltnt1ng and even repellent 1n the first part of MY Jour-nal 
i\1etaphys1gue. I waa liko a man who is irked by a. su1t of' 
olothes which 1s too tl~ht for h1m, and whloh he is vainly 
trylng to dlaoard. What st-rlko8 me as particularly strange 
about My rt''Ulot1ons At th...flt time i9 th~ pa.rtiality they ~how 
for belief. ~hleh, in all good faith, I eould not have said 
thal t I held. 3 
In these words we have an arGUment for th~ ttncOnsc!oUD influence of 
~~aroel '. Idealistic teachers and acquaintances. 
If the crIticIsM of Robert Ostermann Is accurate, ¥aroel nev-
er threw orf thIs IdealistIc "suit of olothes" and neve:%' aohieved 
-, 
realism: "But trom our vantage polnt 8~veying the forty years ot 
change, the m1nd see. nothIng in the later productIons inoonsistent 
with the formatlon laid in 1925 in an essay which he himself re-
gards as cent1"al [E!;lstenoe !! objectlvlte, at the end ot Journal 
m&taRelslguelJ nor i8 there anything in the subsequent deepening 
or extension whioh oannot be reduced to these first pronounoements 
as their prinoiple. ,.24 It 1s true that Marcel regaros this 
23 Marcel , Ph11oaoRhl sa:. ~18teno •• p. 88. 
24Robert Ostermann! "GabrIel }~rc8l: The Disoovery ot BeIng," 
MOdern Sehoolman. XXXI (January 1954). 104. 
t 
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essay as central, but it is also true that he regards it as basio-
ally Kantian. He says of it at a later date: "I do not believe 
that I am wrong 1n saying that on the epistemolo~ioal plane, even 
in Existence at Objectivlte, I was basically holdine- to a Kantian 
line of thought. u25 This objeotion of Ostermann can serve as a 
springboard for the remainder of the thesis, since it still remain 
to be shown that Marcel emerged from his Kantianism. Thus in one 
way the rest of the thesis i8 a response to the objection raised b 
Many and worded by Os termaIll1. 
PROBLEM WITH EXISTENCE 
One of the first problems that Maroel found with idealism was 
the insight he received regarding the immediacy of existence, hody, 
sensation, and intelligibility, that is, the problems that led him 
to concrete participation. In fact, this insistence upon the eon-
crete is what at first attracted him t~Kant and Hegel. Kant al-
lowed for the conerete in his phenomenon, and Marcel gives his own 
observations on Hegel concerning the point. "But this distrust of 
abstractions explains, for instanee, the fascination which the He-
gelian system exercised for me for such a long time. For, in spit 
of appearance to the contrary, Hegel did make a very splendid ef-
fort to preserve the primaoy of the concrete; and no philosopher 
2SGabriel Marcel, letter to the author, December 4, 1954: ttJe 
ne crois pas me tramper en disant que sur le plan epistemologique, 
m~me dana Existence et Objectivlte, je m'an tenais au fond a una 
ligne de penatee kantTenne." 
r _____ ----------, 
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has protested more strongly a~ainst the oonfusion of the conorete 
with the iI"lmediately given." 26 His innate sense of the concrete 
never allowed Marcel to deny the real world of existential experi. 
enoe and sensation. 
The tendency of idealists to overlook this existential exper-
ience 1s what elioited t'rom Maroel a further oondemnation: "Thus 
I rebelled very early a~ainst the way in which Idealism overrates 
the part of oonstruction in sensual perception, to the point of 
ushing aside to the confines of non-being all such concrete and 
foreseeable detail as not only clotbes our experienoe, but gives 
it its flavour of reality.tt27 Finally, it was in this insistence 
on the concrete, which we have labored to bring out, that Collins 
sees Marcel as adequately refuting Descartes, as well as Kant, even 
though Marcel OWeS muoh to Kant for the original notion of the con-
crete. It must be remembered, however, th&t this refutation would 
ecome conclusive only at a. later date •.. "Marcel re~ards the dilem-
a. of sensuous versus intellectual intuition as an artificial pre-
icament, ca.used by overlooking the nroperly huma.n way of knowing. 
uman cOF,nition is a synthesis of intellectual and sense factors. 
oth of which are involved intuitively in the immediate affirmation 
f existence with which metaphysios begins. fl2B 
26Marcel, Mass Society, p. i. 
27Marcel, Philosophy.2!. Existence, p. B • 
. ,,' 
28James Collins, The Existentialists (Chicago, 1952), p. 199. 
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PROBLEM 'rliTH THE BfDIVIDUAL AIm THE ABSOLUTE 
Another problem with the idealists which Marcel constantly 
faced is the relationship between the individual and the Absolute. 
as outlined 1n the doct~lne of Royce. Royce's Absolute, as has 
been noted, is a s7stem of ideas and the realization of the finali 
ty inherent in idea.s. The relationship of the Absolute wi th indi-
viduals is a recip~ocal one. The Absolute wills itself in a cer-
tain instant by attention. At that sa.me instant, by the sa.me aot 
in which existenoe is willed by the Absolute, the finite individua. 
sets up his own plan or system of I and not-I. The Absolute and 
the finite indivIdual are then different, yet mutually dependent, 
aspects of the same reality. Royoe reconciles the finite individ-
ual with the infinite Absolute in the same reality by what he calls 
after DedekInd, a u self .. rep~esenta tive sys tem. ff Tt1.lS may be lik-
ened to a map representing itself. The Absolute 1s this map. 
• 
Eac 
" . 
element in the Absolute has a relation to another, yet is distinot 
from it. Each represents another !£ infinitum. In this way the 
finite individuals are as the individual elements, and the Absolute 
s the embodiment of the whole. 29 
This .olution never satisfied Maroel. His criticism of Hegel 
n the same point, can also be applied to R07oe. At all costs the 
eeds of the IndivIdual and the conorete must be maintained; Maroel 
29Gabriel Marcel, ~ metaphysigue ~ Royce (PariS, 1945), pp. 
08-109, 152-153. 
~---------------, 
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telt that Hegel tended to t11mmerse the reality and the destiny of 
the individual into an absolute In which they were in danger of be 
coming lost."30 This same oriticism Is valid against Royoe. 
Marcel also mistrusted Royce's solution of the problem of 
and eternIty. All Royoe seems to say is that the problem must be 
recognized and that the whole must be present if it is to be under 
stood. or course this is explained, In some way, by his Absolute. 
Time will then be the form of the wIll as auoh, the realIzatIon of 
desire. Marcel feels that to resolve past and present In God makes 
Him composIte or In part vIrtual. It also seems to Marcel that 
this Absolute must know changIng moods. Consequently, he could bu 
now outoomes. That 1s, he would know only tho fulfilment of the 
urposes and not the indefinite representations first telt in the 
individual mind. 31 Even In the early days of the Journal Marcel 
f'l stIll engrossed with this dilemma; and the explanation ot Brad-
el was inadequate for him, appealing a.s it did, as well as' did 
oyoe, to the unintelligible. 
PROBLEM WITH THE RgALITY O:F THE ABSOLUTE 
Marcel's problem with idealists was also their proofs for the 
eality of the Absolute. Here is how Royce arrives at hls final 
octrlne ot the Absolute. The twofold nature ot ideas disoussed 
bove is presented to man in a problematic situation: what!! ver-
II J J°lrarcel, Ph1l0.0:~ of Ex1. tanoe, p. 78. 31MarQel, ;:::e, _p_ ~h-~;6. 
L 
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what ought to be, the experience versus the goal of experience. 
e problem is solved by interpretation. If there is no interpret-
there is no Community; and if no Community, there is no real 
Royce's original notion of the Absolute has now become the 
Community interpreting itself !£ infinitum. Unless this 
Community is real, nothing is real. Ultimately, for Royce 
there would seem to be no personal God but only some vast, ever-
oving aggregate contained in the unity of one Absolute Thought. 32 
however, feels it neoessary to conaider this Absolute as a 
Person, not as Royce's cold, impersonal foroe. He criticizes 
Roycets doctrine, in criticizing the similar doctrine of Brunsch-
, 
vicg. "That God who is only in spirit and in truth and who is, as 
it were, outside the pale of existenoe; who is not a person, and 
for whom we are nothing, is no more in my eyes than an abstract 
and useless fabrication.,,33 
" . 
PROBLEM WITH THE SUBJECT AnD OBJECT IN THOUGHT 
The tinal problem that Maroel faces is the most important. 
When he has solved the problem of the relationship between the sub-
jeot and objeot in thought, he will have abandoned idealism and be 
32Fisoh, Amerioan PhIlosophers, p. 234. 
33Gabriel Marcel, Bulletin de la Societe francais de philoso-
~hIe, (Maroh 24, 1928), 8S. Quot;d~y A. D. 8ertillanges, O.P., 1 
e ohriatianiame ~ !!! phIlosophies (Paris r 1941), p. 32: "Ce Die qui ntost quten esprit at en verlt', o'est-a-dire en de~a de l' 
existence, Ql.ll n 'est personna et pour quI noue ne somma rian, ce n t 
est ames yeux qU'une fiction abstraite et sans vartu." 
L 
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far along in developing his realism. As has been seen, Marcel's 
entire quest for realism has been an attempt to suppress this dual-
ity. Even at an early date he realized the difficulty in conceiv-
in~ thought as being in an order separate from things. He says: 
"[w]e forget how untenable, metaphysically speaking, is the posi-
tion of a thought which believes that it C~l place itself over 
against things in order to grasp them. u34 
Father Roger Troisfontalnas' summary of the problems that face 
Marcel at the end of the first period of his idealism serve as a 
fitting close to this chapter. hSinoe his youthful writings, if he 
refuses to identify reality with 'Absolute Knowledge,' Marcel re-
fuses as well to deny that what is real is somehow immanent to con-
sciousness. This would be in effect, either 1) to deny reality 
outright, or 2) to exclude from thought what is real, which would 
be the same as to deny reality. • • • On the other hand, if 
thought is totally external to being, it would be a mere form en-
compassing in itself nothing substantial.,,)5 Certainly Ma.rcel did 
~ot deny the real. His constant preoccupa.tion with the problems of 
34Marcel, Being ~ Having, p. 168. 
35Roger Troisfontaines, S.,J. De l'existence a. l~etre: 1;!. phil-
osophie de Gabriel Marcel (Namur, 1952), I, 134: "£!.!. ~ ecri ts 
~ jeunesse, s til refuse d'identifier le reel au '3avoir Absolu, i 
Marcel se garde egalement de nier une certaine immanence du reel a 
1a conscience. ee serait, en effet, 1) ou bien nier absolument qu' 
11 y ait du reel, 2) ou bien l'exclure de le. pansea, ea qui serait 
encore le nier. • • • D'autre part, si le. pensea etait totalement 
~xterleure a ltetre, el1e ne serait qU'une forme et ne trouverait 
en soi rien de substantiel." 
~----------------, 
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duality, concreteness, and the iMmediacy of experience attest to 
this, as well as his expressed difficulties with the doctrine of 
idealists such as Kant, Hegel, and Royce. At this stage of his de 
velopment his solution to these problems has not yet been com-
pletely formulated. There is still a long road to climb before he 
will find solutions and replies to these idealists. His search 
will be to discover how thought is somehow both within and outside 
of being. In the meantime he will be baptized into the Roman 
catholic Church, and come into contact with many realists and 
Thomists. His next book, Etre !l avoir. appeared three years afte 
the Journal and Ex.ls tenee !.! obj ecti vi te were COMt."lleted. It is 
clear from the opening pages that those three years were important, 
eeause he immediately begins to ascend f.rom Kantia.n c.ontexts into 
his Intersubjective realm of mystery and participation in being. 
rr-----------, 
CHAPTJ1JR III 
REALIST DOCTRniE AND INFLUENCE 
In the foregoing chapter it has been shown that Marcel, ea.rly 
1n his philosophical career, felt dissatisfaction with the idealis 
wIth whioh he had begun his philosophical peregrinations. Gradual 
ly, by his process of dialectic and reflection, he turned toward 
realism. The present ohapter hopes to develop his gradual emer-
gence into a realist position characvorized by his own doctrine of 
concrete existenoe. 
The realism of Maroel can best be desoribed in a language he 
himself often uses, that of music. Marcel's gradual development 0 
realist doctrines resembles the movements of a symphony. The early 
reflections, whioh we discussed in the: previous chapter, mal be 
considered as the overture with partially developed themes. In 
this and suooeeding ohapters these themes w11l develop, vary, and 
expand in three movements. The prinoiple themes under oonsidera-
tion are those of existenoe and being and their relation to thought 
and the nature of the subjeot-ego. In Marcel's future development 
this ego emerges from its concrete existential situation as the in-
divIdual more deeply commits himself to being by oreatlve response, 
Itness, fidelity, and love. Finally, the oommunion of indlviduals 
Ith eaoh other and with God, on the plane of spirit or values, 
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that ls, being, oomes to light. Since the latter themes a~e beyon 
the soope of this thesis, they oan only be considered briefly. 
The fi~st movement of Maroel's thought is oontained prinoipal 
ly in his work published in 1935 and oovering the periods 1928-1933, 
gtre et avoir. The second movement is taken up with a number of 
---- -
articles published from 1933-1950. The third and final deve10pmen 
is oontained in the two volume work, M,ystere s!!. l'~, whlch ap-
peared in 1950. Symphonic variations on themes developed in this 
work appear in his later books, ~ deo11n ~ l! sagesse, written i 
1954, and &'homme prob1ematigue in 1955. 
The first movement began in 1928 and progressed until 1933. 
The first theme to eonsider w111 be that of existenoe. This 
may be called, in the language adopted in the preoeding chapters, 
the first dialectical ascent. 
IMf'I!IIDIACY OF EXiSTENCE 
Existence and body now beoome inseparably bound by what Mar-
cel calls incarnation. He acknowledges his previous error in ao-
cepting a disincarna te tlmind." He feels indebted to Bradley for 
helping him to unoover this error, as well as for pointing out 
other new idea. to him.l For the notion of incarnation he also ad 
mits receiving help from Schelling. "I seemed to disoern, at the 
end ot the immense journey travelled by Schelling, a light which 
1Marcel, Metaphzsical Journal, p. 190. 
~~~---------------------------------
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perhaps one day r.'light help me to discover my own ~'th. Was there 
not an ardUOtlS way whioh might gi va access to a higher emptricism 
and to the sa.tisfaction of that need of the individual nnd the con-
Cr~)te whioh I felt in myself?,,2 In th:LS light accepted from Schel-
linr: and Bradley r,~arcel saw toot the individual is tied by an in-
soluble bond vii th the existing universe. Consequently, the primary 
experienoe of a subjeot is not that of the subject-obJect duality 
but of subject-object unity. If he starts from that separ'ated du-
ality, it will be impossible ever to rejoin the two. Incarnation, 
then, is the indissoluble unity which must be the startinF point 
for all metaphysiCS, the "given. 1f 
Tilis notion of incarnation subsequently develops into the 
proof for one's own existence. Marcelts purpose at this point is 
to free exis tence from the constructiveness of thouP.'pt. Unless 
this can be accomplished, he cannot break with idealism. His firs1 
conclusion is that thought must in some way be within existence; 11 
must start from it. In some way) however, thought can ar;straot 
from existence and consider itself apart. But then it is not with. 
in concrete realism. This movement of thought must be intra-
existential or it 1s meaningless for anyone but an idealist. Mar-
cel expresses this as follows: 
Thought is unable to abandon existence, thou~fl to a de-
gree it can abstract from it. However, thought must hold as 
a first principle the impossibili ty of being misled by t~lis 
abstraction. To fabricate existence is wholly unconceivable, 
~ ~L _____ 2~Ma~r~c~e~l~,~P=h=i=1=o=s=O=P=hl~ __ =o=r~Ex=i=s=t=e=n=c=e=.~p~.~7~8~.~ __________________ .J 
r.-----------, 
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e. senseless absurd1 ty. Thus what lIe a.re here elucidE!. tlng is 
a. certain Intra-exlstential transformation, only within which 
can idealis~ be avoided. We are then compelled to conclude 
that thought is within existence and somehow a species of ex-
istence which for oet'tain strictly determined ends enjoys the 
privilege of abstracting from itself as existence.3 
Troisfontaines recognizes this achievement of the intra-existential 
aspect of thought as of cardinal importance in Marcel's development. 
He emphasizes the point that Marcel has reoognized both the immedi-
acy of existence as well as the ability of mind to abstract from 
ex:is tence ror a determined purpose.4 
Marcel now turns his attention from the immediacy of the exis-
tence of the subject to the existence of others. He sees that as 
I consider myself as an existent, at the same time I must consider 
myself as not other existents. But I can only think of others as 
existing. Therefore, what exists must somehow condition thought; 
end thoue~t cannot be merely a relation with itself. 
IMMAllE:r-rCE AND TRANSCENDENCE OF BEIlIG TO THOUGHT .• 
Slt11l w1 thin the theme of existence, Marcel turns to the 
3Marcel, Etre !i avail', pp. 34-35: ttLa penses ns peut pas sart-
11' de l"lxistence; elle ne pent qu'lIIl faire abstraction dana une 
eer\;::~i7\P' meaure, et il importe au premier chef <iue de cet act~ d'. 
abstraction elle ne soit pas dupe. Le passage a 1 'existence est· 
quelque chose de radioalement impensable, quelque chose qui nta 
m&me aucun sen8.~Ce que naus appelons ainsi est una certain trans-
formation intra-existentiel1e. Et c'est senlement par IS. qulon 
peut evader de l'idealisme. II taut done dire que la pansee est 
1nterleure a 1 'existence, qufelle est lIDe certains modalite do l' 
existenoe qui jouit de privIlege de pouvoir faire abstraction d' 
elle meme en tant qutexistence, eel a pour des fins strictement 
determinees." 
4Troisfontaines. 8.J •• De l'exlstence. I li7 
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rela tlonshlp of being and thought. He understands that thought de-
~nds being, not analytioally, but in a way in whioh thought refers 
uo being. If this were not true, thought must dissolve itself and 
consider being as what remains. Marcel conoeived thought as doing 
preoisely this in his positive dialectio in 1912. He now sees that 
.uoh a dissolution is resolved into a contradiotion of thought 
~hinking itself. Consequently, many idealists notwithstanding, be-
~ng oannot be absorbed into tho~p~t. Furthermore, the aot which 
~rasps being must be beyond disourslve thought. Therefore, thought 
~s immanent in being. Maroel develops this oonclusion in the fol-
~owing passage. "To 8.S81nne that thought is immanent in being is to 
t'ecognize with the realists that thought, once it exists, refers to 
something which surpasses it and which it cannot pretend to absorb 
\ 
.. nto 1 tself without betraying 1 ts own true nature. ,,5 This problem 
~f thought's natural reference to being will later be called in ten-
"lonali ty and is the basis for t!.arcel' S" ·realis t epis temology. It 
~ill be considered at length in Chapter IV. 
If, then, the aot which grasps being 1s beyond d1scursive 
~ought, how does thought grasp being? Marcel says that it must be 
P1 an intuition of consciousness--"reflexive Intuition"--beyond 
~iscursive thought. The noetic sItuation is something like this: 
.. am face to faoe with being. I see it and yet I do not, since I, 
"Marcel, Etre.et avo1r, pp. 49-50: "Poser l'im.manence de la 
)ensee a l'etre;-c'iit reconnaitre avec les realistes que la pensea, 
88 qU'elle est, se refere a quelque chose qui 18. depasse et qutel~ 
18 peut pretendre resorber en s01 sans trahir sa veritable nature." 
rr 
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I the subject, am myself involved in being. Consequently, the intui 
tion ~ich grasps being cannot ~erlect upon itself directly but de 
pands, as will later be seen, on secondary reflection. 
fJest he still be confused with idealists, Marcel further ex-
plains this intuition. The subject does not posit the reality it 
affirms. n18 subject affirms reality because it is. This p~e8Up-
poses 80me prior reflection, since thought can reflect on being on-
ly if in some way being was previously known by thought. Since the 
intuition already supposes being as given in thought, Marcel notes 
that this prior recognition of being would regress to infinity un-
an act of affirmation intervened. The affirmation, therefore, 
"I affirm it because it is,'' is put at the beginning. Being has 
aid siege to the self, and the subject intervenes between being 
d thought, but only as the subject is itself being.6 
This grasp of being, however, is a mystery and cannot be ob-
ectivized but only recognized. • Fu~thep, T~olsfontaines notes that 
n act of reflection cannot convert this participation in existence 
nto an objective concept without a contradiction. An essential 
Ifference must be held between participation and objectivization. 7 
arcel then~rizes this very important advance. The sharpness 
r Marcel's own French brings out better than could a translation 
e firmness ot his conclusion: "Je pense, donc l'etre est: car 
e pensee exige l'itre; elle ne l'enveloppe pas analytiquement, 
6Ib1d., PP. 141-142, 203-204, 43. 
7Tro 
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mais se r'f~re I lui. H8 
It is now clear that a second type of reflection is necessary 
to recognize the first intuition. I do not immediately know this 
first intuition. Only a type of second reflection or, as it is 
termed earlier, a dialectic of experience, can discover being. 
consequently. thought must be looked upon as a double process: 
spontaneous intuition, and a subsequent reflection grasping this 
primary intuition. 
NA TORE OF THE SUBJECT 
The next theme to be considered is the nature of the subject. 
ego. Seoond reflection indicates some fundamental tension in the 
thinking subject to go beyond itself. This is what Marcel meana 
when he says that reflection of the I econd power is absorbed into 
the first intuition of being. This ontological need is alao redo-
lent of Schelling, in whose doctrine of. the tension between spirit 
and matter Narcsl found a place for this creativity of the self. 
If this subject is considered as a means of communioation wit 
other Bubjects, Marcel goes back to his notions in the .TournaI. 
The Bubject can only be a person who answers questions. This is 
possible by the subjectts power to make himself "othel'. t1 This is 
the fundamental possibility for expression. The subject can stand 
back from himself and his own ideas and thus make it possible to 
l' l 8Marcel, ~ .!.! avoil', p. 52. ----___ -----1 
rr 58 if those ideas to others. However, though the subject can sepa-
himself from his ideas, he cannot abstract fro~ himself as be-
since he is besieged by being. fw1arcel calla this aba trac tion 
self as beinr, a pretention. It is important to note at this 
taPce that Marcel maintains that it is possible for me to make an 
bstraetlon from myself as existing, as well as fram my ideas, but 
ot from myself as being. This abstractive process will later be 
armed "primary reflection." Attention must now be turned to the 
the subjeot as bein~, the realm of mystery. Creativity, 
Itness, faith, fidelity, and love are the responses evoked from a 
who is involved or committed to being. 
THE ONTOLOGICAL MYSTERY AND THE PERSONAL RESPONSE 
First, an urge to create is evoked by the nature of this onto-
ogieal participation. This creativity is based upon a fundamental 
ttestation to reali ty at its foundatio:p.-; an attestation of" t."'e 
ansee and of the whole beinR. As Marcel puts so clearly, it is 
at the individual's destiny merely to submit passively to reality, 
o be oommitted to existence, but actively to engage 1n it, to re-
reate bein~ in himself. In this creative attestation as witness, 
person is free and may refuse. Consequently, his obligation is 
arsonal and serious and raises his creativity to the realm of 
It should be noted here that Marcel's doctrine of creative 
itnes8 is contrary to idealism, which holds that only the mind an 
not the senses attest to being. Nor can it be identified with the 
~.--' -----~ 
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self-creutivity as expressed by Royce.9 In Roycets doctrine, each 
indi vidual person ontologically crea tea 1; maelf and other indl vidu 
als, as well as their personal rela.tionships. The person thus in-
dividualizes both himself nne others, by freely determininr; and 
limi ting more and more the universal form of the Absolute. As TAar 
eel expresses it, man 1s a "unique reality" to whom unity and u-
niqueness can only come from himself. The world of the individual 
1s a world of hls own making, a "fln Inoarnee."10 However muoh in 
debted Marcel might be to Royoe for the notion of individuallty 
creating Itself, thore Is a declded dlfrerenoe. Marcel never Iden 
tified the individual with the Absolute, as did Royoe, nor did he 
attempt to el~lnate the existential experlence or the body as 
mediator in knowing. 
~~e conclusions of this concrete onto1or,y so briefly outllned 
a.bove oannot be pursued, 1"arcel notes, in the "plgeon-holes" of 
logical thought. Rather, certain proper.ly spirt tua 1 rae ts b.f ex-
perience such as fidelity and love must be analyzed. All these 
faots of experience, as was seen tn the co.,.,.,-ments made on nreflexiv 
intuItion," indicate particular types of response to the ontologi-
cal mystery. These responses evoked by a being actlvely engaged 
in reality must now, as Marcel recommends, be analyzed. 
The first of these responses to be oonsidered is faith or 
91£!£., pp. 170-171, 177, 234, 245-246, 139, 168. 
10Marael, 1! metaphyslaue, p. 69. 
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fideli ty. Mari tain sees in '~a.rcel t s r (>.flec tions on fidel! ty a sol-
1d :Jroof of his ontologica.l realisM. He ;-:ays: "Therefore, if I 
:ri9'htly underst9.nd M. "!lrcel 's thou~ht, if 1'10 follow its direction 
e shall conclude that a philosophy of life wl-~ic:>1 confuses my ~ 
ith the flux of my life 1s inconsistent with the experience of 
'flle experience, the irreducible real!ty of what I ex-
erlenee and know a.s fidelity, is pregnant with a.n ontological real 
1srn. ,,11 This fidelity can issue only from a being who feels r:im-
self involved; who feels, with an inward consoiousness, that he is 
ithin a reality Which at once penetrates and enfolds him. Tha.t 
reality, further, must be something which is absolutely given. It 
demands, therefore, an absolute commitment made with tho whole of 
y beinp:. Hor can fidelity be given to a thing; it must be given 
to a person, bD an absolute person, to beln~ itself, to the totali-
ty of whnt is. Consequently, n subjeot is invf)lved in a permanent 
ontologioal status grea tar than himself .. whioh demands a ~)er"sonal 
commitment. This oommitment is creative witness, or creative 
fidel! ty. 
Marcel adds one finnl characteristic to the experienoe at' 
cren tlve witness. Since this crea ti va \'fi tnf:}Ss lnv01 vos the entire 
person or being of the subject as well as the being which is out-
side the subject, a tension arises between the subjective and the 
obJective ontological factors in experience. Marcel found the 
llJacques Maritaln, A Preface !2 Metapillrsics (London, 1939), 
P. 51. 
~.--' ----------. 
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recognition of a similar tension in thewritin~s of Bergson and 
st. Augustine.12 
When the communication between beines is considered, the sec-
ond crea.tive response, that of love, comes into focus. With love 
the triad of questioner, object, responder, ohanges to a dyadio re 
lation of interoommunioation. In this dyadic relation the other 
may be oonsidered in two way;. First, loan oonsider h1m as other 
gua other. I thus form a cirCle within myself and place his objeo 
tlvized idea there. This i8 treating him as an "it" [!!!!] and is 
on the level of problem, as will be shown presently. On the othe 
hand, I can open myself to him and treat him as a Thou (tol], not 
an "it." This Is neither the realm of self or of other, that is 
objectivity, but of love or intersubjectivity. If it is an Abso-
lute Person I love, I freely SUbordinate myself to this superior 
reality. Maroel 8ays that love transcends the self and the other 
and establishes lY!. in being. He notes,tha t many scholastios find 
\J 
themselves 1n a rut precisely because the primaoy of love is 
13 ignored. 
Thus, by the oreative witness to reality shown 1n faith, a 
person commits himself to being or the absolute being. ny love, a 
person oomm1 ts 'tl1mself to ;;.nother person, e1 ther human or absolute 
12Maroel, Etre ~ avoir, pp. 173, 144. 
13~., pp. 308-309, 63, 173-174, 155, 244. By soholastic 
Marcel means any sohool of philosophy wh1ch oonsiders its own 
system as integral and closed. Thus the term applies to the Kant-
ian system, the Hegelian system, the Roycian system, and perhaps 
to the systems ot aome !homiats. 
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ONTOLOGICAL REALMS OF PROBLEM Afro MYS~ERY 
It must be noted now that Marcel's doctrinal considerations 
are falling into two categories: one of mystery, which includes 
existence and being, myself, and intersubjectivltYi the other of 
problem, that is, objectivity, self as abstracted from existence, 
other as other. Marcel gives the essential distinction between 
these two categories in the following passage. 
In fact, it seems very likely that there is this essential 
difference between a problem and a mystery. A problem is 
something which I meet, which I find complete before me, but 
which I can therefore lay siege to and reduce. But a mystery 
is something in which I am myself involved, and it can there-
fore only be thought of as a sphere wbere ih!. distinction 
between what is in me and what is before me loses its meaning 
and Its IiiItIiI vi'l'IdIti7 -rgenuine probl&m is subjeot to an 
appropriate teohnique by the exercise of whioh it is defined: 
whereas a mystery, by defInItion, transcends every conoeivable 
technique. It is, no doubt, always possible (logioally and 
psychologIcally) to degrade a mystery so as to turn it into a 
problem. But this is a fundamentally vicious proceeding, 
whose spring. might perha£~ be discovered in a kind of corrup· 
tion of the intelligence. L,J. .~ 
" 
A problem, then, is the realm of the other gua other. It is 
in the order of objectivized thou~ht and abstraction, and is sus-
ceptible of a definite teohn1que. But most important, wherever a 
problem is found, the subject working on it 1s not taken into ac-
count but 1s merely presupposed. Consequently, in a problem the 
subject-ego is not considered. In a mystery, on the other hand, 
the "I" is most definitely involved. A mystery is something of 
which I am a part. Consequently, it is not objectifiable for me. 
14Marcel, Being !B& Having, p. 117. 
b 
In other wox-ds, it is a "problem which encroacbes upon its own dat 
and invades them, and so is transcended qua problem. "15 F'rom the 
subject-object point of view, Rosemary Fitzpatrick adequately sum-
marizes for the purpose or this thesis, the relation between pro-
blem and mystery. II A mystery cannot be reduced to the eleT'lents 
that constitute it nor to prior elements and, consequently, discur 
sive thought is not possible. It transoends tbe order of subject-
object. A problem, on the other hand, is concerlled preCisely wi th 
this subject-object relationship and can be analyzed in terms of 
its preoedent elements, while in the process one term or set or 
terms can be substituted tor another. n16 
The roots for Marcel's distinction between problem and myster 
can be found, more or less developed, in the doctrines of Brunsch-
vlcg and Royoe. Brunaohviog had taught Marcel that man by his lib 
arty has the option of reducing thought to the objectitlable. 
Royce, in !h!. World !!!!! E.h!. ... I.... n.. d ... I ... v, ;;;;i .. d... lla=l ,.,dI v ides na ture into the 
15 Ib1d., p. 171: Marcel realizes that the term mystery might 
p,ossibly-b$ oonfusing to Catholics. He distinguishes as follows: 
'I should like to note that from my own standpoint the distinction 
between the natural and the supernatural must be rigorously main-
tained. It will perhaps be objected that there is a danger that 
the word 'mystery' might confuse the issue. 
"I would reply that there is no question of confusing those 
mys teries w}t oh are enveloped in human experience as such with 
those mysterIes whioh are revealed, suoh as the Inoarnation or Re-
demption and to which no effort of thought bearing on experIence 
oan enable us to atta1n" (PhI1osophX ~ Existenoe, pp. 30-31). 
16Rosemary Fitzpatrick, "The Role of Love in the Philosophy 
of GabrIel Marcel," Unpublished ~,laster's Thesis (Loyola UIliversity 
Chioago, 19$1), p. 23. 
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.orld of description and the world of appreciation. The world of 
description is that of soience and nature, situated in space and 
ordered in a series, the world of eonerete exporience. The world 
of appreciation is the world of abstraot evaluated thought, the 
.orld of metaphysics, spiritual, but not a world of ideas. This is 
the world of communication of concrete experience. 17 The parallels 
~etween these doctrines no doubt started Marcel thinking toward 
problem and mystery. 
BEING AND HAVING 
Akin to the distinction between problem and mystery is that 
~etween Beine; and Having. Belng has taken up a good part of the 
~evelopment so far and will continue to do so, but the phenomenolo-
~lcal analysis of Having must be considered so that subsequent re-
~erences will have meaning. In gener~l, Having is in the order of 
" 
'Other qua other" and therefore a Problem. The most characteristio 
~ote of Having, however, is the t enston bet''Ieen what I !!! and what 
I~. This tension is similar to that between the subject as be-
~ng and being itself. Consequently, Having 1s neither completely 
1nterior nor exterior, but rather Is found in a scale where exter-
~lity and internality oan no longer really be separated. Of it-
aelf Having tends to destroy what I am. This tension seeks to mak~ 
the subjeot an object, what I ~, a Mystery, into what I h!!!, a 
l7Maroel, ~ metaph:£sig,uQ, p. 153. 
Problem. Having, however, can be sublima.ted by creativity and 
transformed into being. The example he gives is body, the arch tYPE 
of all Having. In one way I can abstract from my body and then my 
body Is something I have, merely an instrument. But ~rom another 
polnt of view I !!! my body. In this sense body can be used for 
18 creativity, fIdelIty, and witness. This notion of body as part 
of my oreative being will f5.gure prominently in Maroel's doctrine 
of partioipation. 
We have now roached the important ~uncture between the early 
and middle realist period. Since this preceding period is so im-
portant, a short summary, a finale to the first movement of the 
symphony, is 1n order. 
Thought now appears to Marcel as essentially of two movements 
The first movement is a nameless primary intuition of being. The 
seoond movement is a reflection on the first, rediscovering in the 
• first movement the nature of thou~~ht ttself, the nature of the sub· 
ject, the realm of being, and the creative responses evoked from 
the subject by being: witness, fidelity, love. 
Through second reflection thought seas itself as Involv~d in 
being and tending beyond itself. The subject is revealed as an 
incarnate being: bound to body in a oonc~ete experience which ne-
gates the duality of body-mind, as well as the distinction between 
what is inside and what is outside the subject. Body thu~ becomes 
18Marcel, Beins ~ Having, pp. 10, 161. 
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the mediator between thought and being. Further, thou~ht sees it-
self as involved in the ontological mystery. The creative response 
demanded of the subject by this revelation of being expresses it • 
• el f in a commitment to the reality of being. And being is the 
realm of spirit, of love, of intersubjectivity, of "Absolute fidel· 
ity to the personal Absolute," Being Itself. 
'l'wo principle doctrines stand out here. One is the need, the 
tension, the drawing of thought to a beyond or tlothertl outside the 
thinking subject, as typified by the tension in Having. The other 
1. the condition of the subject as involved in a concrete existing 
universe and yet, through theoontological need, striving to rise 
above it. The first is the foundation of Marcel's epistemology: 
intentIonality of consciousness. The second is the foundation for 
lareel's concrete ontology: participatIon. This ontological order. 
the order of Being and Mystery, can only be recognized by a con-
.oious person, one who 1s :free to afr1,].'\m or deny 1t. His "is the 
obligation to open himself to Being. 
The 8 econd movement of Marcel's real is t 8ymphony, the second 
dialectical aecent, began in 1935 and progressed to 1950. At this 
time one book and a series of articles appeared. The book was Home 
11ator: ~ metaphys1que ~ !'esperance, in 1944. Some of the ar-
\1el •• , however, were often gathered together into collections and 
Published as books. ~ retus! !'invocation and The PhilosophY £! 
~18tence were two such collectIons which drew on articles from th s 
per10d of almost twenty years. One important article, published 
~ree times, was "Position et approchss concretes du mystere ontol-
ogique.,t This small work first appeared in 1933 and was republish-
.d for the last time In 1949. He wrote "Aper~us phenomenologlques 
,ur l'etre en situation" in 1936. This was followed by "Ebauche 
,'une philosophie concrete" In 1938 and "L'etre incarne ••• " [ili] 
in 1939. After the turn of the decade "Le temoignage comma looali-
lation de l'existentiel tt appeared in 1946, and in 1947 "De Itaudace 
en metaphysique.« Within the last few years before the Gifford 
Lectures in 1950, "The Malady of the Age: A Fanaticized Conscious-
ne.s" was published. It would be Innacurate to say that these were 
~. only writings produoed by Marcel in this prolific period, but 
theY' are the articles which give a general trend to his thought and 
,hich were avaliable to this author. 
The titles of these artioles show Marcel's preoocupation with 
luoh themes as eXistence, concreteness, being 1n a situation, wit-
Deas, ruld being itself. All of these themes were introduced in the 
,orks of his earlier period, but in his realist period they become 
ot prLmary importance. 
The first theme to be considered 1n the first movement is that 
of thought in relation to being and existence. Marcel stresses the 
Dotion that thought must be a contemplation, a research by which 
~ought goes beyond itself, as it were, to discover being. 19 Being 
1. irreduoible and immanent tothought. It ~anscends the opposition 
19 
D_ Gabriel Maroel, ffEbauche d 'une philosophie concrete," 
~oherche8 £! Soiences Rel16ieuses, IV, (1938), 157. 
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between the being of the subject and the being affirmed by the sub-
ject. Cognition is thus enveloped in belng~ and opens for me my 
entire subjective being to a reality other than myself, yet still 
at the heart or. myself. Thought, through secondary reflection, nOli 
enters the roalm of mystery where the "given" 1s surpa.ssed. In 
this realm the world is enco~pas8ed in the mystery of being. Thus 
1IY knowledge of' reality must transcend all localized problems. 
PENSIm PENSANTE AND IMMEDIATE EXISTENCE 
At this point Marcel coins a new phrase for his doctrine: 
E,!'nsee I)ensante. The philosophy of the pensee pensante is distinct 
trom the pensee penaee of idealism. In this development Maroel 
wl1l olearly distinguish his notion of participation. Thus far he 
has been speaking of participation more with reference to being, 
the realms of values. He will now discuss, rather, participation 
1n existenoe. The two, of course~ are .. necessarily connected. It 
wl11 be seen subsequently, however, that existential participation 
1s basically the foundation, the !!U! gua ~, for participation i~ 
being. 
DeCorte accurately describes the distinction between Ransee 
l lnsante and pensee pensee. "Thought as thinking is immersed in 
~edlate experience; it grasps being without ~ ~ 2£ all so 
called psychological intermediaries. Thought as thought, on the 
'~trary, is the fallac10us result of an act by which the mind cuts 
~e umb11ical cord binding 1t to being and places itself outside 
-
i "20 the un verse. This philosophy of the Eensee pensante, although 
it is essentially subjective, has nothing in common with subjectiv 
1st idealism. It is possible only when constant comm~~icat1on wit 
being is maintained. 
Thus, the point of departure for pensee pensante is the per-
.onal , concrete experience of participation :.n existence. The 
(ollowing quotation is crucial in Marcel and marks a new climax to 
hIs realism: "At the outset of this investigation we must fix an 
indubitable 'given,' not logical or rational, but existential. If 
.xletence is not at the beginning, it will be nowhere. There can 
b, no passage to existence which is not a slight of hand or a form 
ot trickery. ,,21 Therefore, philosophy must start wi th the experi-
ence of existence as an immediate concrete partioipation in reali-
~. The idea of concrete partioipation has been developing for 
.any years. Marcel now crystallizes this notion as hl18 incarnate 
lubject, bound to body, indubitable exJ.sting, an immediate' given. 
AI a result of this primary participation the subject is also 
20Marcel DeCorte, Preface to Position et apnroches concretes 
~ my! tare ontologique (Paris, 1949), pp. 14-1;: liLa pensee pen-
lante stInsire dans l'immediat: el1e va i 1 t etre p~r deli tous les 
intermediares dlts psychologlques. La pensee pensee,-au-contraire 
.at le resultat fallaoieux de l'acte par lequel 1 'esprit a coupe 
1, cordon ombl1ioal qui le relie i l'~tre at stest plae~ en dehors 
4. 1 'uni vera.« 
21Gabriel Maroel, Du retus a 1 t invocation (Parls, 1940), p. 
2S; "Au depart de cette1nvestigatIon 11 nous faudra placer un ~dubitable, non pas logique ou rationne1, mais existentel; s1 l' 
tllstence nteat pas a l'origine, elle ne sera nulle part; i1 nty a 
pat I, je pense, de passage a l'existence qui ne soit escamotage ou 
1'1ckerle." 
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Ifestable to others. I can know myself and he knovm to others 
as I am an extstlnp.: body. This body ha.s an unthlnl~able, there 
a mysterious, relation to my soul and yet is not synonymous 
me. The precise relations between body, soul, and self re-
a.t this stage of \,18.1"col'5 thou€,ht still obscure. 
FUR'IHER REFLECTIONS ON INlr}t~RSUBJECTIVITY 
The manlfestabillty in existing leads Marcel to consider the 
SUbjects. It should be noted that Marcel is 
ere penetrating more deeply the idea of love or intersubj(~tlvity 
hlch had been described in ~ ~ avoir in 1935. He gives same 
story of the new development in this theory. ~arcel tells us 
hat, while carrying out his job during the war, he often. had to 
answers regarding X or Y. He 1s. ter considered them not so 
as answers but as responses to ap appeal. 'Phs one to whom the 
" 
wa.s addressed, himself in this ease, could not be an object, 
tabulation of answers. The appeal was personal and an ob-
the time" into account. He sees, then, that the 
person could be treated in two ways: as an object, and as 
As an object he beoomes more oxternal ;he more I make him 
and he might as well be ,aba:nt from me. As 
we." the ca.tegories of "same" and "other" can oe transcended 
ough some mutual experience. Formerly he spoke of this twofold 
onsideration of object as the dissolution of the triad into the 
As I penetrate myself by reflection and contemplation I 
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become less external to myself and more sy~".pa. thetic to the t' other. 11 
I then 0.110'11'1 him to panetra to me. 'rhis real1.za. tion brinGs ~f!a.rcel 
aun1n to his doctrine of intersubjectivlty. In P.tre at avoir ho 
--
saW love and intersubjectivity as a creative r0sponae of a being 
ao U vely enr:aged in reali ty. !n ££ refus he idontif~.es this en-
gagement in reality as concrete participation in oxistence. The 
oharacteristic note, however, of love and intersubjeotivity in both 
looi ia that the subject rises above the plane of existence and 
emerges into the realm of value or being. 
Ma.rcel now turns his attention to coordinating ma.ny of the 
other ideas he had previously considered. The notions of creativi-
ty, wi tness, fideli ty, and sensation will now dev9lop into his 
mature doctrine of "creative fidelity." 
CREATIVE FIDELITY 
He first turns his attention again to the nature of creativi-
ty. This creativity is a free acceptance or denial or the beingts 
concrete situation. Creativity must mean, than, to create chez 
-
!2.1. By this free act one takes into h.imself fro'n outside :111>'!self 
and participates more fully in a certain plenitude. 22 
fi!arcel next expatiates the nature of witness. He draws a dis-
tinction at this point between wItnessing and attesting. Attesta-
t10n 1s purely external, a phenomenon, depersonalized. Vie attest 
22~., pp. 27, 46, 3$, 41. 
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n11 to a fact in the present, hic !!~. I attest to something 
Further, I must attest; I am obliged; I have 
o choice in the matter. In this note of obligation attestation 
are most different. To witness 1s personal, not re-
the immediate, and refers to another in the presence of 
This other is the real which demands from me a to-
One i8 a witness to a person oapable of responding 
en the objeotive element is suppressed. In analyzing this notio 
of witness and the subject as witness, Marcel approaches very close 
to the Augustinian notion of truth. 
I can be a witness only because I have a "light" which I can 
give. I can retuse, of course; but then I would be a traitor to 
the light, and sink to the level of mere spectator. I possess ;;;hi 
light only partially and act to inorease it when it is not directl 
visible. It is precisely because th1,s light is not dl pectly vis-
ible that witness is a continuing proc'ess. Consequently, I must 
look upon wi tness as fidelity to a light received, or, as ),~arcel 
terms It, a grace received. 
tion, a giving of oneself. 
Witness, then, is a sort of oommunioa 
It is not ~ndicative of a void to be 
tIlled, but more of a conseoration to another, a giving of some-
thing received. Furthermore,.it is an appeal demanding a response 
Be gives the beautiful example of a littJ",~ child offering flowers 
tor a word of praise. Things are given to us as a g1ft, a gift 
Which enriches the being of the one receiving. The gift itself 
appeals to us to witness to it. In other words, in the gift is 
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bodied an appeal for us to give of that which we have received. 
thermore, the giver of the gift reveals himself in his gift, as 
reveals himself in his response. The object, in this 
on a new quality, a being-for-another in particular. 
my witness to the gift as well as by my receiving 
are personalized and communication between beings 
s effected through me. As I receive so do I give. 23 
Marcel next applies this analogy of the gift, or light receiv-
to sensation. Sensation is the prerequisite for this witness 
response to reality. It is a necessary condition, as has been 
am to know myself. The act of sensation is to receive, 
• a gift, but also to witness or respond to that gift, to open MJ-
,If, to give MJself, to create ~!2!. Both the reception and 
e creativity in sensation must presuppose the existence of myself 
of the world. My body, then, mus~ be the intermediary between 
, . 
and the world, between myself as'closed or open, establish-
this receptivity and creativlty.24 The Bergsonian category of 
, 
"open" helps Marcel to develop this notion of~~psation as wit-
He feels, however, that Bargson never realized the implica-
23Gabrlel Marcel, "La t~molgnage comme looalization de l'exis-
ential," Nouvelle Revue Theologigue, LXVIII (1946), 182, 185, 186, 
87-188, 190, 191. 
24Gabrie1 Marcel, "AperQus phenomenologiques sur l'etre en 
ltuat1on," Reoherohes Philosophiques, VI (1936-1937), 10. 
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tiona of his disoovary.25 
Creativity in oognition, however, should not be overstressed. 
For oreativity, first of all, implies a dooility to the real whioh 
is rioher than all the creativity of the mind alone. 26 Ostermann 
calla the experience with the real a rencontre and sees in the wit-
ness evoked, as did Maritain in fidelity, Marcel's determinate 
realism. 27 
Lastly in this movement, Marcel connects these notions of wit· 
ness and creativity with :f1delity in what he now terms "creative 
fidelity.ft It must be noted by this time how these notions of Mar-
cel gradually dovetail int~ eaoh other and indicate that higher 
realm spoken of before. They are as different faoets of the same 
thing. That thing is being itself. It has been shown that creati· 
vity demands a being in a state of permeability. This presenoe 
Which is outside 1s also avec mol; there is a state of coessa be-
--
tweel' the being that evokes fidelity and that responding. 28 Con-
aequently, due to creative fidelity I am a being opened to reality 
wlth W1ich I can cormnunicate, not only passively an.d objectively 
but eo t1 vely and with my whole being. 
25Yarcel, Metaphys1cal Journal, pp. 130, xiii. 
26Gabr1el Marcel, "De 1 taudaoe en met.aphysique, rt Revue !!!. 
~'taphzsigue ~ ~ Morale, LII (1947), 239. 
27aobert Ostermann, "Gabriel Marcel: the Recovery of Being." 
![, XXXI (May, 1954), 292. 
28Gabriel Marcel, Position et approches concr~tes ~ mystere 
~tologigue (Paris, 1949), p. 52:-
r--------------. 
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Clearly, then, at the end of this second realist movement Mar-
has distinguished two realms: that of primary, piecemeal exls-
ants; and of unity, participation, values. The latter is the 
ealm of being. Sensation is the foundation for both realms. 
Inga are given to us as gifts in sensation. 1~is demands a dou-
response on our part. First, dooility in the face of reality, 
second, aotive creatIvity. ~~e body, then, mediates between 
ings and ourselves, and is necessary for communioation between 
As we receive this gift or light from things we respond 
creating, thus givIng something of ourselves to the gift reoeiv-
as well as passing on the gift to others. As this creativity 
ourselves to the gift expands and grows we emerg6 from the plane 
piecemeal existents into the realm of hearts, coease, intersub-
It is this realm of being that further explains the 
ossIbI11ty of unity In sensation, existence and oommunication, but 
" 
1y after this realm has been recogniz~d through the secondary re-
followed upon the primary experienoe of concrete 
rtioipation. Thus t~aroel 'a dialectic transcends itself and fi-
ally affirms being as irreducible. 
The thi~d movement of Marcel's realist symphony began in 1950; 
18 his third dialectIcal ascent. r-he oulmination of his doo-
came in 1949-1950, when he was asked to give the Gifford lec-
at Aberdeen University in Great Britain. The collection of 
is lectures was published in two volumes entitled ~ mystere ~ 
tetre in 1950 a.nd prc:lsenta the most systematio presentation of his 
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complete doctrine. Other books have since been published: 1!homme 
contra l'huma1ne in 19$2; Le declin ~ 1! sagesse in 1954; and his 
!-
~atest book, ~thomme problematigue in 1955. To the knowledge of 
this author he has not published anything since. 
In this final stage of development Marcel will aye teme. tize 
and crystallize many of his previous unconnected observations. 
Thus will appear definitely the starting point for his metaphysics 
__ the experience of the concrete ego. Further, he will elucidate 
the thought process by which this primary situation is illuminated. 
Finally, he will indicate again the real~ of beinp, where the varied 
.xperlences of human existence are unified and are givAn meaning. 
~e development 1n this third movement will bo taken mostly from 
!;!! roys t41re £! 1. f ~. 
Propaedeutic to his doctrine must be a consideration of his 
~eveloped method. In general Marcel says that it is experience 
'. Hlu.mined by truth which gives the 8 tartlng point for all philoso-
~hy. Experience 1s a concrete situation with inconceivable multi-
~lic1ty, and it 1s the task of reason to illuminate the implica-
~lons in the situation. Thought must then progress to some satis-
~led un~ty in this multiplicity. This experience is not a given 
or an object, but a single lived reality. 
TRUTH AS ILLUMINATION 
The second advance to be noted is the principle of progression 
in thought. In general a subject 1s seized with an inward and 
11 
outward yearning to create above himself. This does not mean that 
be wishes ~o go outside himself but to deepen himself by an inti-
mately lived experience. An illumination is required to reveal thE 
depths in an experience. The fact itself doas not give this 11lu-
~ination. Only the mind can illumine the fact, and this illumina-
tion is truth. Truth must be considered both as a striving toward 
and as a pushing from within. Marcel gives the example of two con-
versationalistsa They forget themselves in the conversation and 
seek truth trom within themselves as well as from the object. 
Sometimes all the illumination a subject can give the object is 
appreciation, but he has still advanced in truth. Truth, then, ca~ 
be looked upon as a milieu intelligible, a background for discourse 
or dialectic which appears inoomplete at the beginning and somewhat 
resolved at the end of the quest. The discourse can be between 
two persons or between one person and himself. 29 
The method of progression in &! ml",-tere is 8ubstantiai'ly the 
same as 1n the previous works we have analyzed. The subject begins 
to reason on a plane of existenoe and sensation and is drawn to a 
higher realm, the realm of being. Marcel distInguishes between 
this higher realm as "the intelligible region" which is ftnot our 
natal s011," and, later in t he same passage, the lower realm ot 
eXistence, "the world we do naturally belong to, the world of our 
sense experiences, the world that oonstitutes us as existing 
29GaQr1el Marcel, ~ mocste£e ~ !'~ (Paris, 1951), I, 8, 45. 1$, 16, 12, 89. 
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creature •• "30 We have seen this double realm steadIly developing, 
and It now becomes of cardinal importance. '!*he progress is carrie( 
on through ascendine levels which, however, serve to deepen the 
understanding of the self. The method is not abstractive but al-
ways active and dialectical through a phenomenological ~-search. 
STARTING POIU'!': IMMEDIATE EXISTEliCE OF THE EGO 
, 
The phenomenological re-aearch in 1! mlstere begins with the 
concrete experienoe of the "ego." At thi. period, then, Marcel 
unl tea hi. retlections on existence with those on t he nature of 
the subject and concludes that here is the logical startin,g poInt 
for metaph7s1cs. My own exIstence is indubitable} and, as was" 
.een berare, It is only due to this, G:4 stence that I am manifesta ... 
ble to others. This "ego" can be treated both as an object, "some-
body," or as a subject, "I." As an object it is as any other some .. 
" body, radically detached ~om myself and lacking In interest for 
me. When considered as subject, however, it is a lived intimacy 
with myselr; I !!!! my body. My body is not something given to me, 
nor merely an instrument, but it Is an unobjectlfiable possession 
not independent of the possessor. Consequently, I am bound to my 
body in so far as M'1 life 1s incarnate in it. Marcel speaks of' thE 
body heps as the link between the subject thinking and the object 
30Marcel, MYster;: or B.inf' I, 16. This passage does not ap-
pear in the French e~tIOn of he work publ1shed 1n 1951. Chapter 
IV ends just before it. For a possible explanation see the letter 
of the translator 1n Appendix III. 
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thought, or the exlernal world. Consequently, the body can appear 
as a problem when it is objectified, and as a mystery when it is 
not. 3l 
PROGRESSION: PRIMARY AND SECONDARY REFLECTION 
At this point in Marcel's development the double realm of re-
flection takes on a new noteo We have seen before that he spoke oj 
the first intuition and the seconda.ry, uniting reflection. Now he 
recognizes three movements in thought: the primary unnamed and in-
tuitive experience; the .fragmentizing primary re.flectioIl; and uni-
fying secondary re.tlection. Primary reflection follows the origi-
nal intuitive experience and tends to dissolve the unity of our 
primary intuition by spontaneous unformed thought which interprets 
sensation as a message and falls into a contradiction. Secondary 
reflection works on the data of experience plus the results o.f the 
primary re.tlectlon. Consequently, secondary reflection makes In-
telligible'~~e primary intui tlon by revealing the immediacy of sen 
sation, particl1ation, and the degrees of participation of the sub-
ject 1n concrete reality. Thus it is the function of secondary 
reflection to effect unity from soparateness--the ego a.s one with 
existing concrete reality through body. Trolstontalnes' analysis 
o.f this disoovery is p ertlnent: n I remain a being to whom reality 
means something and whom, in a most profound manner, it interests. 
31Marcel, &! !lstere, pp. 103-108, 114-116. 
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A (subsequent) reflection upon my first dissecting reflection re-
veals its fallacious charact~r. Secondary reflection compels 111e to 
recor,nize that the isolated entity, the ttl n for whom the world 
"quld be a mere happening, cannot be considered apart from the 
world from which I have pretended to sever it. n32 Secondary re-
flection, then, the movement of re-unification, unites the notions 
of subject, existence, being, and experience into conCl'ete partici-
pation. It 1s necessary to and rnsults in the recognition of the 
individual's primary ontological status--participation inunergoe. 
Considered 1n itself secondary reflection is creative contem-
plation. It is the thought of one's inner presence, a communica-
tion in the higher world of being, truth, and intersubjectivity. 
This contemplation is neither a practical looking nor a scientific 
analysis. It is rather an inner awareness of the outer world, the 
In~athering of oneself in the face of the real, transliminal to 
imagination, a drawing near to reality but not abandoning it' as in 
~bstraction. Delhomme distinguishes contemplative secondary rerlec~ 
tion from primary reflection by saying that its purpose is more to 
~eepen understanding than to see. 33 
.32TrolatontalneB, S.,T., De 1 '6x1s tencn, I, 138: "Ja paste un 111:'1 
etre que la realite concerneet"; au 8ens Ie plus profond, inter-
esse. Une reflexlon (ulterieure) s'exerQant sur ma premiere dis-
sociation reflexive en decele Ie caractere fallacieuse; elle me 
contrainte a reconnaltre que cetta entite separee, ce tmoi' par 
rapport auquel Ie monde seralt comme adventlce, ne se lalsse pas 
lPenser .t ·part de ce dont je pretends Ie a'parer.·1 
33Jeanne Delhomme, "T'moignage et dialectique,ff E:xistentialis-
~ ChretIen, ad. Etienne Gl1son (Paria, 1947), p. 142. 
81 
Secondary reflection presents an adequate solution to Marcel'. 
persistent subject-object problem. The subject can no longer be 
considered as the abstract self of Kant's pure reason, nor some 
spatial inner reality. Therefore, in the last analysis, a return 
to the self is achieved by this creative contemplation whose final 
result is different, more enriched, than the starting point. The 
object, on the other hand, is reoognized as one of the "ext~rnal 
ciroumstanoes." In themselves such ciroumstanoes have no autono-
moUs validity. Nor do they have any independent existenoe outside 
the self, or they could never become matter for my inward ordeal, 
as Marcel has frequently termed the effort of the subject to cre-
ate itselt. They are a part of the aelt in so far as they posi-
tively foater the inwardness of my creative spirit. 
This last observation must not be taken in an idealist sense. 
Maroel does not mean that the external ciroumstanoes are created or 
" 
projected by the subject. What he does'mean is that they are bound 
to the subject by bonds of existence and are part of him in so far 
~s he gathers them into himself. It would be more correot to say 
that the external circumstances oreate the "ego," if it be under-
.tood that this creativity depends on the light of the mind as well 
~s on the free aoceptance of the obJeot by the subjeot. 
"MY LIFE" 
Maroel now introduces a new element into his discourse, the 
~otion of "my lire." Since thia notion will take us far beyond 
rr the scope of this thesis, it can only be considered briefly. It 82 
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has been seen that participation means having a part in a broader 
whole. Consequently, if I am to understand the meaning of my life 
I must appeal to the beyond in Which it shares. My life must de-
pend on some other purpose other than itself to give it meaning 
since in itself it is only a disconnected narrative of works and 
chaotic acts. Consequently, since I can also refuse this appeal t 
the beyond, my life has meaning only as I participate freely and 
creatively in something beyond my life. 34 
A definitive pro~ression is obvious in Marcel's doctrine at 
h~.S time. In general, this doctrine is pointing to a beyond, an 
area Df mystery where being and value are fused. Muoh of his ef-
fort in this last ascent has been to develop the nature of the 
thoup,ht Which oan pierce this realm and oommunioa te in it. Three 
themes particularly evolve into this dootrine of the beyond. 
The first of these is the nature o~ experience as the 'startin 
point for a ooncrete metaphysios. It is not any existing experi-
enoe but the lived reality of the incarnate ego. He will later 
refer to this starting point as "participation immergee." 
In his later book Maroel sheds further light on the two sub-
sequent movements of thought. Secondary refleotion oan be consid-
ered as the oontrolling power over primary reflection. "The power 
of the second degree whioh I have proposed oan only be regarded 
r.---------, 
as meta-teolmical with reference to the abstractive power of the 
first degree. • • • But it must not be forgotten that the power 
of the second degree is essentially reflection."35 Marcel now 
realizes the necessity of prImary reflection as fundamentally ante 
cedent to the seoond. The import of the second is to reflect upon 
the first, thus reuniting by contemplation what was separat~d by 
first refle)tion. 
The third development noted is the new knowledge of the en-
riched "ego" in the light of secondary reflection. This ego is 
immersed in a situation which may be called "my life." The life 0 
the ego points to this be~'ond :ror intelligibility. The inwardness 
of this self which c!'les for fulfilment in the beyond is distinct 
from the objects surrounding the subject over which he has a prob-
lematic cont!'ol. 
Marcel finishes the first volUMe of I:!!!. mystere with some fur-
" ther developments in the communication between beings in this 
realm of the ontological mystery, and some further reflections on 
the nature of the self. To explain the phenomenon of the duration 
of the self recourse must b(~ had to a new category: emplaoement, 
and here the French becomes difficult, slnce no word in English 
adequately expresses all that Marcel means by emplacement. It 
3SGabrlel Maroel, La decl1n de la sagesse (Paris, 1954), p. 
?3: [L]e pouvoir du second degre:-dont 3'ai faIt etat, ne peut 
etr. regarde que oomme meta-teolmlque en prinoipe par rapport d 
celul du premier degree • •• Mals n t oubl10ns pas que Ie pouvolr 
du seoond degre, o'eat essentiellement la reflexion." 
~---------., 
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means being placed in a sltuatlon, not by chance but by design. 
It is placed in this situation not by just any being~ but by a. 
supreme Being. This Is my particular status as a being who is 
free, and Vlho oan re-oreate this being for himself. All this Is 
!:rnplacemant; perhaps we could leas t aWl.kwardly call it the "tran-
scendenoe of being-here."36 
With these last remarks '1arcel concludes the first volu.11'1e of 
the Gifford Lectures. From his OWL words it Is clear that in his 
first experience of the ego as a concrE\te existing beitlG he is a 
rE\alist. This immediate experienoe of cf)ncrete existence :'1erges 
ir:to the fullness of 'heinr:. rrhat element intrinsic to thought 
wllich draws it upwards as well as that which expl:J.ins the exis-
tence of the other and the urge of the existent iQ.:\"~ is intention-
ality. Intentionality of consciousness~ then, is the foundation 
for Marcel fa realist epistemology. To this lr:lportant groundwork 
our attention must now be turned. 
36Marcel, &! mystere, I, 206.207. 
b 
CHt,PTER IV 
A REALIST EPISTm~OLOGY: INTENTIONALITY 
Intentiona.lity in Marcel's doctrine can be considered as the 
urge or pull of a being to go beyond itself to the "other." Prini 
in fa.ot desoribes Marcel's entire dootrine as lithe intentionality 
of the soul whole and entire,"l and the description is not inappro-
priate. It has been seen that Marcel begins his reasoning in Imme 
diate concrete experience, and the intellect ascends to higher lev 
els of experience. IntentionalIty of consciousness and thought is 
the outward urge or pull of the intellect. For Marcel, intention-
ality indicates other objeots as existing, other persons, and Bein,. 
SOURCES F0R IIfTENTIOlHLITY 
A oonsideration of the authors w~ose works we are certain Mar 
cel read up to this period of his life occasions interesting specu 
lation as to their influence in Varcel's doctrine. They were pri-
maril,. Royce, Maritain, and Edmund Husseri. Harcel's earliest ac-
quaintance was with Royce in 1917 or shortly before. However, as 
will appear presently, Maroel did not at·this early time recognize 
IPietro Prin;, Gabri!1 Maraet .!U la methodo1ogle4.i!! Itinveri-
flable (Paris, 1953), p.IS: "1' ntentTonallte de l'ame tout 
entiire." 
8S 
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the lntentionality implicit in his own doctrine. However, the ob-
Jerv~tlons of Royce concerning intentionality seem most probably 
to have led lt~arcel to become more conscious of intentionality. 
Royce, in his book, !b!:!. \'/orld !!!£ ~ Ina! vidual, ma.tntains 
tha t an idea is nothing more than an incOl'nplete intention of the 
object.. The fulfilment of the idea 1s alwa.ys what the idea itself 
at first intended. To clarify this internal purpose of an idea, 
Royce adduces two examples. These examples wIll alao help to clar-
ify Marcel's intentionality. "f;i'irat, in trying to reY'lember a. name 
the !nind sf:eks to fulf!l or rea.lize a pu.rpose only dimly conceived 
at first. Second, the same is true in a mathematical investigatior 
in which certain conditions a.re pr08ent but only intelligible as 
pointing to a solution of a problem. Every idea, then, by its verJ 
ne. turo, t'1nds to a C onforrlJ. ty wi th an ob j flC t. 2 
Marcel's explicit consciousness or, as he terms it, "discover .. 
y" of in ten tional! ty oocu.red after he read Ma:r-l taIn' s book," Reflex .. 
1.2!l! !!!!. l' intelllr;ence.3 Tbis book was firs c published :t.n192I~ 
and a second tl!'1e1 in 1926. Therefore, from hts O'Nl1 adYiliss ion, Mar. 
cel dId not become conscious of intentional! ty in his own vTor1:: be-
fore this time. 
Ma.rcel next read Hueaerl on intentionality, f·md he states in 
an article alrea.dy quoted, published in 19.50 I that it was:1usser'l 
2Marcel, ~ metaphysique, p. 48. 
3Marcel, Letter to the author, Deoember 4, 1954. 
I·I!I !~ 
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whO proved the intentionalIty of consciousness by developing cer-
tain medieval idea.s. 4 The firs t book in vb ich Husserl speaks of 
intentionality was published in 1901 and again in 1928. His secane 
book appeared in 1929. Husserl no doubt owes much of his own doc-
trine to the "Descriptive Psychology" of his teacher Franz Brentanc. 
Brentano taught that psychic phenomena, that is, any form of con-
.ciousness, was intentiona~by nature and pointed to a reality be-
yond itself. HUB.erl's doctrine of intentionality depends much on 
that of Brentano as well as on his own characteristic phenomenolo-
gy. Husserl speaks of the phenomenon as "the thing in itself, per .. 
r.: 
calved in its self-owned being. n .? The nature of consciousnes8 i. 
to point to this phenomenon as its proper Object. Collins' a.naly-
sis of Husserl' s intentionality is apt at this point. There is an 
evident similar1ty between this doctrine of Husserl and the finali-
ty of 1deas as described by Royce. fI It is characteristic of oon-
" 
Iclousness to be of something, and tha~ to which it refers is the 
field of intentional objeots •• • • The mind intends its object, 
~nd the office of phenomenolo~~ is to bring this objective inten-
tion to fulfilment. "6 
It must be ooncluded, then, that Marcel first became aware or 
~ntentionality between 1924 and 1930, although he had been conver-
-
4Marcel, "Malady of the Age," p. 2. 
5Rdmund Husserl, Formale ~ Transendentale Logik (Halle, 
.. 929), p. 248. 
6Collins, Existentialists, PP. 28-29. 
--
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sant wi th it from Royoe as early as 1917. The firs t explioi t a-
.areness seems to have oome fror1 Maritain about 1926, and the seo-
ond from Husserl about 1929. In speaking of his own intentionalitj 
Marcel lator acknowledges explicitly this influence: "fry personal 
position on the point agrees almost completely with that of M. 
,Jacques Maritain, and coincides on the other hand with the German 
theorists of intentionality, that is, the contemporary phenomeno-
logists, ,,7 This latter reference is certainly· to Husserl and 
possibily to Brentano as well. 
Two observations are neoessary here. First of all it is im-
portant that the disoovery of intentionality occured in that per-
iod in which Maroel was becoming increasingly dissatisfied with 
idealism and turning, though he was probably unaware of it, to 
realism. From 192$ to 1928 he published almost nothing philoso-
phical. Yet in 1928, with ~ ~ av~ir his realism Is practicallJ 
confirmed, and in 1929 he begins his analyses of intentionality. 
It seems probable, then, that he read 7~ari tain and Husserl on the 
point between 192$ and 1929. But--and this is the second important 
thing to note--Varcel did not accept intentionality merely as an 
accretion to his own thought. It is only a disoovery crowning his 
own long and arduous asoent. Clearly, he had used the phenomeno-
logIcal method from the begInnIng of hIs writing. Husserl and 
7 Marcel, Etre et Elvolr, P, 279: "La position personelle sur 
ce point colno~art a peu pres oompl~tement avec celle de M. 
Jacques MaritaIn, at rejoindrait dtautre part les theoriciens 
allemands de l'intentlonallte, c'est-a-dire les phenomenologues 
0 ...... _, « 
Maritain merely confirmed Ma.rcel's thought at this time and identi· 
fied by name an element in his original investigations. Therefore, 
it is the contention of this thesis that Marcel did not add realisn 
to his own doctrine as one would put on a coat, but that it was 
precisely intentionality, itlherent in his own doctrine from the 
beginning, that explains his emergence from idealism into realism. 
, 
This is the more cogent because he never recognized intentionality 
while propounding idealism. 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 0:£1' IMPLICIT INTENTIONALITY 
From an historical point of view, Marcel's early doctrines 
from 1912 to 1925 were implicitly intentional. In 1912 he set the 
problem when he recognized that "in some general way being is pre-
sent in the mind.,,8 In 1914 he discusses the planes of conscious-
ness progressively surmounted by thoup.,ht. He further recognized 
,,"'" 
• 
the two elements fUndamental for intentionality: a dualism in con-
sciousness, and the ability of consciousness SOMehow to go beyond 
itself. The dualism wa.s recognized when he saw that thou~ht could 
~istinguish between itself and what was external to itself. Again. 
be recognized that one's own existence as well as that of others is 
possible only inaSMuch as we are manifestable as bodies. Conse-
quently, he draws the distinction between what is within and what 
8Marcel, riLes oonditions dialectiques," p. 640: "l'etre est ~lune maniere generale present dans l'esprit. tl 
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1S outside thought, as well as between tho knower and the bodily 
object known. Consciousness, however, is also able to fW beyond 
itself sinc9 it can supprecs tho exteriority to which it was orig-
inally bound and ~o beyond this immediate experienoe. Further, 
consciousness can think an intelligible content which is not body 
and is not posl ted in space. Thus from his earlies t 1;'11'1 tines Mar-
eel reoognized the abi11ty of mind to go, as it were, outside the 
subject thinking. 
}i'rom 1915 to 1919 it has been seen thut Marcel was working on 
~he idea of the triadic dialectic. This dialectic presupposes 
"somebody else" since it 113 an appeal for an answer and l"oquires 
somebody to p,ive the answer. Therefore, this triad reveals a type 
of intentionality between the personal subject asking and the nsome~ 
body else" answering, with regards to the third term or object. 
During this period also Marcel finds that the relationship ot mind, 
of body, and of sensation depends on the external world. 
, 
He was 
also then preocoupied with Royce and recognized from him the inten-
tionality of the idea. Even though MRrcel was now considering in-
tentionali ty, he did not recognize it, as was shown above, as the 
intentiona.lity of the realists. 
In the period ~rom 1919 to 1923 we find the first explicit 
~ent10n of intentionality, a.lthough 5.n a Kantian context and refer-
~1ng more to the will than to the intellect. 
Now, too, Marcel began working with his notion of an appetite 
tor being revealed in dialeotioal progression. The mind seeks what 
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is; that is, something beyond the phenomenon. 
P'urther, in his notion of experienoe intentionality is ex-
pressed implicitly. ExPerience is an objective fact and an inter-
nal disposi tion. In the imnedia to experience the being C.O~S not 
realize the fullness of what 1s, and this unrealized fullness ~.m­
plies a non-actualized presence.9 
At the end of the period of implicit intentionality It is 
clear that ~~arcel understands consoiousness as betng able to tran-
.cend itself. Although bound to body, it seeks heyond this parti-
cipation in existence to find what is. Through those same bodies 
existents are 1n contaot, and the triad of que~:;l;ioner, responder, 
and objeot implies that when one subject questions he appeals for 
an answer from another external to himself. In the later part of 
this first period he speaks of invocation and f'i:n 1 8 it necessary 
to distinguish what thought thinks in:to penseI' a, which at this 
time is merely thinking of the other, 'tl.nd penser, which seems to 
indicate an abstracted essence. He ends on this note and continue 
his philosophical wrl ting seven years 180 tel' after readinG ~Rarl taln 
and Huss erl. 
EX'LIC IT UiTENTIONALITY: INTENTIONAL PRIMARY COl'lSC IOUSNESS 
The period of explici t intentionalit:l traverses 1929 to 1933, 
its developmental sta.ges and continues into his mature period. 
9Marce1, Journal metaEhysigue, pp. 121, 114, 207, 177, 246. 
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Bis firs t notions concern the na.ture of thoup'ht, and 1 t is here 
that explicit realism will be found as well as tho basic tenets of 
his theory of intentionality. 
•
v1a.rce1 firs t faces the prob1e'.11 of the principle of identity', 
whic:1 can be enuncia.ted as A is A. If this princir,le Is denied, 
thought evidently cannot have liny bearing on rea.lity. It is a 
fix'S t principle In the 'TIlomis tic sense, and se1f-eviden t. 
idealis ts hold -e.ha. t thillklng Is only the posl ting of the A. 
'.rowever 
• 
Ma.r-
ce1 brines forth two arguments to prove that this is impossible ane 
thll t thought mus t be tt of other. 11 Ilhls terminology is a1mcs t iden-
tical with that of Husserl. FIrst, Murca1 says, it' t:Lought is not 
"of other," it ceases tobe a thought, since thought 1s not a vac-
uum but identified and circumscribed by a content; 1 t must be "of 
something." Seoond, if I do not think of thought as lIof some-
thing, t1 I carmot thinlr of myself without saying that I nID.st be 
nothing. IO 
In this realIst period, then, the primary meaning of inton-
tlona15ty is: thought must filways be tlof somethlngff; it indicates 
a.nother. The theory of COGnition of a prominent Thomist, r~tionne 
Gilson, presents a strikln[l' par-alle1 to Harcel's ')n this po_~nt. 
Gilson says that thought is not sAlf-enclosed, but that it erasps, 
'1 or ra the!", necessarily implies, an object. - i~arcel fundanentally 
10Maroel, ~ at avoir, p. 39-40. 
l1Etienne '11l80n, Realisms methodlgue (Paris, n.d.), p. 3. 
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subscribes to this when he says that "here I rejoin Thomism, at 
least in so far as I understand it~ Thought is in no way a self-
relationship, but on the oontrary is of its nature self-transcen-
.:; "12 c,ence. 
For Marcel, the indioation of the other, implied in intention-
ality, can be toward others as existing or as being. qe holds tha 
it is almost the essence (in the sense of "nature." as explained 
in Chapter I, p. 11) of the other to exist and that one cannot 
think of others without thinking of them as existing. Nor can I 
think of my-self as existing separately from them. Collins notes 
this existential tendency in Marcel aocording to which he insists 
that thought must transoend itself and in this way go out to otherl 
and in some way to being itself. He says that "Marcel ••• in-
sists upon what Hartmann calls the transoendence of knowledge, its 
essential ordination to something ot~er than itself and more than 
its own ideal properties. tt13 " Here might also be distinguished 
Marcel's double r-artioipation in existence and being, both indi-
cated by intentionality. 
INTENTIONALITY OF PENSER llND I'ENSER ~ 
In this period the distinction between the two movoments of 
12Maroel, Etre et avoir, p. 40: ttC'est ioi que je rejoins le 
thomisme, tel dUiiiOins que je Ie oomprends. La pensee nfest nulle· 
ment relation aveo soi-meme, elle est au contraire par essenoe 
self-transoendenoe." 
l3James Collins "Gabriel Maroel and the Mystery of Being," 
Thought, XVIII (1943~, 673. 
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thought in Marcel's development was beglnnin;; to shape, and he 
called it the distinction between penseI' and Eenser a. In general 
he distingUishes between these two modes of thought in the follow-
ing paragraph. ttIn summary, thinking bears only upon essences. 
Notice how such depersonalization, perfectly legitimate in this 
O/3.Se, is imposs ible in the order of thinkinp; 2!. Here it is doubt· 
lesS !!..2.!!!!t 2n! who thinks of some being or of some thlng." l4 Merely 
to think. penser, is in a manner to abstract, to recognize or bulle 
an artificial structure, bearing only on essences. This can be a 
tl1ing or an individual person who is thought, but it must be deper-
.analized as an nit lt and not a "thou. tl He says in continuing the 
above passage that the more penseI' is filled in, the more it ap-
proaohes Renser a. This is nothing more than to say that the more 
an object is restored by secondary reflection to it. immediate 
situation tn existence, the more it i~ recognized as real. 
" 
His elaboration of Renser ! is hePe extensive. This is the 
German denken, which means thlnkin~ of a being or an event in such 
a way as to make depersonalization impossible. Only a certain 
person can tlthink of" a certain beinr': in a manner 1n which space i_ 
actively denied. That is, the person "thinking Ofll something 
bl'ings the object into himself and establishes an intimate communi 
t1 between the two terms. He is here striving for the realm of thE 
-
l4Marce1. Etre at avoir, p. 41: "En somme, 1ft pensee ne porte 
qUe sur les essiii'C'es:- Remarquer que le depersonalization, par-
ii~~tement legitime dans cs cas, est au contraire impossible dans 
~~r~hg~ RInser!. Of est bien ~ !!l qui pense a tel ~tre ou A 
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"thOU," whlch grows Into that of Intersubjectlvity.15 
The next necessary element In penseI' ! Is that I can only 
think the other as existlng, whether it is a thing or a person. 11 
it is isolated from existence, it becomes a pseudo-essence and pen-
ser applies. As Marcel says: ttl think 2! a thing, 2! a being; and 
--
existence is here bound to that act of thinking 2.£. something or 2!. 
someone. • • • But if I isolate axis tence from them, I think ll. 
that is, I treat it as an essence, or more exactly a pseudo-
essenoe. n16 
He next considers penseI' ! negatively. On the supposition 
that others are merely my thought ot others, what would be the con-
sequences for their existence? In thla cas., existence would be 
unthinkable, and would involve positing the subject In an endless 
circle from which he would never emerge with the existence of those 
objects. This is properly positing tpa subject-object duality at 
the beginning of the thought prooess, which can only terminate in 
a r~ltless search tor existence. On following out this supposi-
tion the subject would end in imposs1ble solipsism. Maroel goes O~ 
to say that the knower must in some way be open to the object if 11 
is to penetrate him. He must not form a closed c1rcle within him-
self. If the subject does so close himself, the other would merelJ 
15 
.!21!:!., p • 42 • 
16Ib1d ., p. 51: "Je pense a une chose, 1 una &tre; et l'ex1s-
tence eat:roi 11es a cat acte de penser a elre ou a lui •••• Mais 
s1 jl1s01e dteux l'existence, je ~ pense, c'est-a=d1re que je la 
tra1te comme une essence, ou plus exactement comme un pseudo-
eseanna " 
rr-----------. 
I 96 
be my idea of the other, other as I make him~ not othor ~u~ other. 
To put it differently, I neglect the intentionality in my consciou -
nesS and instead employ penseI' and convert the other into a pseudo 
essence. 
INTElJTIONALITY OF BEING 
In the next analysis Marcel seems to be considering intention 
ality indicative of the being of others, rather thnn of their ex-
istence. He begins with Ii refuta.tion of the thesis tha.t intention 
ality 1s merely an analysis of the states of consciousness. The 
first 11¥Pothesis of this erroneous t1:l.es 1s istha t I know only my 
states of consciousness. If this 1s true, Marcel asks, why are 
these stat~!' definItively limited only to this or that? It would 
seem, Marcel argues, that states of consciousness presuppose some 
other reality as a referential axis for themselves. On the origi-, 
" 
nal hypothesis of this theory, however,' states of consciousness ar 
alone knowable. Therefore, this referential axis cannot be known. 
Consequently, unless knowledgo 1s to end in a contradiction, the 
world cannot consist merely of pure states of consei~usnes3. Some 
"other" is necessary for their intelligibility. ~¥larcel goes fur-
ther and says that the idea of "othert! seems to imply some othor 
order, wl),ich would be that of being. '!'his sponta.neous a.nd irresis 
tibla assertion of the other as being cannot be explained. The 
idea itself is the indelible mark which the other has left on me. 
The final conclusIon he draws Is that the abil1ty of thought to go 
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out of itself can be understood only in the llght of reflection. 
In this last analysis is found the link by which the notions 
of penser and penser ! can be joined to those of primary and sec-
ondary reflection. Primary reflection works on the content of 
~8nser; it is ~~e activity of thought 1hich results in penser, 
cnnsequently, by primary reflection a thing or a person is ab-
stracted from existence and being, and thought, penaer, as object 
or pseudo-essence. Secondary reflection is the act1 vi ty of thoughi 
by which existence and being are restored to the abstracted object 
and the object is thought of [penseI' !) as existing aHd personal-
ized by the subject. Conseq'J.ently .. secondary reflection actualizea 
the potential intentionality in the idea of Renser, t.hus bringing 
to light, in E,.enser A, the object as exlstlng or as being, or both. 
if the object Is a person. 
In summary, then, at the end of this firs t realis t period of 
" 
explicit Intenti')nal1ty, Marcel recognized that consciousness is 
essentially of an "other," external to the knower. The subject 
does not post t this "other." This l/OUld deny the principIa of 
identity since r am myself and not "other" and moreover y,ould make 
any thought of myself unthinkable. Nor is this consciousness 
merely "s ta test! of consciousness" Knowledt~e is of 8. darini te aome 
thing. Mere "states" would imply an unknowable "other" of the 
thinking subject to explain the eta. tea. Therefore, fundamenta.l to 
thought is our recogni tion of the othel' which cannot be explained. 
Maroel further elaborated the distinction between penser and 
> 
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£8nser!. The first concerns objectivized essences and structures, 
and the second p~sons. If the object 1s a person or being, 
thought denies space; and the subject must open himself to the othe~ 
unless he would form merely an idea of other. If the object is a 
thing,penser ! must think it as existing. This places the com-
munication between the subject and object above mere existence in 
the region of love and intersubjectivity. This is the realm of the 
"thou" [~J, as Marcel puts it. Thls realm of love Is neither of 
other completely as other, nor of self completely as self. His 
method, then, as has been said frequently, is a phenomenological 
analY8is of the content of thought, which by nature seeks to grasp 
the reality of the object at first imperfectly conceived in ~~e 
subject.17 
FURTHER ELA B ORA 'lIONS OF INTEUTIONALITY 
., 
From 1933 to 1949 Marcel stresses the fact that philosophy is 
a ~-search. The world is not merely my representation of it. 
Otherwise my atatement of the world would be meaningless since 
there is no reason why I think ~ restricted thing and not ~, 
nor why my knowledge increases. He says: "Again reflection wl11 
induce me to ask myself how I can in fact think of that restriction 
and where I get the idea of a oertain thing which would be outside 
my own representation of it; even if I sufficiently think of that 
17~.J pp. 152, 155, 77-78, 219, 299. 
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something only enough to judge it unthinkable. nlB And so whether 
I know s:> me thing to be a certain thlngor nothing, I mus t think il 
terms of a. limit put upon me by something outside my own r epreser~-
tatton of it. 
Working with the notion of witness, he again finds the neces-
sity of intentionality, since to witness to something or someone i! 
unintelligible unless it has a reference to another. 19 
In the period from 1949 to 1954 he elaborates a little more 
the nature of the intentionality of consciousness, further relates 
EEmser and pen.ser ! to the development of primary and seoondary 
reflection, and brings in the notion of tlmy life" as indioative at 
intentional witness. 
Hi! significant point in the first of these elaborations is 
that, though consoiousness is essentially of the other, I cannot be 
conscious of myself without first having been consoious of other • 
. , 
Consciousness of self, then, is a deriYative and not a starting 
point; it depends OIl first passing to the "other" and then return-
Ing. 20 This Is consonant with realism as Gilson holds. For real-
ism does not begin with the analysis of a thought, but with the 
analysis of cognition, which implies two. Consequently, before thE 
l8Maroe1, Du refue, p. 1+-4: "Encore 1a refloxion m'amE\ne~a-t ... 
ell. a me demander comment je puis penseI' en fait oatta I'ostrlctl01 
at d'o~ me v1ent l'idee de quelque chose qui serait audela de rna 
representation, m6me sl Je no pense oe quelque chose que juste 
S.ssez pour 1e deolarer impensable." 
19 Marcel, "La temolgnage," p. 183. 
20Maroel La mvstAre I. 60-61 
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subject 1s known as such it 1s known as thinking an object. This 
is the starting point for ~ilson's realism, and the notion of in-
tentionality is inherent in such a position. As the ThoMlst des-
cribes it: "Something beyond thou'''',ht would not be thinka.ble unless 
certain thour.;hts were cop'"n:t tions, and unless every cogni tion im-
plied S O"1ething beyond thought. n21 
Marcel then p;oes on to develop the notion thnt coenition 1s 
not a mere seizing or takin~, nor is it the recognition of subjec-
tive states. states usually ref(lr to the fluctuation of the body, 
but in this sense they are merely objects conceived as distinct 
from the self. Consiousness, however, seeks some ideal permanency 
not found in the fluctuating bodily states. Therefore, n state of 
consciousness which is fluctuating contradicts that consciousness 
which is of a permanent state. Furthermore, states are sImtial, 
and retlectlol'" 'lnd consciousness are.not. 22 However, consciousnesl, 
" 
even though not spatial, is not beyond the pale of experience 
since what is beyond experience 1a nothlne. Troisfontaines sum-
marizes well Marcel's conclusions regarding the relationship be-
tween experience and' thouf"ht. F..xperience is not anterior to 
thoue:..ht. Thpu(l'ht must be founded in existential experience if it 
·2lGl1s0n, Realisme methodigue, p. P;3: "Un a.u-dela. de la pense~ 
ne seralt pas pensable, 81 certaInes pensaes ntataient des connais 
annces, at s1 touts connaissance ntimpJ.iquait un au-dala de la 
pense .... 
22Marcel, ~ mystere, I, 59-60. 
> 
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1s to be intelligible.. clowever, thought Is not l1mi ted to a. merelJ 
existential experience.. Thus in every experience there 1s a.n as-
vira tlon towa.rd a hii_~her dep,ree of experience, and th:ts is another 
reference to intentlonallty.23 
The notion that comes into prominence now is that of inten-
tionallty as 1 t refers t,:] being i taelt', or to the real"!! of being .. 
The point to be brour,,:ht out is thn t Marcel here recor;nlzes a tran-
SC'3ndenoe in the intentionali ty of thought. This comes to licl1t 
when he begIns reflecting on his own life. Onet~ life soes beyond 
the consciousness of that life. ~lis consciousness cannot consti-
tute that life sinee one had life before he was aware of it. 
Therefore, there must be a beyond where life's purpose c~n be dis-
covered. This consolousness of one's lIfe 1.s not absolute, since 
it is alterable and progressive and oan in no way be divorced from 
concrete experience.24 
SUMMARY STATEMENT OF MARCEL'S EPISTEMOLOGY 
This properly conclude!'! t'l1e l1is+oric8.1 development of' ~~arcel tf 
theory of intentionality. We wIll no*, attempt to summarize by u-
n1 tinp: the foragolnrr, r"3fleetions into a coherent statemont of' JKar ... 
eel's realist epistemology. 
The starting point for ~,tarcelts philosophy is If I exist," or 
23Troisfontaines, Q! l'existenc~, I, 191. 
24Marcel, &! !lstera, I, 182. 
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better, since I am bound to my body and to other existents through 
my body, "we exist"--!!.2.!!! sommes. Sensation is the Drtmary datum, 
creative, yet docile and open to reality. Thus even ::n sensation 
sone intentionality 1s present.2$ For body is the existential ful-
c~~m for sensation. Body's existential experience is, on the one 
hand, only a part of the universe, yet, on the otho!', indicates thE 
tota.lity of the universe. Consequently, we a!'e certain that other! 
exist outside of our own experience of the moment, because of 
intentionality.26 
Negatively considered, intentionality is not merely subjectiv. 
ist states of consciousness. This would be inadequate to explain 
knowledge. Positively considered, intentionality is the thought 01 
the tt other" or thoug,.~t itself MUS t be meaninr,leas. Firs t, inten-
tionality indicates others as existents, upon which the subject de· 
pends for consciousness of hi~self. Nor can it be objected that 
the subjeot merely posits these objeots in reality. • Suoh an hy-
pothesls ends in a contradiotion of the principle of identity--the 
"self" ia not the "other." This spontaneous rl)oor;n-r. tion of the 
existenoe of others is further indica ted by the tons"'.on between 
what one 1s ~nd w~at one haR~ Second, intentionality indioates 
beinp" a transoendental, a beyond neoessary to explain the purpose 
my life requires and demands. Consequently, my consciousness is 
not '301ipsistio. 
25Maroel, ~ refus, p. 16. 
26Marcel. Journal m&taoh::rrsiaue. DD. 261-262. 
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The first noetic experience, then, is a nameless mass, slm11a1 
to the first impressions of a baby, *hich must be elaborated by 
fUrther J:1Iefleotions. Marcel says in a later work: 
These expressions, 'tor the sake of the oonorete, on behalf 0 
the concrete' have about them a flavour that may surprise the 
unreflective mind: one might in faot be tempted to suppose 
that the concrete is what is given at first, 1s what our 
thinking must start fram. But nothinp, could be more false 
than such a supposition: and .'1.ere ':"3reson is at one with He-
gel. What is given us to start with is a sort of unnamed and 
unnamable confusion where abstractions, not yet elaborated, 
are like so many little still unseparated clots of matter, I 
is only by going through and beyond the process of scientific 
abstrac~10n that the concrete can be regrasped and recon-
quered. 7 
The firs t movement of thought elabora tinf! this initial name-
less experience is primary reflection. This primary reflection 
tends to diSintegrate, to depersonalize, and to abstract mere stru<-
tures of thought. This 1s the "going throu~p • • • the process of 
acientitl0 abstraction." ~lat reflection following upon the pri-
mary refleotion aocording to whioh the concrete is "regrasped and 
reconquered," is secondary reflection, the going "beyond ••• the 
prooess of scientific abstraotion." This secondary reflection is 
fundamentally recollection and contemplation, creative fidelity 
and witness to the primary experienoe. Through secondary reflec-
tion I think of others as existents, penser A, and this implies an 
openness to them. Lastly, secondary reflection achieves a thinkine 
"towards" the realm of being. "Consoiousness is essentially con-
soiousness g!. or (rather more precisely) consciousness towards. 
27Maroel, ~ Sooiety, p. 119. 
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It reaches out to a reality from which it can be separated only by 
a vicious abstraction. n28 
Therefore, the intentionality of thoupnt and consciousness 
answers the "why" in Marcel's epistemology: why thou~ht moves to 
the other; why thought rises to being; why my life seems so inade-
quate in itself and points to a beyond. The intentional nature of 
thought itself, which would never allow Marcel to rest in subjec-
tivism, explains as well why he progressed from idealism to real-
ism. 
MARCEL • S INTENT IOUAL ITY AND TIIOMISM 
Since Ma.rcel adml ts influence from Thom1s ts and ideal is ts, it 
~, ' . 
is proper at the close of ~his chapter to indicate the affinity of 
his epistemology to theirs, Prini, a Thomist, believe. that by 
reading Thomistic authors flareel saw the insufficiency of dialectic 
., 
as such and recognized intentionality and transcendence in 
thought. 29 This is partially true in that it was due to at least 
one Thomistic author, Maritain, that Maroel recoggized the inten-
tionality in his own thought. But as has been pointed out, Marcel 
used intentionality implicitly before cOming under the influence 
of any Thom1st. FUrthermore, it was not only Thomism which pointed 
out intentionality but the idealism of Husserl and Royce as well. 
28Mareel, "Malady of OUr Age,n p. 2. 
29Prlni, p. 51. 
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It 1s true that Maroe1 aoknow1edged an agreement with Maritain on 
this point at least. In addition Marcel came close to the episte-
mological observations of another Thomist, Gilson. 
Doctrinally, when the validity for other existing things a-
rises, Thomistio and Marcel1an thoup~t frequently parallel. Con-
sciousness is by nature "of something other." Consciousness for 
both Marcel and Thomists is always reflective. Direct knowledge 
1s not consciou8ness. For '~arcel one becomes conscious of direct 
knowledge in the initial unnamed experience only after primary and 
secondary refleotion. But neither Marcel nor Irhomists admit that 
it is suff~cient merely to analyze the states of oonsoiousness or 
con8ciousness itself to validate an extramentally real object. 
Both have reoourse to something else to supplement this intention 
of the mind. For example, Hoenen, a Thomist, in his Reality .!.!.ll! 
Judgment uses refleotion on the si~pl~ apprehension before the 
judgment to make explicit what was implicit in intentionalIty.30 
Marcel holds that consoiousness i8 bound to body, and only as a 
body participates in a concrete world is consciousness of the othe 
possible. This primary experience is in the realm of mystery. 
Thus both Thomists and Maroel realize the need of some ontological 
foundation before the epis~emological can take plaoe. Once this 
subject-object relation in concrete experience is had, then thou~h 
can refleot and become oonscious of itself. 
30peter Hoenen S.J., Reality and JUdfYent (Ohioa~o, 19$2), 
Chapter V, pp. 131-1$0, 164-171, espeoIal y 165. ' 
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Given the similarities, Ilowever, it is perhaps precisely in 
this epistemology, as Collins believes, that Marcel would find most 
difficulty with Thomism~ "It is doubtful, however, whether Mar-
cel's standpoint can be characterized as Aristoteli~l, let alone 
Thomistic. Beyond a broad acceptance of the realist stress upon 
the primacy of being, he has always experienoed difficulties with 
the detailed epistemological explanations offered by .Mari tain and 
Garrigou-Lagrange, the leading Thomists whom he consulted at the 
time of his conversion to Catholioism."31 It might be observed, 
finally, that many Thomists as well find difficulty with the epis-
temology of these two leading Thomlsts. Even Thomists themselves 
dIffer in their approaches to epistemology. 
MARCEL'S INTENTIONALITY AND IDEALISM 
The next question, perhaps more to the point, is why Maroel 
did not remain an idealist using, fundamentally, the same method 
as that of the idealists Husserl and Royce. In brief, it is be-
cause the starting points of idealists and Mareel differ. The i-
dealists begin with It pense and proceed to analyze abstract 
thought, or the stat.s of consciousness, even though they attempt 
to take the intentional nature of this phenomenon into considera-
tion. Beginning with thought as abstracted, the idealist!, from 
the start, cut off the objeot and consequently oannot but end in 
thought. ~Aarcel, on the other hand, begins with ROu,!. mommas. 
31Co1lins, Existentialists, p. 239, n. 19. 
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This talces into account tho pos!. tion of the body ~wt.he fulcrum ot 
existonce. Pri)coeding to :tnte,retione.llty as such. the Idealists art 
neoessarily subjectIvIsts, wh:lle Maroel, thOUg11 not esohewing the 
subjective startIng point, recognizes that the external situation 
1s nocessary to define tho subject h'-mselt. Consequently, the bIg 
difference in thut Maroel. as the 'rhomists, recognl:;es the insuffi· 
cienoy of intentionality itself, while the idealists rest with it. 
Tho:re 1s a problem fo:r Marcel as to whether in centlonali tlP in .. 
dioateR being as well Q8 exiatonts other than the subject. He him .. 
self poses t..'1e difficulty. "Thougrlt turns toward the Othe:r •• 
The wholo :riddle Is to discover whether the Other Is Belng."32 
• • 
In .. 
tentlonall ty indioates the- existence of the othoz- and movos in the 
realm of being. Howeve~, d003 it grasp the beins of the other? 
The aolution lIes 1n Na:roel's unique understanding of Being. As 
has been seen, intentionality depends ,on a previous experienoe, the 
junotion wIth the object. Intontlonall'ty arises only after the 
subject and object have been JoIned in the experience of concrete 
eXistenoe, the myatare 9ntoloslque discoverod by secondary reflec-
tion. 'l'h1s mystery 1s beyond epistemology as such, and 1s non-
objoctlflable. However, thought does not remaIn 1n this initial 
experienoe but rofers by na ture t;) somflthing beyond itself. This 
tayond is beIng. Th.ez-efore, t:1our,ht :to sot;lohow a ;>articipatlon in 
'belnp:. 
pOint: 
Troistontaines oloaz-Iy expressea Marcel fS thought on this 
"[C]ognltlon 18 suspended f:rom a mode of partioipation 
32Maroel. Bew$! and Ravins:. D .. lOa 
> 
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which no epis temology can hope to e].uoida te s .ince tho opis temology 
itself supposes it. The act of thinking is incapable of being ro-
presented and must grasp itself ~s such."33 Consequently, it see~ 
that thought rises to a higher participation tha.n thnt of existenoE. 
This is the realm of being_ It is the opinion of this Ruthor that 
Mnrcel's thought never gra.si)s being-as-being in a Tho1""istlc sonse. 
The most that can be snid 1.s thut through intentionality a SUbJ{lct 
is borne to a realM, a dlncension of thought, where he is Y'1ado aware 
of a personal participation in the fulness of ~ .~. 
In summary, then, the primary noetic experience of a subject 
is nameless. The ser:ond movement of thoug..lLt is primary reflection, 
which separates and abstracts, .followed by secondary re.f1ection, 
which unites and joins. ~lrough secondary reflection reality is 
illumined and made intelligible. The subject and other exlstenta 
are recognized, first, as participating in existence; and sec0nd, 
., 
as participatinr in being. In this secondary movement of' thought 
intentionality is first employed, and secondly, recognized. I.f I 
ask how I know that others are existing and beirw:, the response is 
that it is the nature of ~y consciousness to so inform me. By 
secondary reflection the intentionality in the pr!~ary experience 
of "otherness" is made explicit. 
33Troisfontaines, De l'existence, It 276: tI[LJ a connaissance 
se suspend a un mode de~artic!pation dont nulle epietemologie ne 
peut esp~rer rendre camp e paree qutelle-meme il suppose. L'acte 
de j)enser est irrepresentable at doit se saisir comme tel. tf 
> 
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Finally, it 1s clear that both ontologicD.lly and noot:~cally, 
c.x~:s ten tinl .,J11.1"tic!pu. tion r:lust take precedence over in ten tionali t~r 
0::~ tolo c:ically, as Trois fontaines po:!.nts out, If (tJ'!:le idea is inten-
tional b(;cause Y'islng fY'om the heart of' that priM.ary partlcipat10n tf 
i)oetically, 1 t is only w1J.en mind, ha.v!nr: already recof"111zed exls-
tential participation of other realities, turns upon :ttne1.f and 
seeks to explain that l:nowled['!:e, thnt lntentionalit:,T co~"!es t:) 
IJ(tht. Troisfontn~.nos conf:J.Y'Ms this primacy a:::.d f'ur1ther ind:!..catos 
t 1H1 t historically the two doctrinos devDloped slmul tgneotlsly. 
"[I)t 1s from participation that Marcel has beon led to recognize 
intentionality. • • • And as there is question of the same realit 
as 1 t wel'e" from the front and from the rear, r am tempted to be-
lieve that the progression of the two was mutually parallel. tt34 
Consequently, even though intentionality and concrete particl 
:..:at1on progress in parallel lines, inifentionallty presupposes par-
" 
ticipation for its validity and in itself 1s insuffic1ent to refut 
idealism. It is to this concrete participation in existence as 
~~F,rcel 's ()ntolo~ical founds. tion the. t we mnst noV! turn our 
attentlon. 
34rnformatlon in a letter to the author from Father TI·oisfon ... 
taines# October 30, 1954: "L'idee est intentionnel1e parce qu l e1l 
surglt , l'interieur de catta partlcipatlon J?rimitive." "[el'est 
de la participation qu'll est venu a reconnaltre l'intentionallte • 
• • • [E]t comme 11 stag1t un pau du recto et du verso d'une meme 
rea1ite, je suis tents de croire que les deux ant pro~resse 
parall'lement." -
CHAPTER V 
CONCRETE PARTICIPATION--INCARNATION 
Since Gabriel Marcel began his philosophizing as an idealist, 
an exposition of his mature realism demands a discussion of his 
starting point. This chapter purposes to explain Marcel's realist 
point ot departure. This is the ex:perience of tl:le concrete exis-
tence of the self in communion with o~her existents tr~ough body 
and sensation. 
However, three points disoussed above are presupposed in this 
chapter. First of all, there is the epistemology developed in the 
foregoing ohapter. Marcel's thought process consists essentially 
of three steps: first, the nameless experienoe; seoond, the primarJ 
retlection on this experience or the .l.bstractive movement; .,third, 
seoondary reflection, by whioh the primary experience is reunited 
1n its entireity. Secondly, it should be recalled that the nature 
of thought is to point to or indicate an object external to itself. 
This object may be other existents or being. Intentionality is 
thus the indicator for realism. '1'hirdly, intentionality is valid 
only it the participation from which it emerges is valid. Tl-:is 
particlpation--concrete participation--must now be established as 
validly real. 
110 
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DEFINITION OF CONCRETE PARTICIPATION 
A working definition of participation must be indicated. Par 
tlcipatlon, etymologica.lly considered, means partem capere, or the 
taking of a part. This part ma.y be material or immaterial. lnlere 
fore, participation means some sharing of parts in a whole. Phen-
omenologically, the same conclusion is roached. A rew examples 
will bear this out. It is commonly said that an actor takes a 
part, participates, in a drama. A person may participate in some 
movement whether socIal, religious, or otherwise. Catholics also 
speak of participating in the Holy Sacrifice of the flass. Thus it 
is clear that fundamentally speaking participation means a sharing 
in something. 
Marcel, in general, by ooncrete participation means to stress 
a personts sharing in existence. The immediate experience of a 
human person i3 the consoiousness of his own concreteness qf exist 
ing as bound to body and sensation. Moreover, thnre is a double 
aspect to this primary experience, the first subjectIve, the 
relative; for it is through body and sensation that a person 1s in 
oontaot with other concrete existents. The first experience of 
ooncrete participation (participation immergee] is merely an ex-
clamatory awareness, while through secondary reflection at a later 
stage the implioations of this participation are developed. A 
further participation is elaborated by Maroel as partioipation in 
Being [partIcipation emergee]. Therefore, a dual participation 
must be noted. The rela.tionship between the two is signified by 
b 
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the title of Roger Troisfontaines' book, ~ lfexistence ! !t~. 
Marcel felt that this title adequately expressed his doctrine. l 
From "immersed participation" in existence a person must rise to 
"emerged participation" in being. Since the latter participation 
1s beyond the soope of this thesis, it will be treated only sum-
marily at the conclusion of this chapter. 
EARLIEST NOTIONS OF BODY, SENSATION, EXISTIDqCE: 
HISTORICAL DRVELOPMEN'r OF PARTIe IPATION 
Early in 1914 Marcel beoame interested in the notions of body 
sensation, and existenoe. He realized that a dialectio must begin 
with an immediate experienoe of consciousness. This experience 
consista of different aspects of one aot of the mind positing si-
multaneously the objeot, its eXistenoe, and a relation to the body 
of the subject. It will be reoalled that Maroel was an idealist a i 
" 
this time. He attempted to formulate a definition of existenoe as 
contact or relation with one's body. His subsequent dialeotic re-
veals the body as a n~oe88ary datum, but insufficient in itself fOl 
knowledge. In fact, this exteriority dependent on body must be 
negated for a person really to know. 
Consequently, at this early date it was the reality of the 
body whioh Marcel felt to be the oentral problem of philosophy.2 
IFrom a personal interview of the author with Father Trois-
fontaines, S.J. 
2Maroel, Journal metaphysigue. pp. 26, 125. 
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He saw that body is not simply a juxtaposition to mind, as Des-
oartes had held, but that it is bound up in some way with the con-
struction of the external world. But the most important advance 
roade at this time was the recognition that body must become a ful-
crum for all existents. Sensation was mentioned only in passing. 
Though these are realist themes, Marcel was still solving then 
as an idealist--perhaps not so much that of absolute idealism, but 
certainly in the Kantian dichotomy of a double experience in con-
aciousness. One is the experience-limit as a datum in apace, and 
the other that which posits this datum in spaoe. Marcel admits a 
Kantian context here, and speaks of the transcendence of thought 
over space to resolve the diohotomy. "It would obviously be absurd 
to see in all this any spatial realism. Anyone can see immediate13 
that this whole theory is oonsonant rather with Kantian idealism.") 
In the period from 1915 to 1923, in which time he became ac-
quainted with Royce, Marcel .further developed the notions o'f body 
and sensation, and took up the analysis of feeling. All these no ... 
tiona he unites in the immediacy of existence. 
Marcel begins with the notion of body as necessary for com-
~unioatlon between persons. It must be the mediator between the 
Ifact and the questioner. Therefore, the body appears to be an 
absolute instrument between the subject and object. Since mind 
3Ibid ., p. 27: "11 serait rta.n1festement absurde de voir dans 
tout cecr-un realisme de ltespac8; on comprend aussitet , en erret, 
~ue c'est bien plutat avec l'idealisme kantien que a'accord toute 
~ette theorie. tI 
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is only where body is, the subject can exercise attention only if 
body is the mediUl!! of mind. Tl\ls means, further, that a person--
1--c9.n exercise attention to something only as I pay attention to 
myself as a feeling being. Body is thus a condition for all ob-
jects. However, if I think of body as itself an object, it ceases 
to be mine, since an object 1s indifferent to the "III thinking. 
Therefore, the body-as-m1ne enters the realm of the meta-problem-
atlc.4 Collins sees in this !mportant step the .foundation for 
Marcel's future realism. 
My hody becomes a problem only when I step back and attempt 
to detach it from me as one object amonp; others. By that 
very act, it ceases to be my body and so renders the problem 
insoluble from the start. It is a strictly non-significant 
question to as.K how m body can be related to the self 2!. 
which it is the body, for an instrument of the self is no 
constituent of the self. Existenoe, sensation and 'my body' 
oannot be reduced to an aporetio state. Either they are ad-
mittedly meta-problematic data that serve as the oonditions 
f'or every problem, or the mind is doomed to a futile quest fo 
problematic solutions where none. are possible. So close is 
the interdependenoe between the Immediate bases of the objec-
tive and conceptual that this pha!e of Marcel's doctrine has 
been termed with some justice a 'mysticisme emp1riste.' (J. 
WL~l, ~ ~ oonoret, PariS, 1932, 245) [!ia).5 
Marcel then further analyzes the notion of sensation and join~ 
the oonclusions regarding sensation to the conclusions on body. 
Sensation cannot be a message, since this would mean that one must 
go outside himself to verify its authenticity. Nor ca.n it be fA 
mere translation, since this means to give a datum to oneself whie1: 
4~., pp. 243-247. 
5Colllns, ThoupAt. XVIII, 681. 
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Vlas origina.lly given to the subject in another way. But the only 
given in sensation 1s the physical event itself. Therefore, the 
import of sensation must be in its immediacy and the absolute me-
dlation of sensation must be joined to the absolute mediation of 
body. 
In this immediacy of sensation, Marcel has the key that needs 
little turning to allow him to emerge into realism. For, as Gi1s01 
. . 
has pointed out, in order to comprehend a.nd grasp the meaning of 
existential ·realism the act of sensation must have the nature and 
value of a principle of knowledge. 6 
F1EELING 
Marcel next analyzes the experience of feeling. 'l'he [lody, 
first of all, is continually felt as the absolute condition for all 
other feelings. A feeling implios a presence that cannot be actu-
alized, tnerefore, a real conjunct1on •. ' It cannot merely ,he communi-
cation since this presupposes feeling. Feeling, then, menns, not 
to receive, but immediately to participate. 
The progression 80 far reveals an immediate, non-mediatizab1e 
element in experience which is body, sensation, and feeling--an im-
mediate participation. But there is also a relative element in 
this immediacy. As a body and sensation are mine, they are immed-
iate. It is also possible, however, to oonsider body as an 
6Etienne Gilson, Realisme thomiste et critique de 180 connais-
sanee, (Paris, 1941), p. 200. ----
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instrument and sensation as a message. According to these inter-
pretations my body and sensation are distinct from myself. There-
fore, Marcel is able to distinguish between the realms of problem 
and mystery; between primary and seoondary movement of thought. 
INCARNATION 
Maroel next connects the above notions with that of existence 
He originally held that the subJeot posits the existence of the 
obJeots oonstruoted in spaoe. Therefore, existenoe is necessarily 
bound to oonsciousness and, for the same reason, to a body. He 
asks himself at this period whether the new reflections on body 
will influenoe his former conolusions on existence. If body and 
sensation are unobjectifiable immediates, and if existence is only 
a prolongation of body, then existence must be just as unobjeotifi 
able and just as immediate: incarnation. Therefore, existenoe oan 
; 
no longer be oons idered a predioa te nor., the frui t of a dialeo tic, 
nor an abstraction, but must be the non-instrumental mediation, 
along with body and sensation, in existential judgments. Existeno 
is no longer oon!erred upon objects sinoe objeots are 1n 
of predicates and abstraotions, but existenoe must be the immediat 
starting point of all dialeetio. Furthermore, between me and thin 
thero is the same relation as between me and my body. I am attach 
ed, as it were to reality throup~ my body, and things depend on me 
as I on my body. Therefore, if I am to communioate, to aot on the 
external world, it oan only be inasmuoh as I am united with, rathe 
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as I am my body. 7 
At the end or 192), Ma~cel defines existence as myself g~asp­
lng my body s1mult~leously as object and non-object; an immediate 
myste~y. The existence of the exte~nal world must be of' the same 
nature as my body; and therefore, as I cannot define my relation-
ship with ml body, neithe~ can I define or oonceptualize that 
"othe~" as it exists. 
Further developments of the nature of existenoe appear in 1925 
~n 1-ftarcel's Existenoe et objectivi te. This short treatise was pub-
~ished in the last stages of his idealism, in which he progressed 
from the i:mmediacy of existence to the necessity of sensation, 
feeling, and body-~exaotly the inverse of his earlier progression. 
~. L. Mascall's observation is here pertinent: "Strictly speaking, 
I cannot oonceive-a-thlng-8.s-existing, I can only affirm or deny 
!that it exists."8 :Existence, then, must be the indubitable given. 
~arcel brings forth two proofs for this.. First of all, to 'aoubt 
!existence is to say that it is not possible to affirm, ft!hU ex-
p.sts. ft But this d.oubt presupposes some idea of existence which the 
subject hesitates to apply to the t1that. Tt Therefore, it seems that 
between the idea of existence and the experienoe of existence there 
:LS no guaranteed contact, sinoe we doubt the application of the 
ttdea consid0red as a whole. If this is true, the;idea of existence 
7Marcel, Journal metaphysigue, pp. 253, 251, 267, 261, 266, 
~05. 
BE. L. Mascall,Existenca !!ll! AnaloPiZ (New York, 1949), p. 50. 
118 
must be nothing, existenoe is meaningless, and our experience 1s 
senseless. But we do have the experienoe of existence and not 
merely an idea of existence. Hence, existence must have meaning. 
The second argument begins with a definition of doubt. Mar-
cel describes doubt as a provisional and recognized rupture of a 
particular attachment or cohesion which can only be expressed 
where there is a dula,ity in thought. But, as was shown, existence 
cannot be a. predicate, and in reality the existence of a thing and 
the thing itself cannot be separated. Therefore, to doubt exis-
tence requires a decree, since whatever is given is given as exis-
ting. The actuality of any experience is surmounted by the mind 
deliberately cutting itself off fron:: it, iJUtting aside the irreduc~ 
ible and primary elements of experience. Existence, then, if it is 
to be real, must be the necessary immediate. This consists in an 
. 
unquestioned assurance, primary and indemonstrable, of an existing 
" 
universe; not a prinoiple, i.e., a universal principle, but an 
immed.iate cognition, a participation. 
FURTHER REFLECTIONS ON SENSATION AND BODY 
Sensation, as well, Is similar to the immediacy of eXistence, 
and is incapable of characterization. Sensation must be looked 
upon as an immed1~e participation in a surrounding atmosphere from 
which it cannot be separated. And the whole of sensation and ex-
istence is bound to a body. 
To consider the body as an instrument involves the entire 
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notion in an endless regression of physical instruments, and the 
body is not mine, but is distinct from me, and I cannot explain it 
Any attempt to explain the relationship.~petween me and my body 
conceived as dL:;tinct from me can only be in terms of a hypotheti-
cal relationship in wl~ ich I place myself in a different cOllili tion 
from that which gave rise to my first inquiry about body. There-
fore, when I refuse to consider my body as an object, or in other 
words, as an instrument, I establish by thought a reincarnation 
between me and my body. This reincarnation is the work of second-
ary re.flection, which reunites that which was united in primary 
experience and disjoined by primary reflection.9 
Participation is recognized at this period as an immediate 
indubitable condition of oneself in existence through body and sen 
sation. Existence is no longer called into doubt. However, re-
gardless of hOil realistic this might sound, Marcel is still con-
" 
ceiving participation as transoendent to the duality of body-mind 
and is still in a Kantian context. He admits this at a later date. 
"l do not believe I am wrong in saying that, epistemologically 
speaking, even in Existence !..!.!£ Objectivity, I adhered basically tc 
a Kantian line of thought. It seems to me today that rundamentall~ 
partioipation appeared to me as transcendent to the SUbject-object 
dichotomy. 1110 To evolVe rrom this Kantian line of thought !11arcel 
9Marcel, Journal metaphysique, pp .. 310"315, 322, 325, 326. 
10Marcel, letter to the author, December 4, 1954= "Je ne crais 
pas me tromper en disant que sur le plan epistemologique, meme dan~ 
r-
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must by reflection pierce beyond the objoctivity of the existing, 
sensing, incarnate subject in contact with things and the Kantian 
phenomena into the actuality of the noumena. 
FIRST REALIST CONCRETE PARTICI ?ATION 
Between the years 1928 and 1933 Marcel managed to accoMplish 
this transition w5.thout, however, the dubious use of inference. A1 
this time he achieved the most important insir:.ht tn his de~Jclopment. 
For on the conclusion of' this progression depend.s the valid! ty of 
his !"ealism. Participa t1 on 5_n axis tance ~.s the irnrtedia te experi-
enoe of incarnation, in which consciousness of the self as existin!O 
and as bound to body cannot be separated. This immediacy of my OWl 
concrete existence is concrete participation. Therefore, since in 
this first experience subject and object are not distinguished, we 
have the key to combat Kantianism. If thought starts from the 
., 
subject-object duality, it can never rejoin them; but according to 
Marcel, the primary experience ~ pot 2! duality ~ 2! unity--st 
bodl exists. This 1s the essential starting point of metaphysics. 
Incarnation--the pivotal 'given' for metaphysics. Incar-
nation--the status of a being bound to body. A 'given' in-
scrutable to itself; in opposition to the cogito. or that 
body I can say neither that it is I, no!" that it is not I, nOI 
that it is for me (as an object). At once the subject-object 
dichotomy 1s transoended. Inversely, if I start from this 
diohotomy as a basic prinCiple there will be no logical 
ExistenCE! !! Objectivite, 'e roten tenais au fond Ii una ligna de 
pensee kantienne. II me paratt aujourdthui que la participation SE 
presentalt au fond a mol comme transcendante par rapport a l'oppo-
sition du 8ujet at de Itobjet." 
121 
hocus-pocus which will enable me to rejoin the unity of that 
fundamen tal experienoe. frhis experience will inevitably be 
avoided or refused, whioh comes to the same thing. ll 
Nor is this existential situation solipsistic, but it is the 
proper position of a beine-in-the-world. Through his body the sub. 
ject is immediately in contact with all ather existents. These 
existents as well as the subject are parts of the universe. As I 
oannot place myself outside the universe, I oannot objeotivize it; 
and again there must be an immediacy whioh donies duality. There 
are not, then, two orders that must be joined; but in ""nrcol's doo-
tri.ne th~ duality is suppressed in it unity that is a primary expel"-
ience--I, my body, the world. Gilson aptly desc!'ibes whHt Maroel 
has here stated: "la salsie dlroote de l'existence des ohoses dan! 
une sensibilite.,,12 
Fr-om 1934 to 1938 Maroel did little publishing, and from 1938 
to 1950 came the series of essays men~ioned on pp. 66-67, in Chap-
" 
ter- III. Attention must now be given to Marcel's oentr-a1 doctrine 
of participation as it developed in these essays and in &! mysters 
de 1,etre. 
---
l1Marce1, Etre et avoir, p. 11: "L'incarnation--donnee cen-
trale deAla metaphyslque. L'inoarnation--sltuation d'un etrs qui 
s'apparait COmMe lie a'un corps. Donee non-tranaparante a ello-
mome: opposition au eogito. De oe corps, je ne puis dire nl qu'il 
est moi, ni qu'il n'est pas mot, ni qulil est pour moi (objet). D' 
8mblee, l'opposltlon du sujet et de l'objat sa trouve transoendse. 
Inversement, si je pars de cetta opposition traitse COMma fondamen-
tale, i1 n 'aur-a pas de tour de passe-passe 1 r)gique qui me permet~e 
de rejotndre cette experience; celle-o! sera i.nevi tahlement eludee, 
ou recuses, oe qui revlent au meme. tt 
12Gilson, Realisme Mothodigue, p. 49. 
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OONORETE PARTIC IPATION A.S TIlE PHlLOSQ}PHY OF JtEPROUVE 
- . 
Any philosophy that claims to be realist must lay down as a 
first principle the recognition of existents. The primary existen 
is myself. Not..1!. ,Eens. nor l!. :£1!. but rather, j teprouve. 'this 
philosophy of l'eprouve is not a new doctrine of Marcel but merely 
a further development of two aspeots of concrete participation al-
ready noted. The first of these is the existential position of a 
person as etre Incar~', the indispensable conditIon for knowledge. 
The second is the oreativity of sensation. 
1. Oondition for Knowledge: itrs incarne 
It seems characteristic of ooncrete participation and also of 
participation in being for Marcel to use 1teprouve. In this term 
is brought out the Simultaneity of the subjective starting point 
and the initial contaot with other existents, necessary for know-
" 
ledge_ This is the immediate unity of experience, !2h erlebe 
[I experience], the experience of a concretely existing being who 
knows and can be known through its own body. Consequently, as I 
my body, my existence is manifestable to others, and theirs to me • 
. Th18 unthinkable relationship between me and my body is that of an 
~tr. Incarne. Man knows properly as an incarnate being, not a dis 
incarnate spirit or mind. The I'elation of me and my body is thus 
the foundation for proper human knowledge. 
2. Creativity of Sensation 
r 
12) 
Here Maroel further analyzes the notion of oreativity observe, 
before. Sensation is not merely a passive reoeption, but is a 
creative response, The physical event underl:l1.ng sensation oannot 
be understood merely as a given to consoiousness. Rather, sensa-
tion must translate the physical event into knowledge. Thus sen-
sation 1s a reoeptivity and an activity, ua welcoming something 
from outaide oneself into oneself."l) Therefore I must be open to 
a reality other than myself with which loan communioate. Sensa-
tion, then, can be oonsidered in two ways: as non-objectlflable, 
where it 1s body-as-subjeoti and as objectifiable, where it is oon-
sidered as not-mine. In t'!.e first case sensation is iL1.mediate, 
metaphysioal, and Ultimate. In the second case sensation must be 
considered as a message. l4 Sensation cannot be demonstrated but i8 
a first datum. ~lis is in aocord with realism as Gilson describes 
it. The error precisely of demanding ,an intellectual demonstratioD 
" 
tor the validity ot sensation is that of idealism. "Difficulties 
arise when the philosopher attempts to convert the oertitude of 
sensation into demonstrable oertitude proper to the intellect. At 
this point are born the classic objeotions of idealism against the 
validity of the testimony of the sen8es."1.5 
l.3Marcel, Du refus, p. 41: !!accueillir ohez soi quelqu 'un du 
dehors." --
14 Ibid ., pp. 39, )). 
l.5Gilson, Realisme thomiste, p. 197: "Les d:1.rficul tes oemmen-
cent seulement lorsque 10 phIlosophe entreprend de transformer 
cette certitude sensible en une certitude de nature demontrable qui 
Marcel goes on to stress the creative aspect in sensation. He 
holds that the concrete situation, on the one hand, actually makes 
!!!. On the other hand, if this sensati>n be oonsidered as a mes-
sage and not as a subjeot, t~e body is an objeot and can be placed 
in the realm of problems. His final note is that I am free to denl 
this immediate subjective participation and convert it into the 
abstracted subjeot-object duality, in which case I do violence to 
the fact and would end in idealism. Whereas, if I accept this im-
mediate datum and r~-create it within myself, I am witness to what 
exists outside myself" and in "aome way bring it into myself to be-
oome a part of my own existence. E~istlne reality thus becomes a 
part of me. l6 
FIliAL STATEMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF COUCRETE PARTICIPATIOli 
In &! mystere we find the final development of" concrete parti. 
clpation. First Marcel elaborates the notion under the passivity 
of partioipation and distinguishes the various gradations in this 
phase of participation. Later he will elaborate the activity in 
participation. 
serait l'oeuvre de l'intellect. C'est alors que naissant les ob-
jeotions 1d&alistes olassiques contre la validite du temolgnage 
des sens." 
16Maroel, ~ ret"us, pp. 39-40, 34-35, 186. 
r 
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1. Passive Concrete Pa.rtlcipation 
The passive aspect of participation involves the immediacy of 
III eXist." as an excl~~tory awaroness and an outward manlfestabil 
i ty. This is neither t.l'le cogi to nor the sontio. because any infer 
ence destroys th~ immediacy of the experience. ~ is the hallmar 
of affirmation, or better sumus. The body in this immediate exper 
ie:noe can be considered as subject or object. If the body is 
treated as object, the immediacy is destroyed; the body as subjeot 
must mediate cognition or thought falls into the world of abstrao-
tions whioh incarnation of its nature transcends. This ego in the 
primary experienoe is an immediate massive datum of existence not 
transparent to itself. It is not completely dematerialized since 
the body is used as an instrument and has pos8osc;ions whioh imply 
things. However, neither is it completoly material, or an infinit 
regress of bodies would be necessary to explain its activi1;y; the 
unity In experience would be Wlintelligible. Therefore, the exist 
lng ego 1s rather a fundamental feelins of myself.~a feeling pas-
sively considered--whlch cannot amount to merely objective pos.es-
sian, or to any instrumental relation, or to something whioh could 
be treated purely and simply as identity of the subjeot with the 
object. This is the fundamental indubitable experienoe with which 
philosophy must begin. To deny or to abstract from this experienc 
is to substitute a product of the mind for reality. This fundamen 
tal feeling of the concretely existing ego is the reoognition of 
r 
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conorete participation.17 
Marcel next distinguishes the grades of participation in this 
paszive vhase of the doctrine. ~lere is firJt the purely objeotive 
partioipation, as for example, the share in a piece of cake. This 
is mere possession and can de ideal in the sense that I can get it 
for another. The second degree is the objective-subjective partic1i-
pation, as when one takes part in a ceremony. This is the partic-
ular personal expression of some objeotive announoement. However, 
it oan still be ideally conceived since I am able to projeot myself 
in thought in order to accomplish this degree. The third degree 1s 
that of non-objective participa tion, as prayer and sacrifice. 'I'his 
is a partioular ceremony whioh is a special aspeot or indioation of 
a greater partioipation. 
Marcel then distinguishes this non-objeotive participation in-
to two diViSions, partioipation immeraee and participation emergee. 
" 
This is the most important conclusion in Marcel's notion of concretl& 
[participation and that about whioh we have been speaking and to 
~hich the reflections on body, sensation, and feeling have been d1-
~eoted. Participation immergee, or immersed partiOipation, is par-
ticipation in existenoe. ParticipatIon emergee is partioipation in 
~eing. A oonsoious, oontemplative, free being, therefore a person, 
arises from participation immergee into participation emergee--de 
~'existenc~ ! ltetre. 
17Maroel, ~ mystere, I, 116-117, 132. 
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2. Partioipation immerge. 
For the purpose of this thesis the notion of Harticipatlon 
immergee is most important. Conseq"uently, this notlon .. ,ill now be 
developed at length. At the conclusion of the chapter will be put 
Ii brief discussion of participation emerl1ee. In i tael f, any lengtl::-
y disoussion of this notion "ould take us far beyond the th~sis. 
In Eartieipation immergee the ontological concrete starting 
point for philosophy is t·~iven. This immorsed participation is the 
metaphysical status of the knowing subJect. Secondary reflection 
reveals it as a co'-:-~mon feellng nnd an inner presence, transcending 
what can be soen and had, similap to the mys tcrious link w1,:ich 
binds a peasant to the soil. It is purely immediate experlence, a. 
partioipation in which we are immersed. 1S 
3. Active Concrete PartiCipation 
But, as has been seen, Marcel does not rest with the merely 
passive aspect of participation in the philosophy of l,eprouve. 
From the ber,inning he has insisted that an active element is also 
present. In this period of his mature doctrine ho coins a new tern, 
receptlv1.ty, which transcends both activity and passivity. 
Receptivity implies the situation of a. being-ln-the-world, 
acoenting now not the subjective aspect of participation but the 
relative or communicative. Aotive participation is to receive 
r 
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chez!2!. Such active reoeption requires a deliberate orientation 
of mind and feeling and is therefore possible only for a free par-
son. In other words, a stone may participate in existenoe, but 
this Is merely passive; an animal may participate in existence 
through sensation, but not fully. PartiCipation, as Maroel wishes 
the notion to be understood, requires a person who oan orient him-
self to existing reality. r.coe~lze and reaot to it, and somehow 
re-create it w1thin himselr--~!2!. This presuppos. a deliber-
ate welooming attitude, a free predisposition ·to respond. Conse-
quently. a spectator whose only motive for observing reality is 
mere ouriosity, or an empiric looking only to the future, does not 
actively participate in rea.lity. \a,1lat is demanded is a here-and ... 
now response of an individual with a sure grip on eXistenoe. 19 
This wIll be developed later into the highest form of partioipatlor 
creatIVe contemplation, l?articipation~el'!1ergee. 
., 
This responsive attitude is further clarified by two examples. 
To re-create sh!! !2! is more closely akin to the work of the ar-
tist than to that ot the soientist. An artist professes to ~­
create the present form of things. This requires a selr-oommitment 
a8 well as oontemplation of the thing to be re-created. The scien. 
tlet, on the contrary, professes the non-responsive attitude. He 
manufactures for the future; his work depends on the material oon-
dltions of workability. His is the attitude of a spectator who 
19Ibid., 135-136. 
-
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makes as if he would participate, but refuses to do so.20 
SUMMARY 
At the end of Volume I of &!mystere Marcel has completed the. 
foundation--the realist point of departure--for a future meta-
phys1os. In summary, this start:i.ng point is incarnation, concrete 
participation in existence, 1,eprouve. More preoisely, particlpa-
ll2!!. immergee is the initial, primary, existential starting point 
shrouded in the mystery of oognition--a mystery in which the sub-
ject encroaches upon its own data. One's own body is recognized 
as the fulcrum for all existents, both of the flIn and of the "oth-
er." The body is not an object, but is the fundamentally felt per 
sonalnesa of sensation and feeling, the subject's own unobjectifi-
able experience. Body Is thus the indubItable basis for knowledge 
of one's own and other's ooncrete existence. In the prims.ry stage 
this ex.perience is only passively felt -,in the immediaoy of" partic-
1pated reality. When thought begins to refleot upon this primary 
experienoe, it first divides Into subject and object, and later, 
through the actIvity of seoondary refleotion reunites, reincarnatel 
this primary experience. Secondary reflection shapes and explains 
the primary exp:rience .. noting, by the recognition of intentional-
ity, the unique situation of a being-in-the-world. Even secondary 
reflection does not exhaust the meaning of this primary experience 
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since it is part and parcel of the mystery of being. This primar 
experience is not a problem w}:~ich can be put before the scientist 
and exhausted. Rather. contemplation, akin to that of ~le artist, 
brings a person to partioipate more and more fully in the primary 
existential experienoe. Consequently, cOllcrets participatio~ 1s 
two-edged tool verifying not only the existence of the self in re 
ality, but alBo the concrete reality of other existents with whic 
it is in communion. Thus Marcel's starting point 1s not cogito, 
not .!.:!S, not even ll~' but rather j,'eErouve, ll2!:ll!.. sommes, or 
coessa. Marcel DeCorte b.Ul given an adequate summary of this con 
crete ex:i.stential starting point. He has pointed up, as well, th 
richness of this experience as also involving the subject in par-
tioiEation emergee or participation in Being. 
We here co:me to the heart of Gabriel Marcel's philosophy, the 
invisible center of gravity around which all his researches 
revolve. Let us designate this core with a reputable but 
unavoidably inadequate term: participation, or more exactly 
perhaps, oommunication; and expre$s, more or less aocurately, 
the first affirmatIon elicited by this partioipation: .!?!!.2 
is essentially coesse. Incarnation 1s coessa of mind and of 
life; metaphysical cognition is the coessa of thought-thinki 
and of being: the first conditions the seoond, but incarnati 
1s itself conditioned by its own c08x1stential structure. 
other words, the knowledge I have of myself as myself and of 
the other as other, would strictly not be possible unless 
there is a pre-ontological ~£d pre-predicatlve solidarity as 
its principle and sanction. 
21DeCorte, Preface to Position et apyroches concretes, pp. 1 
17: "Nous touohons ici au noyau de laphi osophle de H. Gabriel 
Marcel, au centre de graVitation invisible de toutes ses reoher-
ches. Nommon-le d'unvocable aooredit., mais inevitablement defie 
ient: !! partioipation, ou ~lus exaetement, peut-~tre, !! oo~i 
on, et exprlm.ons dfune maniere approximative 1 'affirmation premi-
ere qul!l diffuse: ~ est essentiellement coesse. L'inoarnatio 
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DeCorte ~xpresses very woll, by the torms pre-ontological and pre-
predicative, the ttmdamental ontological status of a person--
coesse--before the abstractive process of primary reflection, or 
the metaphysical secondary reflection can function. Therefore, 
Ma.rcel's startin,.; point is clearly not a fabrication constructed 
by ontological thoug~t, but an initial metaphysical concrete given 
that 18 later recognized as the startlng point by subsectuent move-
ments of thought. 
~\RCEL AND THOMISTS ON PARTICIPATION 
Before the thesis is concluded, something cun fittingly be 
sald concerning ~;farcelts relation with Thomists on this doctrine 0 
concrete participation. 
Perhaps the most obvious parallel between the two doctrines i: 
that both Thomists and Marcel agree tp,at the properly human way of 
knowing is neither sensitive nor intellective, but the conjoined 
operation of both. Thomists make this explicit by joining body an( 
sst coessa de l'esprit et de la vie; la connaissanoo metaphysique 
est coesse de la pensee pensante et de It3tre: le. premIere condl-
tionne la seconde, ma.is el1e est elle-mame condttionnee par SA. pro-
pre structure ooexlstentielle. En dtautres termes, ls. perception 
que j t ai de moi-meme en tant que moi at de l'autre en tant qu'autrE 
n'est rlgoureusement possible sans une solldarlte anterieure pre-
ontologlque et antepredicative qui la fonde at qui la sanctionne." 
Translator'S note: The phrase "esse est essentlellement coesse" 
can be translated in either of two ways: 'existence is essentially 
coexistence' or 'to be is essentially to be with.' Father Trois-
fontaines, in a personal interview withthO' author, attests that 
Marcel himsAlf frequently uses the term etre (esse) with referenoe 
to existence or to being. ---- ----
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soul; Marcel joins reflection to sensation and feeling. 
In the initial grasp of existence as unobjectifiable, indamon 
strable, and yet the primary indubitable, some agree:nont carl also 
be noted. Oognition must begin from the con.1unctum of sensation 
and intellection; existence is grasped through sensibility in the 
primary experience. 
Beyond these agreements, comparisons would be hazardous. 
First, as was pointed out in Chapter I, the terminoloGY or Thomist 
and Marcel e oncerning exis tenes and beln,<:S adml ts of disparate in-
terpretations. Second, tltour;h perhaps j"areel '8 nameless experienc 
could be compared to a eertatn 'L'homls t1c intu! tion or be inr: spoken 
of by Mari tain, and though perha.ps Marcel '8 prbnnry and 8ecanda.ry 
reflection could be said to onco~'1pass eleMents of T'I1o~dstic si.r"ple 
apprehension and judgment, the difference in those interpretations 
tar outweigh the si"Hilarities. Oons~quently, Marcelts doctrine of 
" 
concrete participation in existence, thougb not contradicting any 
fundamental Thomistic doctrine, would be difficult to establish as 
Thomistic in itself. However, this is not to say that ~;~ar'cel 's 
contributions cannot be used by Thomists. Rather, Thomlets could 
well find in many of Marcelts reflections, a welcome complement to 
their own system. 
THE REALISM OF GABRIEL MARCEL 
At the end of this thesis vre must take Ii backward glance at 
the ground covered, enrich the starting point, and indicate the 
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direction toward which Marcel's thought rises beyond the scope of 
this thesis. The first part of this summary is concerned with 
Marcel's doctrine of 1ntentionality and participation immergee. 
The second part will summarize his doctrine of being; and the 
realm of being characterized by Qarticipation emergee. 
It is the contention of this thesis that, though Marcel began 
his philosophy among the abstractions of subjectivist idealism, by 
his own reflection he oame torealism. The purpose of this thesis 
has been to establish the fact of this realism by an historioal 
analysis of his development and the ph1losophical foundations of 
his realism: intentionality and concrete participation in existenc • 
1. Intentionality and PartioiEation immergee 
Intentionality, as developed by Marcel, was seen to be a 
characteristic of thought which by its nature led the thinking sub 
.. ject to the "other." This "other" is -both the existent and being. 
But Marcel also held that, unless intentionality began from a sub-
ject whoae nature is to participate in the concreteness of the 
eXisting world. it is no more than the projection of the mind. 
Therefore, the doctrine of participation can be considered 
the center and summit of Marcelts philosophical peregrination. He 
has made this explicit in the letter previously mentioned: "It is 
participation which had priority in my thoue~t 
• • • 
"and fI 
. .' . 
in no way was this a question of participation in an Idea, but of 
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participation in Be1ng.,,22 In the course of the thesis we have 
seen the sign1:C1cance of these remarks and can agre~; now with Mar-
eel's own estimate of its importance in his doctrine. 
This notion of participation ca.n be taken tn two senses. The 
first 1s participation in the concrf)tenesa of existing, which es-
tablishes Marcel's doctrine as realist. The other is participa.tio~ 
in being. 
I/...areel terms concrete lJl rticipation in existence participation 
immer~ee. This participation, !.;·assively considered, 1s my body 
with concomitant sensation and feelIng immersed in and open to ex-
ist1np:'reality. Consequently, I !!!! my body, and my body 1s part of 
the concretely existing universe. If I consider my body only as 
myselt', this participation immergee is merely subJective. However, 
,r'" 
this would be to destroy my situation in the world. Fot' my body 
i. also the t'ulcrum for all other existents. Participation immer-
~ must, then, also be considered act1vely. I not only submit to 
existing reality but I must re-create other existents in myself, 
and make them pa.rt of my own existence. And so W6 have the philo-
sophy of lfeprouve or ~ sommes. 
2. Participation emergee 
Marcel's doc trine of participation in the second :16nse 1s more 
22Marcel, letter to the author, December 4, 19.54: "Cfest la 
partloiDation qui dans ma pensee posseda 10. priorite ••• ft ft ••• 
11 n t ets'lt nullement question de participation a 1 'Idee, mais de 
participation 1 ltEtre." 
f 
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abundant and fruitful than in the first. In fact, many of his more 
fundamental notions can be understood fully only in the lir:ht of 
this further participation. To develop it at len~th, however, 
rwould take us far beyond the thesis. Consequently, this pregnant 
idea can only be delineated here in brief. 
Father Troisfontaines has very well expressed the relationship 
rt;etween these two types of participation. "Are we not forced once 
~gain to recognize that our entire life is unfolded in the stage 
loetween the primordial uni ty of immersed. partioipa tion, which ia 
~reconsclous (existence) and. the final unity of emerged EarticiEa-
tion, consciously and willingly re-created (being)?,,23 Rising out 
pf immersed participation a free, conscious being may emerge from 
~is existing reality to participate in the fullness of being. This 
~articipation in being Marcel terms participation emergee. The 
iSeing in which the individual participates ~.s tho fullness of what 
~s, an upsurge of joy, wh~t I !m when I am most myself. When I 
.' 
rise above the merely existing world of immersed participation, I 
~et most fully, consciously, .freely, re-creating my own being. 
This being, which 1s part of mysel~ is only partially developed in 
~yself. Moreover, it is distinct .from my existence. My being must 
~e looked upon as a g1ft. ~lis gift, this grace or being, 1s 80me-
, ,2J!rolsfontaines, Q! !'exlstence, p. 331. "Ne sommes-nous pas 
~enes a reoonnattre, una fois encore, que touts notre vie se 
tieroule au stade intermediaire entre ltunite primordiale de la Ear-
ticipation immerges, preconsciente (l'''fexistence) et lfunite finale 
de la participation emerp,ee, consciemment, vOlontierement recrdee (lletre)?" 
--
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thing which "is put in peril from tho first moment of my existence, 
but which can be saved, only, however, on condition thnt lt has 
already b~en saved. That reality ••• is my soul.,,24 
Since the re-creating and saving of his soul, i.e., his being, 
is so closely bound up with man's freedom, a short exp~anation of 
an individual fS freedom is here in place. In general M:arcel dis-
tinguishes between non-authentic and authentic freedom in a man. 
These two notions parallel the division of the realms of Problem 
and Mystery. Non-authentic freedom is in the ob;1ectivized realm 01 
problems. ~lUB it can be analyzed as an objective universal pred-
ioate. Choice, described as free because made without external 
com.pulsion, is the aot of this unauthentic freedom. 
Authentic treeder"!, however, is that freedom moa t referred to 
In this thesis. Authentic :freedom is in the realm of Mystery. 
Tr'ererore authentio freedom is the non-objective, pe'rsonal,. realm 
" 
of the self. Consequently, authentic"freedom is inseparable from 
the realm of bein~ and values. The exercise of this freedom is 
possible only when I am most myself, when '! have an interior pleni-
tude, when I am in the presence of and in conmrunion with God. As 
I am my being, I am my freedom. A person will use this freedom 
rarely, and only in a most significant oreative situation in which 
~e chooses to re.create his oml being. Therefore it follows that. 
24Marcel, Journal metaph:y:sigue, p. 282: "Quelque chose est mis 
en peril des le moment o~ j'existe, mais peut aussi etre sauve et 
ns sera meme qU'a condition dtavolr ate sauve: Cette reallte •• 
• o'est mon arne." 
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eYen in the faoe ot external oompulsion one oan still be authenti-
oally free. The essence of man is his freedom. Since my freedom 
is my being, and my being is my soul, my freedom is the soul of my 
soul. 2S 
Since the gIft of being, or soul, is only partially developed 
in dIfr.~ent eXistents, Marcel ~ust distinguish a "slope" of being, 
as he terms it. At the foot of the slope are things which merely 
exi.t. Ascending the slope, man finds his plaoe as both sharing 
in existence through body and, in some partially developed manner, 
in being through soul. As man exercises his creative froeedom in 
co-operation with the gift, the grace Riven to him as soul, he oan 
gradually oome into the :rullnese of being and more and rl.ore olose 
the gap between his existenoe and his being. However, no ~atter 
~ow muoh a person tries, at least in this life, the gap will never 
b. closed. Only at the very summit of the slope is there One who 
" do •• not exist, but Who I.s--~ Suprem!ssimum--"I am Who am." Con-
sequently, this ~ealm ot Being, this realm of partiCipation in the 
plenitude, the fullne.s ot what is, becomes the realm of value 
.here t1"uth, goodness, hope, and. faith are found. This 113 the 
realm of the "Thou," where being communicates with being in the 
~nt.1"aubjeotiVlty of lOVe, and where oreature communicates with 
tne Oreator through loving contemplation and prayer. 
2.$1"01" a thorough discussion of t'reedlJm in Marcel, see Trois-
fontaine.' De l'exlstence !!t~, It 316-330. 
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EVALUATION 
In concll~ionJ what should be said of Gabriel Marcel's con-
tribution to the historical and doctrinal continuity of Qhilosophia 
loerrenis, the sum-deposit of philosophical truth built up by the 
insights of thinkers of' all generations? It must be concluded 
that Marcelts contribution has been chiefly the illumination of 
~uman subjective experience. This is the opinion, too, of Jacques 
Mar1ta1n: ttIn the order of genuine phenomenology (where moral and 
p8ycho,1~glcal analys1s is really an approach to :;ntological prob-
lems and where the very purity of' an unprejudiced investigation 
~llows philosophy to plumb human experience and to isolate its real 
~eaning and values) this Crlristlan existentialism is past master, 
~nd it contributes very valuable discoveries.,,26 Human experience 
~s tne promised land which leads man beyond himself if he will 
!enter wi thin himself through recollect,io.n and find there ihe Ab-
solute Presence. This is munts true worth. As Marcel says: "And 
this explains at last what I said earlier about experience being 
like a. promised land: it has to become, as i~,,~re, its own beyond 
inasmuoh as it has to tranSMute itself and makes its own con-
quest."21 
Man is thus ~ _V.i.a_t_or_ driven on, by the exlgence for exist- , 
j 
'I 
': ence and being experienced in himself, to a deeper and closer 
26Yarltain, ~istence ~ ~ Existent, pp. 129-130. 
21Maroel, Philosoph: 2! Existence, p. 96. 
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partic1pation in the reality of existents and in the transcendent 
reality ot Being itselt. Man is not sum but sursum, and this ul-
-
timate participation in the Transcendent Being sheds new light on 
our notions ot faith. Markus stresses this contribution as the 
reason why Maroel is oalled a Christian existentialist. "What is 
meant is more 11ke what we usually try to say when we call st. 
Thomas a Christian phl1osopher. In both, the philosophy is dev-
eloped without reoourse to the tenets of taith, yet, somehow, en-
ergized trom within by a drive towards the faith and the supernat-
ural. The result is a philosophy capable of standing on its own 
teet; not based on revelation, but on the natural use of our in-
tellectual faculties, and yet open to, and completed by the super-
natural. Our Christian taith finds itself thoroughly at home in 
both St. Thomas's and Marcel's universe.,,28 
In the light of Marcel's dootri~e, man can never fulfill the 
.. 
description given of him by Bertrand RUssell. tiMan is the product 
ot oauses whioh had no prevision of the end they were aohieving; 
• • • his origin, his growth, his hopes and rears, his loves and 
his beliets, are but the outcome ot accidental collocation ot atoms; 
••• no fire, no her01sm, no intensity of thou~ht and teeling, 
CA.tl preserve an individual life beyond the ~r"aveJ " • " all the 
" 
" 
labors ot the ages, ail~·the devotion, allthe inspiration. all the 
no~nday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinotion in 
28Robert Markus, flThe Metaphysios of Love, a Study of Gabriel 
Marcel," !h! Tablet, CXCIX (May 20, 1950), 401-402. 
the va.st death of the solar sys tem, and • • • the Vi.hole temple of 
man's achievment must inevitably be buried beneath the debris of 
a universe in ruins. n29 
Marcel has as his purpose, then, the illumination of individ-
ual human experience. }I'or this reason, to ask whether 1.1arcel fS 
realist approach is philosophically valid is to ask a meaningless 
question. A starting point cannot be properly demonstrated, it 
can only be explained. This explanation must, furthermore, be con 
ducted in the lig-,ht of universal concepts. Suet: universa.lity is 
fundamentally inconsistent wIth the e:;q..ierience or the individual 
man in M'areel's doctrine .. To answer the question each individual 
must reflect upon his own experience, and in the li~ht of his find 
ings, judge whether Marcel's realism is valid. 
Marcel's doctrine should not, and 1rr.1.ll not t'f~ accepted as a 
whole. Rather, as Collins says of e~is tenti!dism in general, we 
"will probably benefit most not by a.dopting any form of existenti-
alism !ll ~ but rather by appropriating the insi~lts of existen-
tialism within our own scientlric and philosophical contexts. Yet 
we cannot allow its distinctive contribution to disappear in the 
process or be watered down. The existentialists are primarily 
~'lOralists of a strenuous breed. Theirs is the salutary warning 
that knowledge i3 not everything for man, that it only heightens 
29Bertrand Russell, "Mysticism and Logic," Hibbert Journal, 
XII (July 1914>,41. 
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the need for mature choice and a. responsible use of' freedo!':l.It)O 
Thus Marcel presents inslphts into the s"C:f.bjective experience of 
overy man unequalled perhaps by any othor ;.:.1' i.o: opher. His is the 
illumination of the individual man's situation on this earth--
aomo Viator. The themes of self-creativity, faith, hope, love, are 
all Chris tian themes developed by a ea t..}lOlic and e;i va us" both 
patholics and ~~omlsts, a profound and useful complement for our 
own doctrine. But we must remain ale""'t to the danger of reinter-
iPretine, ohanging, VIa tering aown the doc trines of ~1arcel to .fi t 
our own systems. For t'l.e personal ordeal of which he speaks does 
Inot lend itself to violence. Thf!3 teachtngs of Gahriel '~arcel must 
!be verified, not by a process of ahstractii!O conceptu.s.l s.nalysis 
~nd deductive syllogistic proo.fn, but by tho lived realit:r of' each 
~ndividual man. 
3'Ocol11ns,"APpeal of Existentialism," p. 9. 
r 
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APPENDIX I 
A LETTER TO THE AUTHOR FROM GABRIEL MARCEL 
1e 4 Decembre 1954 
Cher Monsieur, 
Je re~ois votre lettre et veux y repondre sans tarder. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
N.s.ia je puis des a present repondre d 'une facon tout a fait 
categorique a votre question. C'est la participation qui dans ma 
pensee posseda la priorite at non l'intantiona1ite. Je me rappelle 
du reate trea bien n'avoir decouvert l'intentionalite qu'en lisant 
les reflexions sur l'inte11igence de Maritain. Je ne crois pas me 
tromper en dIsant que sur Ie plan epistemologique t mIme dans Existence at Objectlvlte, je m'en tenais au fond 4 une ligne de 
pensee kantIenne. if me para!t aujourdfhui que 1& participatIon SE 
preaentait au fond a moi comme tranecendante par rapport a 1foppos. 
Ition de eujet et de l'objet. Et cecl remonte tres loIn. Car j'aj 
un reper. chrono1oglque precIs. Je me souviens que lorsque jtallaj 
rendre visite t auesit&t apres avolr ete requ a l'Agregation, donc en ete 1910, a MonsIeur Darlu, qul avalt ete un des membras de mon jury, lorequ t l1 m'interrogea sur mes p~ojets, je luI repondis que 
je me proposals de traval1eur sur la participation. Je vis aussl-
tat qU'il ne comprenait pas de quoi je parlais et qu'i1 prenait ce 
mot dans une acception platonicienne. Je lui dis alors qu'11 n' 
etalt nul1ement question de participation a l'Idee, mais de parti-
cipation a l'Etre. ----
Je dois dire du reste que, lorsque je me replonge. comme je 
viens de le faire, dans ces ecrits qui sont tous la preparation de 
1a Premiere Partie du Journal Metaphysique, J'eprouve comma une 
sensation dtecoeurement. Cec! est lie essentiellement ! 1a pauv-
rete et a l'insuffisance de la terminologie. Je restais a10rs en 
efret prisonnier d'un certain langage d'ail1eurs vacillant (waver-
ing) entre 1e neo-criticisme et le neo-hege1ianisme. Et i1 me 
paralt aujourd'hul que, muni de ce mauvais equipement, je tentais 
peniblement de me frayer un chemin vers una certaine issue, une 
certaine lumlere dont je n'avais que le pressentiment comme 
Informulab1e. 
/ 
b 
De touts maniere, je tians a voua dire roa gratitude pour le 
travail que vous avez entrepris, at je serais haureux de pouvoir 
vous aider. 
Veuillez oroire, cher Monsieur, a l'assuranee de mes senti-
~ents bien sympathiques. 
21, rue de Tournon 
Paris, 68. 
Gabriel Maroel 
APPENDIX II 
A LETTER TO THE AUTHOR FROM ROGER TROISFONTAINES, S.J. 
Mon bien ohar Pere, P.C. 
Namur, 59, rue de Bruxelles, 
30-X-1954 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Pour oe qui est de la question traitee dans votre these, je Ie 
orois fort interessante. C'est vous qui eolairerez 1& dootrine de 
Maroel sur Ie sujet. A mon avis, ls. desoription phenomenologique 
de 1a pensee manifeste en elle oette self-transoendenoe que vous 
relevez, mals n'est-oe pas paroe que la pensee n'emerge elle-meme 
que tardivement 8. 1 f interieur d'une participation (existentielle) 
qutelle contribuera a rendre ontologique? 8i bien que lorsque 
j'eoris "la participation suppose Is. realite de I f autre-que-moi," 
eela ne veut pas dire necessairement que oette realite de Itautre-
que-moi est reoonnue dfabord, independamment de toute partioipa-
tion. Cela signifie plutot que la participation dont je prends peu 
l peu oonsoienoe mais qui "existait" avant oette prise de oon-
scienoe, oondamne dej~ toute pretention solipsiste ou m~me ideal-
iste. t'idee est intentionnelle paro~qu'el1e surglt a l'~.nteri­
eur de cette partioipation primitive. ,Beulement, c'est a vous d' 
etablir si l-etude phenomenologi~ue de oette intentionalite suffit 
a I1prouveru la participation et lit refuter l'idealisme, et - seconde 
question, dtordre historique - si c'est ~ partir de l'intentional-
ita que M. Maroel a retrouve la partici~ation ou au oontraire si c' 
est de 18. partioipation qu'il est venu a reconnattre Itintentional-
it&. En fait, je ne saurais repo~dre avee certitude i at comme il 
stagit un peu du reoto et du vera:> d'une meme rea.1ite, je suis ten-t. de croire que les deux ont progresse paralle13ment. Mais votre 
traval1nous eclairera sur oe point. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Cordialement votre in Chrito 
Bon travail! 
R. Troisfontaines, S.J. 
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APPENDIX III 
.. THE OMITTED PASSAGE IN LE MYSTERE DE LfETRE, VOLUME I, CHAPTER IV. 
......... --- ..... -
L:&'"'TTER TO THE AUTHOR FROM THE ENGIJISH TRANSLATOR, 
GEORGE S. FRASER 
July 31st, 1957 
Dear Father Crocker, 
Please forgive my delay in answering your letter of the 13th, 
hleh has just reached me. Gabriel Marcel delivered the first 
atch of his Gifford Lectures at Aberdeen in, I think, the summer 
term of 1949 and made his own, very ecoentric and original English 
translation (his personality is a charming one ••• ). The Harvil 
Press ••• asked me at first to reshape his English version - this 
was in the late autumn of 1949 - and when I found that almost in-
comprehensible got me the original French version. i'f;a.rcel had al-
ready begun to revise that, and there were several detached pa.ges 
and paragraphs, to be inserted at various spots, for which English 
aquivalents had not, I gathered, been delivered in the original 
lectures. Both English and French versions were typescripts ••• 
ith a number of ink additions and corpections. I worked on my 
version in London towards the end of 1949 and (the bulk of it) on 
a Glenn Line steamer-'tng to Japan, between the Port of London 8.!1 
Singapore, in the early weeks of 1950. I sent my translation and 
Marcel's original English and French typescripts baok from Singa-
pore. I haven't seen the published French text, but if it was not 
ublished until 1951 the probability is that Marcel did a good deal 
of cutting and polishing before publishing the French version; I 
am surprised, however, that he should have omitted a passage whioh, 
ike you, I found eloquent and significant and also about as near 
as he gets to a clear abstract statement of one of his central 
positions (his hatred for "abstraotion" as such - would that be an 
explanation?) But oertainly the passage was there in his original 
typesoript of 1949 and I didn't, for instance, make it up myself! 
• • •• I was scrupulously faithful to his thought, and to what 
one might call the rhythm of his mind. So the only feasible 
explanation is that the passage was there in the 1949 version and 
151 
152 
that he took it out in the French 1951 version. One other rather 
sinister possibility does, however, occur to me •••• there were 
some loose pages of }l'renoh typescript to be inserted at various 
points; just possibly the passage you allude to may have been one 
of them; • • • somewhere between Singapore and London and Pnris, 
to which the Ha:rvil1 Press will ha.ve returned Marcel his type-
scripts the re1eva.nt page or paragraph may have got mislaid! 
I am af:raid this is rather complex, but I hope at least it 
reassures you that the passage is, in its original - whether dis-
carded or lost - authentic Marcel • 
• • • • For a non-philosopher like myself - a poet, a critio, 
and a. man of lettel's - he is one of the most attractive of con-
temporary phi1osophe:rs I know. 
Sincerely yours, 
George Fraser 
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